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INTRODUCTION
The 1980s bore witness to a dramatic upsurge in interest in the
proper roles of the President and Congress in controlling the execu-
tion of the law.  Much of the initial scholarship focused on the consti-
tutionality of the so-called independent agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, which theoretically operate outside of direct presi-
dential control.1  Interest was fanned still further by the Supreme
Court decision in INS v. Chadha2 striking down the legislative veto, as
well as the decision in Bowsher v. Synar3 invalidating the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act’s attempt to lodge executive authority in an agent of
Congress.  The proper scope of presidential power also arose in Clin-
ton v. City of New York,4 which invalidated Congress’s attempt to give
the President the power to make line-item vetoes.  The President’s
constitutional authority also arose in a series of high-profile Supreme
Court cases addressing the legality of detaining “enemy combatants”
in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon.  The Court did not reach the merits of the
constitutional issues, resolving those cases on either statutory5 or juris-
dictional6 grounds.
But the importance of this issue has been underscored most spec-
tacularly by the controversy surrounding the use of independent
1 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 19, 31–36; Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter
M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608–23 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Paul
R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779;
Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215; Symposium,
The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277
(1987).
2 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
5 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rul-
ing that because the President had statutory authority to detain persons designated
enemy combatants, the Court did not need to address the scope of the President’s
constitutional authority to do so). But see id. at 2675–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the plurality’s support for presidential authority in this area, but bas-
ing it instead on constitutional rather than statutory grounds).
6 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004) (ruling that because the
district court lacked jurisdiction, the Court did not need to address the President’s
authority to detain enemy combatants); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004)
(reserving decision on the scope of the President’s power to detain aliens captured
outside of the United States).
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counsels permitted to enforce federal law outside of presidential con-
trol.7  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the inde-
pendent counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson8 despite a powerful
dissent by Justice Scalia warning of the dangers of politically motivated
investigations.9  The years that followed appeared to bear out Justice
Scalia’s dire predictions, as accusations mounted that the indepen-
dent counsel process had been subverted for political purposes,10
climaxing in the barrage of recriminations prompted by the role of
the independent counsel in the impeachment of President Clinton.
Further controversy was forestalled when the statute authorizing inde-
pendent counsels was allowed to lapse in 1999.11
The more recent scholarly commentary has largely centered on
whether the Constitution created a “unitary executive,” in which all
executive authority is centralized in the President.  Participants in the
debate have examined the text12 and ratification history13 of the Con-
7 For early commentary on the constitutionality of independent counsels, see
generally TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: EXECU-
TIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789–1989 (1989); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A
Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Shane,
supra note 1, at 598–608; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as R
Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983).
8 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
9 Id. at 712–14, 727–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10 See Benjamin Ginsberg & Martin Shefter, Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11
J.L. & POL. 497 (1995).  For an analysis of the impact of the political abuse of inde-
pendent counsels for the separation of powers, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Norma-
tive Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi,
Some Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L.
& POL. 521 (1995).
11 For an analysis of the rise and fall of the independent counsel statute, see
Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Fourth Half-Century,
1945–2004, 91 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
12 Compare, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 1377 (1994) (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause, bolstered by other
constitutional provisions, represents a substantive grant of constitutional power),
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (relying on the Vesting Clause of Article II to argue for the
existence of a unitary executive), and Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992)
(concluding that the Article II Vesting Clause represents a power grant to the Execu-
tive), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47–55, 119 (1994) (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi’s views),
and A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
1346 (1994) (arguing against Professor Calabresi’s position).
13 Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 603–05 (arguing that the R
pre-ratification history supports the unitary executive), and Saikrishna Prakash, The
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stitution to determine whether the Constitution rejected the plural
executive employed by the Articles of Confederation and many state
constitutions in favor of a structure in which all administrative author-
ity was concentrated in a single person.14  To the extent that commen-
tators have examined the post-ratification practices with respect to this
issue, they have tended to focus primarily on the practices during the
presidential administrations immediately following the Founding.15
Increasingly, commentators have looked beyond the Founding
era and have begun to assess the implications of the broader sweep of
history.  Some scholars, most notably Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sun-
stein, have argued that the increase in discretionary, policy-making
authority wielded by administrative agencies has strengthened the
case in favor of the unitary executive.16  Others have drawn the oppo-
site conclusion, arguing that the increased policymaking functions of
the modern administrative state justify allowing Congress more lati-
tude in insulating agencies from presidential control.17  Still others
suggest that, regardless of the underlying merits, arguments in favor
of the unitary executive have been foreclosed by the sweep of more
than two centuries of constitutional history.18  In making these argu-
Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 753–89, 808–12 (arguing
that eighteenth century Americans and political theorists viewed the executive power
as unitary), with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1755–810 (1996) (drawing the opposite conclusion), and Abner S. Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138–53 (1994)
(arguing that the President’s executive power ought to be interpreted in light of the
increased role in lawmaking engaged in by the executive branch).
14 It is interesting to note that the conclusion that the Constitution of 1787 estab-
lished a unitary executive has found general acceptance among courts, see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 110–34 (1926); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405–06
(D.C. Cir. 1981), among historians, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 250–53, 257–58 (1996), and even
among leading critics of the unitary executive, see Strauss, supra note 1, at 599–601; R
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432–33
(1987).
15 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 635–63; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in R
Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211
(1989); Gerhard Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency
of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1995); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras:
Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 82–111
(1993); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 5–84; Prakash, supra note 13, at 789–800. R
16 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 93–106. R
17 See Flaherty, supra note 13, at 1816–21; Greene, supra note 13, at 153–95; R
Strauss, supra note 1. R
18 See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
180 n.35 (1994) (noting that “more than 200 years of practice under the Constitu-
tion . . . render a strict separation [of powers] impossible”); Flaherty, supra note 13, at R
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ments, some of these scholars have acknowledged the incompleteness
of the current historical literature and have recognized the need for a
more complete assessment of the historical record of presidential con-
trol over the execution of the law.19
We have attempted to fill this void by embarking on a four-article
series examining the history of the President’s ability to execute the
law.  In The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century,20 we analyzed
the first seven presidencies under the Constitution to determine the
view of presidential power held by the incumbents between 1789 and
1837.  In so doing, we paid particular attention to what is generally
recognized to be the first great clash between the President and Con-
gress over control of the administration of the law: Andrew Jackson’s
removal of his Treasury Secretary during his battle with the Bank of
the United States.21  We continued our project in The Unitary Executive
During the Second Half-Century,22 beginning with Martin Van Buren’s
presidency in 1837 up through the end of Grover Cleveland’s first
term in 1889.  In the process, we offered an extended discussion of
the second great conflict over the unitary executive: the impeachment
of Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act.23
Our analysis employs the interpretive method known as “depart-
mentalism” or “coordinate construction,” which holds that all three
branches of the federal government have the power and duty to inter-
pret the Constitution and that the meaning of the Constitution is de-
termined through the dynamic interaction of all three branches.24
This approach asks whether a long-standing and unbroken practice
exists in which both Congress and the Presidents have acquiesced.  If
1816 (suggesting that a common law constitutionalist would regard the past 200 years
of practice under the Constitution “dispositive” in foreclosing the unitary vision of the
Executive); Tiefer, supra note 7, at 103 (“From the creation of the government’s struc- R
ture by the First Congress, through the development of the modern agency, and
down to the present, the status of agencies has not been a unitary or monolithic
one.”). But see Miller, supra note 1, at 83–86 (finding past Presidents’ failure to con- R
sistently oppose independent agencies problematic, but ultimately insufficient to con-
stitute acquiescence).
19 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 84 n.334 (noting that “a full account of R
the growth of presidential power” would allow consideration of “the enormously sig-
nificant and self-conscious changes in the role of the presidency from the period fol-
lowing Jackson through Franklin Roosevelt”).
20 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
21 Id. at 1538–59.
22 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Sec-
ond Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667 (2003).
23 Id. at 746–58.
24 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1463–72. R
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so, that practice may be justifiably regarded as part of the structure of
our government.25  In this respect, our methodology is the same as
the one followed by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,26 which
relied on the fact that eleven of thirteen Presidents from Woodrow
Wilson to Ronald Reagan had refused to accede to the legislative veto
when rejecting arguments that the legislative veto had become an es-
tablished practice in which all three branches had acquiesced.27  Ac-
cording the legislative and executive branches a role in constitutional
interpretation is particularly appropriate with respect to the separa-
tion of powers.  Because the Supreme Court is often an interested
party in separation of powers disputes, permitting it to act as the final
arbiter would contravene the jurisprudential rule against permitting
parties from being judges in their own causes.
Toward this end, we examined the claim implicit in many attacks
on the unitary executive that a custom, tradition, and practice
emerged during the first century of our Republic which “amounts to a
presidential acquiescence in the existence of a congressional power to
(at times) limit the President’s removal power and curtail his other
constitutionally granted mechanisms of control over law execution.”28
Our historical account focused primarily on the three devices gener-
ally viewed as necessary to any theory of the unitary executive: the
President’s power to remove subordinate policy-making officials at
will, the President’s power to direct the manner in which subordinate
officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the President’s
power to veto or nullify such officials’ exercises of discretionary execu-
tive power.29  Where appropriate, we also discussed presidential exer-
cises of the foreign affairs power, which derives largely from the
Article II Vesting Clause, the same constitutional foundation as the
President’s power to execute the law.30  The question is not whether
there was consensus among all three branches of government as to
25 For the classic statement of this position, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459, 474 (1915).  For other examples, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
668–69, 686 (1981), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
679–83 (1929), Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170–76 (1926), and Stuart v. Laird, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
26 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
27 Id. at 942 n.13.
28 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1457 (emphasis omitted). R
29 Id. at 1458.
30 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252–65 (2001); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676–78 (2002). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Fla-
herty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
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the President’s control of the removal power and of the powers to
direct and nullify.  Rather, we evaluated whether a consistent three
branch anti-unitarian custom, tradition, or practice emerged in which
Presidents have acquiesced sufficient to trump the constitutional text
and the original design.
Our first two articles demonstrated that the twenty-two American
Presidents from George Washington through the first Administration
of Grover Cleveland strongly believed in the President’s sole authority
to control execution of the law and did not hesitate to wield the mech-
anisms essential to any theory of the unitary executive.  In particular,
we proved that from 1789 to 1889, each President asserted a broad
presidential power to remove subordinate officials exercising execu-
tive policy-making power for any reason, including policy disagree-
ments.  We also showed that many of these twenty-two Presidents also
asserted other presidential powers of control over law execution in-
cluding the issuing of binding orders to subordinates to take particu-
lar actions and the nullifying of particular actions taken by
subordinates.
We now pick up the historical account where we left off in the
two prior articles and examine the views of the presidencies during
the third half-century of our constitutional history, beginning with
Benjamin Harrison and ending with Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  In
the process, we offer an extended analysis of FDR’s failed attempt in
1937 and 1938 to implement the Brownlow Committee’s proposal to
reorganize the executive branch, an event that is typically acknowl-
edged as the next key battle between the President and Congress over
control of the execution of the law.31
The period covered by this Article represents the crux of the de-
bate over whether our history under the Constitution has given rise to
an established practice vitiating the unitary executive.  It is during this
period that two events generally assumed to be inconsistent with the
unitary executive—the emergence of independent agencies32 and the
2004) (challenging the argument that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the Presi-
dent residual power over foreign affairs).
31 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2274–75
(2001); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 84 n.334; Miller, supra note 1, at 79, 85. R
32 See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236 (2000) (arguing
that independent agencies have a sufficient historical pedigree to justify regarding
them as an established constitutional practice); Strauss, supra note 1, at 578 (“Almost R
fifty years of experience has accustomed lawyers and judges to accepting the indepen-
dent regulatory commissions, in the metaphor, as a ‘headless “fourth branch”’ of gov-
ernment.” (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1937))).  It is a common
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 8  8-DEC-04 13:46
8 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
extension of civil service protections to federal employees33—were
thought to become more widespread.  This period also bore witness to
the appointment of special prosecutors on three occasions, as well as
the rapid expansion of the federal bureaucracy spurred by the New
Deal.  Many constitutional theorists, led by Bruce Ackerman, regard
these changes to be so sweeping as to constitute a “constitutional mo-
ment” that implicitly ratified major changes in the allocation of power
within the federal government.34
Although many scholars assert that these developments effectively
foreclose any arguments in favor of the unitary executive as a matter
of history, the closer examination of the historical record laid out in
this Article reveals that such assertions are too blithe.  Instead, what
emerges is a largely consistent pattern of presidential insistence on
the unitariness of the executive branch and a general willingness by
Presidents to defend their sole authority to control the execution of
the law.
This period also bore witness to a fundamental shift in the bal-
ance of power between Congress and the President.  At the com-
mencement of the era addressed by this Article, Congress had clearly
emerged as the victor in its battle with the presidency over Recon-
misconception that the history of independent agencies began with the creation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887.  This conclusion is wrong in two
respects.  First, there was precedent for entities, such as the Second Bank of the
United States, that enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the federal government.  As
we have noted earlier, however, the President’s ability to remove federal funds from
the Bank provided him with a mechanism with which to retain control of the execu-
tion of federal law.  Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1539 n.309.  Second, the origi- R
nal ICC was placed in the Department of the Interior and does not appear to have
been regarded as independent by either the President or Congress. See Calabresi &
Yoo, supra note 22, at 797–99.  As this article demonstrates, the ICC did not become R
even arguably independent until well after 1887.
33 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 582 (“The civil service . . . may appropriately R
be regarded as the fourth effective branch of government . . . .”).  It is another com-
mon misconception that limits on the power to remove federal employees began with
the Civil Service Act of 1883.  As we have pointed out, the original Act did not provide
federal employees with any protection against removal aside from prohibiting the fir-
ing of employees for refusing to make political contributions. See Calabresi & Yoo,
supra note 22, at 788–89.  As we shall see, the civil service system did not place limits R
on the President’s removal power until well after the end of the period covered by this
Article.
34 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105–08 (1991);
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799,
845–96 (1995); Flaherty, supra note 13, at 1819–21. R
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struction.35  It would not be until the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury that the presidency (particularly in the figures of Theodore
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt) would reemerge
from the shadow of congressional dominance in the aftermath of the
Civil War.
Furthermore, a number of external forces began to transform the
basic relationship between Congress and the President.  Domestically,
the rise of large industrial corporations sparked, for the first time,
calls for strong central regulation, which in turn provided the impetus
for a concomitant expansion of the federal bureaucracy.  America’s
emergence as an international power also strengthened the case for
stronger centralized control.  As a result, Americans in general began
to look to the President not simply as an administrator, but rather as
the locus of political leadership and the predominant voice in shaping
public policy.
As a result of these changes, the character of America changed as
well.  The country became more national and international in its fo-
cus and more homogenous in its character.  As the country changed,
so too did the presidency.  As America became more imperial, her
presidents took on an imperial persona as well.  One might say that
much of the potential for presidential power that existed implicitly in
the first two periods comes to be actualized in the dominant figures of
this third period.  These figures thereby set the tone for the Executive
that will be seen in the fourth and final period.
Thus, with the onset of the twentieth century, the presidency un-
derwent a dramatic transformation.  The nation’s increasing industri-
alization and the emergence of the United States as a world power
made a strong chief executive more important than ever.  With the
increasing influence of the mass media, the President also began to
emerge as a leader of public opinion.  The presidency expanded to fill
these new roles and, in the process, continued to defend its power to
control the execution of the laws.
We begin in Parts I through X below with a discussion of the ten
presidencies between 1889 and 1945.  We conclude in Part XI below
with a discussion of the Brownlow Committee and of President Frank-
lin Roosevelt’s unsuccessful effort to abolish the independent agen-
cies and merge them into the executive branch.
35 See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869–1901, at 45–48 (1958);
Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422,
447–50 (2000).
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-DEC-04 13:46
10 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
I. BENJAMIN HARRISON
When Benjamin Harrison became the first and only grandson of
a President to be elected to the presidency, many Americans were un-
certain how much to expect from him.  Harrison had been selected by
the electoral college after losing the popular vote to Grover Cleve-
land.  Moreover, Harrison had had only a short career in national
politics before assuming the presidency.
Any doubts about Harrison’s willingness to take responsibility for
executing the law would prove short lived.  As Harrison’s biographers,
Homer Socolofsky and Allan Spetter report:
Benjamin Harrison lacked experience as an administrator and
had had only six years in Washington as a United States senator by
the time he became president.  Thus, political observers concluded
that he would defer on many issues to members of his cabinet who
had been long in the public eye.  Halfway through his presidency
the skepticism about Harrison’s ability to lead his own administra-
tion had changed.  By then it was recognized that he was absolutely
the head in his administration.  Harrison was sure of his position.
While he did not interfere in the departmental work of members of
his cabinet, neither would he permit any encroachment on his over-
all presidential power.36
Thus, Harrison took charge of his Administration and directed
the actions of his subordinates.  He recognized that as President he
possessed the executive power, and accordingly he told his subordi-
nates what to do.  Socolofsky and Spetter report that “Harrison would
be sensitive about his executive and administrative authority as presi-
dent and would not tolerate challenges to his power.”37
Harrison offered the most definitive statement of his attitude re-
garding the President’s sole authority to execute the law in the
memoirs that were published after he left office.  Harrison specifically
noted that the President “is responsible for all executive action.”38  Al-
though “[r]outine matters proceed without the knowledge or interfer-
ence of the President . . . if any matter of major importance arises the
Secretary presents it for the consideration and advice of the Presi-
dent.”39  The Chief Executive may make some effort to accommodate
the views of one of his cabinet members.  However, “when the Presi-
dent has views that he feels he cannot yield, those views must prevail,
36 HOMER E. SOCOLOFSKY & ALLAN B. SPETTER, THE PRESIDENCY OF BENJAMIN HAR-
RISON 84 (1987) (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 47–48.
38 BENJAMIN HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS 105 (1897).
39 Id.
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for the responsibility is his, both in a Constitutional and popular
sense.”40  Allowing cabinet members to exercise authority inconsistent
with the views of the President “would be a farming-out of his Consti-
tutional powers” to “eight Presidents” that would be inconsistent with
the Framers’ rejection of an executive council in favor of an executive
branch headed by a single figure.41
Harrison vigorously exercised his appointment power as a way of
supervising the executive branch.  Harrison “ignored the bosses,”
against whom he waged a continuing battle “over the spoils of vic-
tory—patronage.”42  Harrison personally oversaw many civil service
matters in a somewhat impractical attempt to keep personal control
over appointments43 and appointed a young Theodore Roosevelt to
the Civil Service Commission.44  He changed almost seventy-five per-
cent of the post officers and twenty-seven percent of the postmasters,
numbers comparable to those of his predecessor, Cleveland.45
It is a common misconception that the Civil Service Act of 1883
placed substantive limits on the President’s removal power.  In fact,
the Act left the President’s removal power largely unfettered, aside
from preventing him from discharging a federal employee for refus-
ing to make political contributions.46  Indeed, some of the most ar-
dent supporters of civil service stridently opposed using the civil
service system to impose limits on the President’s power to remove.
As noted by George William Curtis, who was the former Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission under Grant and perhaps the foremost
advocate of civil service reform:
Having annulled all reason for the improper exercise of the power
of dismissal, we hold that it is better to take the risk of occasional
injustice from passion and prejudice, which no law or regulation
can control, than to seal up incompetency, negligence, insubordina-
tion, insolence, and every other mischief in the service, by requiring
a virtual trial at law before an unfit or incapable clerk can be
removed.47
40 Id. at 106.
41 Id. at 70; see Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 977–78 (2001).
42 SOCOLOFSKY & SPETTER, supra note 36, at 29. R
43 Id. at 43.
44 Id. at 40.
45 Id. at 39.
46 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 788–89.  For similar acknowledgments, R
see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 149 (1974), PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 103 (1958), and Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution
Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 954–56 (1976).
47 VAN RIPER, supra note 46, at 102 (citations omitted). R
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 12  8-DEC-04 13:46
12 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
Consistent with this view, Harrison’s Civil Service Commission refused
to construe the Civil Service Act of 1883 as imposing any limits on the
President’s removal power and disclaimed any authority to investigate
non-political removals.48
Harrison also took a number of other key actions in domestic
policy that demonstrated his vigor as an executor of federal law.
Under Harrison, a number of new federal statutes were passed that
delegated substantial new powers to the executive branch.  These stat-
utes included the Sherman Antitrust Act;49 the McKinley Tariff Act,
which delegated significant powers to the President to grant exemp-
tions;50 and the Land Revision Act of 1891, which delegated to the
President the power to set aside public lands as national forests.51
Thus, the amount of delegated power that the President could control
the execution of increased dramatically during the Harrison years.
Another matter involving the unitary executive that arose during
the Harrison Administration was the extraordinary series of events
surrounding the attempted assassination of Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Field by David S. Terry.52  Terry and his wife were litigants in
a case heard by Justice Field and two other federal judges while the
Justice was riding circuit in California.  The Justice ruled against
Terry’s wife, after which Terry attempted to assault Justice Field in
open court.  In the wake of that attempt and after Terry and his wife
had been overheard making threats to kill Justice Field, Attorney Gen-
eral William Henry Harrison Miller assigned U.S. Marshal David Nea-
gle to accompany Justice Field on his travels in California and to
protect the Justice from the Terrys.  While riding a train in California,
David Terry encountered Justice Field and attacked him.  Neagle
came to Justice Field’s defense and shot Terry dead when he refused
to cease and desist.
California officials took Neagle into custody for Terry’s murder,
and Neagle sought habeas corpus relief under a federal statute that
allowed release if Neagle had killed Terry “in pursuance of a law of
the United States.”53  No statute had been enacted under which Nea-
gle was safeguarding Justice Field, but Neagle was assigned to protect
48 9 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 77 (1892); see also Richard A. Merrill, Proce-
dures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REV. 196, 212–13 (1973)
(noting that the Civil Service Commission construed the Pendleton Act strictly and
refused to investigate non-political removal).
49 ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
50 ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612 (1890).
51 ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103.
52 See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5–6, 42–54 (1890) (reviewing the facts of the case).
53 Id. at 41.
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Justice Field on the orders of the Attorney General, who had assumed
there was implied executive power to protect the officers and instru-
mentalities of the United States even in the absence of a statutory
mandate. In re Neagle thus presented the question of whether the con-
stitutional grant of the executive power to the President authorized
the President to take action despite the absence of any statutory man-
date, the same issue that would arise in the Steel Seizure Case 54 a half-
century later.  Related to this was the question whether Neagle had
killed Terry “in pursuance of a law of the United States” because the
President was validly acting under his implied presidential powers.
The Harrison Administration was in charge of litigating this case
before the Supreme Court.  Attorney General Miller argued the case
himself, maintaining:
It was the duty of the Executive Department of the United States to
guard and protect, at any hazard, the life of Mr. Justice Field in the
discharge of his duty: (1) Because such protection is essential to the
existence of the government; (2) Because it is enjoined upon the
President, as the executive, he being required “to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed;” (3) The marshal was merely the hand
of the executive, and unless protected by the marshal the courts and
judges have no protection.
The reason why I say it is the duty of the Executive Department
to protect the judicial, and why I say it has the authority so to do, is
because the power of self-preservation is essential to the very exis-
tence of the government.55
Miller mentioned Abraham Lincoln’s extraordinary actions with-
out statutory authority as support for the Harrison Administration’s
extra-statutory protection of the life of Justice Field.  He also pointed
out that the presidential oath of office requires the President to de-
fend the government, its officers, and its instrumentalities.56  He ob-
served that after Washington was inaugurated but before Congress
had met to pass any laws, the President surely had the authority to
defend the U.S. government.57  Continuing in that vein, the Attorney
General told the Court that
the President, in like manner, by the very fact that he is made the
chief executive of the nation, and is charged to protect, preserve,
and defend the Constitution, and to take care that the laws are faith-
fully executed, is invested with necessary and implied executive pow-
54 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55 Neagle, 135 U.S. at 13.
56 Id. at 14–15.
57 Id. at 15.
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 14  8-DEC-04 13:46
14 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
ers which neither of the other branches of the government can
either take away or abridge; that many of these powers, pertaining
to each branch of the government, are self-executing, and in no way
dependent, except as to the ways and means, upon legislation.58
Miller specifically argued that the Vesting Clause of Article II
grants the President the executive power of the nation and that the
Constitution further enjoins upon him the duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.  Together those two clauses give the Presi-
dent implied powers.59  If Presidents could not protect courts with the
U.S. Marshals, they would not be able to protect even themselves
against assassination attempts.  Finally, he concluded Neagle’s federal
acts in protection of Justice Field trumped state law under the princi-
ples of Cohens v. Virginia,60 Ableman v. Booth,61 and McCulloch v.
Maryland.62
These arguments to the Court by Harrison’s Attorney General
constituted a complete acceptance by the Harrison Administration of
a number of key tenets of the theory of the unitary executive.  Miller
endorsed the Lincolnian view that the Vesting Clause of Article II,
taken together with the Take Care Clause, vests the President with the
whole executive power of the nation giving the President broad, im-
plied powers to execute both the Constitution and laws.  These im-
plied, nonstatutory powers were broad enough to support Neagle’s
taking of Terry’s life.  While the Attorney General made no mention
of the implied presidential power of removal and direction per se,
that power is narrower in scope than the protective power he found
implicit in Article II.  It is inconceivable that an Administration that
endorsed Miller’s Lincolnian interpretation of Article II would not
also believe that the President had the authority to control
subordinate executive officials in their execution of federal law.  In-
deed, the Attorney General exercised precisely those powers of direc-
tion and control when he specifically told subordinates in California
to take steps to protect Justice Field by giving him a body guard.  If
Harrison had the inherent authority to order David Terry to be killed
then surely he had the lesser inherent power to remove and direct
subordinates.
The Supreme Court in Neagle enthusiastically endorsed the Harri-
son Administration’s position over the spirited dissent of Justice La-
58 Id. at 16.
59 Id.
60 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
61 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
62 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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mar joined by Chief Justice Fuller.  The Court said it did not matter
that there was no statute being executed here by the President, rea-
soning that “any obligation fairly and properly inferrible [sic] from
[the Constitution] . . . is ‘a law’ within the meaning of this phrase.”63
The Court added that it would be absurd if the Constitution did not
allow presidents to protect judges in the ordinary exercise of their
duties,64 and the Court pointed out that it was dependent on the mar-
shals to execute federal judgments.65  The Court added:
If we turn to the executive department of the government, we
find . . . [that t]he Constitution, section 3, Article 2, declares that
the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.” . . . He is declared to be commander-in-chief of the army
and navy of the United States.  The duties which are thus imposed
upon him he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in
the Constitution, and the creation by acts of Congress, of executive
departments . . . .66
The Court concluded by saying that federal law authorized Neagle to
do whatever California law would have authorized a marshal to do in
keeping the peace.67  The Court therefore affirmed the lower court in
granting habeas relief to Neagle.
The scope and nature of the majority’s ruling is underscored by
the arguments made in Justice Lamar’s dissent.  A Southerner who
may not have liked the Lincolnian arguments of the majority with re-
spect to executive and federal power, Justice Lamar argued that the
habeas statute would only protect Neagle if he had acted pursuant to a
federal statute and not if he was acting under some claim of implied
presidential power.68  Justice Lamar denied that the Executive could
act without a statute, arguing that under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress alone has the power to legislate to protect judges.69
Justice Lamar’s dissenting view was that Congress was the depository
of all the federal government’s implied lawmaking powers.  The ma-
jority ruled ringingly in favor of implied presidential power, which is
63 Neagle, 135 U.S. at 59.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 61 (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394 (1879)).
66 Id. at 63.
67 Id. at 68–69.
68 Id. at 78–79 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 82–84 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
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surely helpful to those of us who believe in an implied presidential
power to remove, direct, or nullify.70
Another case arose in the Supreme Court during the Harrison
years that has tangential relevance to our thesis.  In McAllister v. United
States,71  the Court ruled six to three that the President had the statu-
tory authority to remove a judge appointed for the territory of Alaska
before the territorial judge’s four-year statutory term of office expired.
The 1869 amendment to the Tenure of Office Act, which was still in
force at the time the dispute arose, acknowledged the President’s
right to suspend and replace any civil officer so long as the new office
holder’s nomination was submitted to the Senate within thirty days of
the commencement of its next session.72  Because the statute on its
face recognized the President’s right to remove McAllister,73 the case
did not present an occasion for the Court to address the constitution-
ality of congressional attempts to restrict the removal power.  The fact
that the Tenure of Office Act had subsequently been repealed sug-
gested that a case directly presenting the President’s power to remove
might arise in the future.  The Court discreetly declined to discuss the
issue in advance.74
One major question hanging over the Harrison Administration
was the President’s role in foreign policy given the presence of James
G. Blaine as Secretary of State.  Blaine was a towering figure in na-
tional politics who had been the GOP candidate for President in 1884,
as well as a leader of the GOP going back to the 1880 national conven-
tion.  Fortunately for Harrison, Blaine was constantly ill between 1889
and 1893.  In 1891, when Blaine was completely incapacitated, Harri-
son seized the opportunity to put his imprint on the nation’s foreign
policy.75  In fact, Socolofsky and Spetter claim:
Since the 1960s, various studies have asserted Harrison’s impor-
tance in late-nineteenth-century foreign policy—placing Blaine in
proper perspective—and have acknowledged these accomplish-
70 See also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 61–63 (1993) (relying on Neagle as support for an inherent presidential power
to protect the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the federal government).
71 141 U.S. 174 (1891).
72 Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, § 2, 16 Stat. 6, 7 (repealed 1887). See generally
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 760–63 (describing the history of this provision). R
73 The statute contained an exception for judges of the courts of the United
States. McAllister, 141 U.S. at 177.  A long line of precedents clearly holding that
territorial courts are not courts of the United States rendered this exception inappli-
cable. Id. at 180–84.
74 Id. at 178 (“What may be the powers of the President over territorial judges,
now that section 1768 is repealed, is a question we need not now discuss.”).
75 SOCOLOFSKY & SPETTER, supra note 36, at 125. R
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ments among others: his major contribution to the development of
the new navy, the establishment of the first American protectorate
in Samoa, participation in the first Pan-American Conference, and a
most successful commercial reciprocity policy.76
In addition, Socolofsky and Spetter give Harrison personal credit
for “the attempt to obtain a first naval base in the Caribbean, the en-
couragement of the construction of a Central American canal, and, of
course, the effort to annex Hawaii—not so much a failure as a final
step toward the events of 1898.”77  After Harrison dictated the nation’s
policy in unresolved disputes with Chile, Great Britain, and Italy,78
Blaine was reduced to a minimal role, in the face of which he finally
resigned.79
In sum, Harrison was an active, involved President who was in
every sense the head of his Administration.  He directly supervised the
affairs of his Administration and made large numbers of removals.
And, in In re Neagle, his Administration argued for and obtained a
Supreme Court ruling that was the Court’s broadest statement of im-
plied executive power up to that time.  In McAllister v. United States, the
Harrison Administration sought and got a broad ruling on the Presi-
dent’s statutory authority to remove territorial judges.  The Harrison
Administration thus provides strong support for the theory of the uni-
tary executive.
II. GROVER CLEVELAND’S SECOND TERM: 1893–1897
The presidential election of 1892 represented the first contest be-
tween candidates who had both seen presidential service at the time
of the election.80  Grover Cleveland was “well aware that only one
other Democrat had ever run in three consecutive presidential elec-
tions: his hero, Andrew Jackson.”81  Like Jackson, Cleveland was des-
tined to win a popular majority three times in a row—a feat that was
not exceeded until the Administration of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.82
Richard Welch, Cleveland’s biographer, emphasizes that Cleve-
land was “a latter day Jacksonian”83 who wished to be seen as a tribune
of the people.  He appreciated that the American public was wearied
76 Id. at 206–07.
77 Id. at 207.
78 Id. at 129–30, 136–52.
79 Id. at 130.
80 RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 106 (1988).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 111.
83 Id. at 118.
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of the personal quarrels and bickering that had characterized Ameri-
can politics since the Civil War and would look with favor upon a can-
didate and a president who appeared to stand tall and independent,
an example of rugged individualism and political courage.84
Cleveland had “a conception of the presidency that if not impe-
rial, was vaguely monarchical.  Convinced that the President was the
sole officer of the national government who was elected by ‘all the
people,’ he felt an obligation jealously to safeguard and protect the
prerogatives of the presidential office for his successors.”85  For this
reason, Welch reports that “Republican cartoons often portrayed
Cleveland in the toga of a Roman emperor, and there was a general
belief that Cleveland was exerting the authority of the presidential of-
fice and intervening in legislative policy in an unprecedented man-
ner.”86  Welch concludes: “There can be little dispute that Cleveland
dominated the executive branch of the government during both of
his administrations.”87  He adds that “Cleveland was successful in as-
serting the autonomy of the presidency, and he was unsuccessful in
achieving executive-legislative collaboration.”88
As a good Jacksonian Democrat, Grover Cleveland was a staunch
defender of the President’s removal power and of the unitary execu-
tive.  In fact, as we described in The Unitary Executive During the Second
Half-Century, Cleveland had obtained the actual repeal of the Tenure
of Office Act during his first term and took a wide range of other
measures to defend the President’s authority to execute the law.89
Cleveland thus took office for the second time in 1893 as a committed
friend of the unitary executive.
For our purposes, the most important domestic issue of Cleve-
land’s second term was his use of federal troops in Chicago in July
1894 to assure the free movement of railroad traffic and the end of
the Pullman strike.90  This strike was a major labor action caused by
the extraordinary wage cuts enacted by the Pullman Car Company,
which led to a strike of its employees and a sympathy strike by mem-
bers of the American Railway Union led by the socialist Eugene V.
Debs.  Debs persuaded railway union workers to boycott any train that
carried a Pullman car.91  Richard Welch reports that by “the early days
84 Id. at 214.
85 Id. at 215.
86 Id. at 218.
87 Id. at 217.
88 Id. at 219.
89 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 790–801. R
90 WELCH, supra note 80, at 141–47. R
91 Id. at 142.
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of July, rail traffic to and from Chicago was at ten percent of its usual
volume, the federal mails were seriously obstructed, and the Chicago
Tribune was denouncing Debs as an anarchist who had dictatorial
ambitions.”92
The Cleveland Administration responded to these developments
by having Attorney General Richard Olney get a sweeping court in-
junction barring any efforts to interfere with rail traffic in and out of
Chicago.  Cleveland then dispatched federal troops to Chicago with
orders to make sure that the injunction was obeyed.  Welch reports
that
[b]y July 10, Debs, with seventy other union members, had been
indicted and arrested for violating the judicial injunction, and fed-
eral troops had secured the safe passage of rail traffic through Chi-
cago.  Strikes and disorders in states west of the Mississippi were
ended by means of other injunctions and the dispatch of other units
of the United States Army.93
It was in all a very dramatic show of executive and federal power by
Cleveland.  He was not the first President to send federal troops to
restore order during a strike; he was, however, the first “to do so at his
own initiative and not at the application of a state governor.”94
The controversy over the Pullman strikes of July 1894 became the
subject of litigation when the Cleveland Administration went into fed-
eral court and sought an injunction against the strikers not for violat-
ing any statute, but for obstruction of interstate commerce and the
U.S. Postal Service.95  The Cleveland Administration’s claim was that
the Constitution gave the federal government an implied power to
keep interstate commerce and the mails free of any obstructions and
that the Executive could do this either on its own or with the aid of a
court order.96  The injunction issued, and Debs and others were im-
prisoned for six months for violating it.97
Debs sought habeas relief and pursued his claim up to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously for Cleveland in a sweeping
opinion by Justice Brewer.98  The Court found that the national gov-
ernment had jurisdiction over this local Illinois disturbance because
the disturbance was clogging interstate commerce and the passage of
92 Id.
93 Id. at 142–43.
94 Id. at 145.
95 Id. at 144.
96 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
97 Id. at 573.
98 Id. at 564.
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the mails.99  Thus, even though Debs was not tried by a jury for violat-
ing any federal statute, he and his cohorts had nonetheless created a
public nuisance that interfered with valid federal powers and from
which Debs could be enjoined by a court of equity.100  In essence, the
Court found an implied federal power in the absence of legislation,
and the Court held the Executive could execute (and litigate under)
that implied federal power in the absence of any federal statute.  In
fact, the Court suggested in dicta that the President could have dis-
patched troops to clear away the strikers even in the absence of any
court injunction.101
In short, the Court, egged on by the Cleveland Administration,
took a Lincolnian view of the breadth of the President’s protective
executive power.  Consonant with the unitary executive thesis, In re
Debs supports the notion that, notwithstanding the Steel Seizure Case,102
the President has broad implied power to act in the absence of statu-
tory authority even if doing so deprives individual citizens of their lib-
erty.103  If the President has that implied power, as Debs suggests he
does, then it would be hard to imagine he does not have authority to
control his subordinates in the execution of the laws and remove
them at will.
Cleveland’s biographer Richard Welch nicely sums up the ironies
of Cleveland’s role in breaking the strikes of 1894:
For a student of the American presidency, the most interesting
feature of Cleveland’s actions during the Pullman strike is the wit-
ness they offer to his evolving conception of presidential authority.
In the campaign of 1884, Cleveland had run on a Democratic plat-
form calling for renewed respect for the rights and sovereignty of
the individual states, and for many years thereafter he had given
periodic warning against undue centralization of power in the fed-
eral government.  In 1894 he claimed for the chief executive of the
national government the authority to supersede the state of Illinois
as the protector of law and order within its boundaries.  Brushing
aside the objections of Governor Altgeld, Cleveland assumed the
police powers traditionally reserved to state and local governments
as he authorized the use of federal military power in a labor-man-
agement dispute.  Like his hero Andrew Jackson, Cleveland could
simultaneously speak against the centralization of power in the fed-
99 Id. at 581–84.
100 Id. at 594–98.
101 Id. at 599.
102 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
103 See also Monaghan, supra note 70, at 63–65 (citing Debs as support for an inher- R
ent presidential power to protect the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of
the federal government).
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eral government and expand the power of the federal executive. . . .
He quoted Jefferson when denouncing federal interference in local
elections, but he acted like Jackson when he overrode Governor
Altgeld and claimed supremacy for the federal government and its
chief executive during the Chicago railroad strike.104
He asserted presidential power more successfully than had any
president since Lincoln, and “in his role as ‘the national sheriff of
public law and order,’” he extended “the authority of the federal gov-
ernment despite his repeated warnings against the evils of undue cen-
tralization of power.”105
The second Cleveland Administration also initiated a noteworthy
case that implicated the presidential removal power even more di-
rectly.106  The case arose when Cleveland fired Lewis Parsons from his
job as a district attorney for no reason other than that Parsons was a
holdover from the Harrison Administration.  The governing statute
provided that district attorneys “shall be appointed for four years.”107
This provision grew out of an 1820 statute that established a four-year
term for many civil officers while explicitly providing that these of-
ficers “shall be removable from office at pleasure.”108  The language
explicitly authorizing removal was deleted by the Tenure of Office Act
of 1867.109  It was unclear, however, whether the subsequent repeal of
the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 reinstated the provision recognizing
the President’s right to remove district attorneys before their four-year
terms expired.
In Parsons v. United States,110 a unanimous Court, speaking
through Justice Peckham, issued what amounts to a paean to the uni-
tary executive.  Justice Peckham discussed the full history of the re-
moval power from the Decision of 1789111 up through the repeal of
104 WELCH, supra note 80, at 147. R
105 Id. at 224.
106 Although the Cleveland Administration was responsible for litigating the case,
the Supreme Court would not issue its ruling until the opening months of the McKin-
ley Administration. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
107 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 102, § 1, 3 Stat. 582, 582 (1820).  For an analysis of
this statute, see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1516–18. R
108 Tenure of Office Act § 1, 3 Stat. at 582.
109 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (repealed 1887).
110 Parsons, 167 U.S. at 328–38.
111 In our previous article on the unitary executive, we described the Decision of
1789 as follows:
Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bill to establish the Department of
Foreign Affairs provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was “to be re-
movable from office by the President of the United States.”  Concerned that
this language suggested that the power to remove the Secretary was con-
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 22  8-DEC-04 13:46
22 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
the Tenure of Office Act, mentioning that such leading figures as
John Adams, Justice Story, Chancellor Kent, Attorney General Clif-
ford, and Attorney General Crittenden had all regarded it settled as a
matter of both interpretation and practice that the removal power was
vested in the President alone.112  Justice Peckham’s opinion also pro-
vided an abbreviated history of the removal power from 1789 up to
the 1890s that is thoroughly consistent with the thesis of this series of
articles.  He described the Tenure of Office Act as an aberration from
the well-established practice of the government that was best ex-
plained by the extraordinarily poor relations between President An-
drew Johnson and Congress in the wake of the Civil War.113  Justice
Peckham left no doubt that he believed the repeal of the Tenure of
Office Act restored the pre-1867 practice of an unlimited presidential
power of removal, and he construed the repeal statute as authorizing
Cleveland’s firing of Parsons.114  The Parsons case is thus a resounding
victory for a broad presidential power of removal.  The fact that Cleve-
land fired Parsons and then litigated the case up to the Supreme
Court establishes that the second Cleveland Administration was just as
devoted to the theory of the unitary executive as was the first.
A final area of domestic policy during Cleveland’s second term
where he made an important contribution was the expansion of the
number of federal employees covered by the civil service system.115
Cleveland expanded the classified service from 16,000 to 27,000 in
1889 and then by another 44,000 positions in 1895–1896.116  In sum,
Cleveland expanded the civil service system in percentage terms by a
larger degree than any other President.117
Although the expansion of the civil service is often perceived as
inconsistent with the unitariness of the executive branch, the opposite
is actually true.  Aside from preventing officials from dunning federal
ferred by congressional rather than constitutional grant, Representative Eg-
bert Benson offered an amendment to this language to remove this
implication.  This amended language was subsequently incorporated into
the statutes creating the War Department (without much controversy) as
well as the Treasury Department (by the narrowest of margins: the casting
vote of Vice President Adams).  Congress’s action has been thereafter re-
garded as recognizing the constitutional basis of the President’s removal
power.
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1473 n.53. R
112 Parsons, 167 U.S. at 328–38.
113 Id. at 339–40.
114 Id. at 342–43.
115 WELCH, supra note 80, at 61. R
116 Id.
117 Id.
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employees into paying political assessments, the original Civil Service
Act did not purport to place any limits on the removal power.  Its
effect was instead to weaken the patronage influence of the Senate.
Leonard White quotes one Senator complaining that “ ‘[t]he reform
of the civil service has doubtless shorn the office of Senator of a good
deal of power.’  Conversely, it tended to add authority to the office of
Chief Executive.”118  The expansion of the civil service is more prop-
erly regarded as a mechanism that Presidents employed to enhance,
rather than weaken, their control over the administration of the law.
Cleveland’s policies of expanding the classified service while refusing
to permit any restrictions on the President’s power to remove thus
tended to reinforce the unitariness of the executive.
Cleveland also rejected a request from the Civil Service Commis-
sion, which for a time included Theodore Roosevelt as a holdover
member from the Harrison Administration, that he issue an executive
order requiring a written statement of reasons for each and every re-
moval.119  Cleveland objected that requiring that the reasons for re-
moval be made public amounted to a presumption of bad faith on the
part of the removing officer and would place executive officials in a
“hampered, suspected, and discredited position.”120
In sum, Cleveland was a vigorous defender of the theory of the
unitary executive who secured repeal of the Tenure of Office Act dur-
ing his first term and won two important Supreme Court victories for
broad inherent executive power during his second.  There was cer-
tainly no acceptance of any diminution in the President’s powers over
removal or law execution during Grover Cleveland’s second term as
President.
III. WILLIAM MCKINLEY
William McKinley became President in 1897 after having been
elected as the candidate of the Republican party—a party torn be-
tween its Whiggish roots and its recent Lincolnian past.  Lewis Gould,
McKinley’s biographer, reports that the “Whiggish heritage of the
Republicans made them suspicious of a strong executive; a powerful
Congress was the appropriate vehicle for their nationalism.”121  The
118 WHITE, supra note 35, at 27 (quoting 2 GEORGE FRISBE HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY R
OF SEVENTY YEARS 46 (1903)).
119 13 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 19 (1897).
120 WHITE, supra note 35, at 343–44 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 51-4038, at 59 (1891)); R
see also Frug, supra note 46, at 956 (noting President Cleveland’s refusal to issue an R
executive order requiring a written statement of reasons for removal).
121 LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 2 (1980).
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heritage of Lincoln, however, pointed in the direction of greater exec-
utive power.
In the end, McKinley turned out to be another strong President
in the mold of Lincoln or Cleveland.  In the process, he laid the foun-
dations of the modern presidency, anticipating many innovations asso-
ciated more today with Theodore Roosevelt.  Gould further observes:
Imperceptibly but inexorably, the power of the presidency ex-
panded under McKinley’s deft direction.  He left no overt statement
that he intended to restore the prestige and authority of his office,
but his actions during his first year reveal a president with an in-
stinct for power and a clear purpose of augmenting it.122
So transformed was the office that McKinley “surrounded the presi-
dency with a dignity that became almost imperial.”123
In domestic affairs, McKinley quietly retained firm control of his
administration.  He was a conscientious Chief Executive who met with
his cabinet twice a week.124  One contemporary reports: “Sometimes
he led discussion . . . [but] quite as often he first elicited the views of
his counselors.”125  McKinley also “left the operations of the Justice
Department to [his] attorney general.”126  It would be a mistake, how-
ever, to construe McKinley’s willingness to consider the views of his
department heads as passivity.  Gould reports: “Whatever their experi-
ence with McKinley, the cabinet officers knew who ran the administra-
tion.”127  In particular, McKinley successfully asserted “[t]he primacy
of the President in foreign affairs.”128  He did this not only by
strengthening the President’s control of foreign policy as compared
with the Congress, but also by asserting his control over what his Sec-
retaries of State were able to do.  John Sherman—who accepted the
position of Secretary of State at age seventy-three as a capstone for his
distinguished career in public service, only to prove too past his prime
to be effective in the job—offered some telling remarks when step-
ping down.  Gould reports:
When John Sherman resigned [as Secretary of State], he wrote that
McKinley “evinced a disposition to assume all the functions of the
members of his Cabinet and especially the duties of the State De-
122 Id. at 56.
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id. at 39.
125 Id. (quoting Charles Emory Smith, McKinley in the Cabinet Room, SATURDAY EVE-
NING POST, Aug. 30, 1902, at 1).
126 Id. at 161.
127 Id. at 39.
128 Id. at 88 (quoting Letter from Cornelius N. Bliss to Elihu Root (Apr. 19, 1898)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Elihu Root)).
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partment.”  The outgoing secretary of state added that McKinley’s
“cabinet counsels were not a free exchange of opinions but rather
the mandates of a paramount ruler.”129
McKinley also asserted his authority over Sherman’s successor, John
Hay, such that McKinley “supervised and controlled the overall out-
lines of what Hay did.”130
McKinley confronted a more difficult situation when controversy
emerged regarding Secretary of War Russell Alger’s inability to man-
age the logistics of supporting the Spanish-American War.131  McKin-
ley tried in various subtle ways to induce Alger to step down, but when
Alger made a public statement saying he would not leave, McKinley
dispatched Vice President Garret A. Hobart to tell Alger the President
wanted him to submit his resignation.132  Alger promptly resigned in
one of the more public removals of the McKinley Administration.  As
the Alger and Sherman departures indicate, McKinley was not shy
about triggering the departures of top aides in whom he had lost
confidence.
McKinley made at least one removal from office during his ten-
ure as President that was to trigger an important case in the history of
the removal power: Shurtleff v. United States.133  Ferdinand Shurtleff
was nominated, confirmed, and then appointed to be a general ap-
praiser of merchandise under the Customs Administrative Act, which
provided that he could be removed for inefficiency, neglect, or mal-
feasance in office.134  On May 3, 1899, McKinley removed Shurtleff
without citing any of those grounds for removal and without any no-
tice or hearing.  McKinley instead relied exclusively on the general
power of removal possessed by all Presidents going back to the Deci-
sion of 1789.135  Shurtleff sued, seeking back pay on the grounds that
the Customs Administrative Act had limited the President’s power to
remove him.136  The McKinley Administration, and later the adminis-
tration of Theodore Roosevelt, defended the validity of the removal.
The Court upheld the executive branch’s claim of power.  Justice
Peckham was the author of Shurtleff, just as he had been the author of
129 Id. at 39 (quoting Letter from John Sherman to W.S. Ward (Apr. 28, 1898) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of John Sherman)).
130 Id. at 130.
131 Id. at 123–26.
132 Id. at 174–76.
133 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
134 Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (1890), repealed by
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 28, 36 Stat. 11, 91.
135 Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 314.
136 Id. at 313.
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the Parsons decision under Cleveland.  Assuming arguendo that the
Constitution permitted Congress to limit the removal power,137
Peckham concluded that it would have to do so by “very clear and
explicit language.”138  Peckham concluded that life tenure was a rare
condition under the Constitution intended only for judges and that
limiting the removal power “would involve the alteration of the uni-
versal practice of the government for over a century.”139  Accordingly,
Peckham construed the Act narrowly as only giving general appraisers
a right to a hearing when they were removed for inefficiency, neglect,
or malfeasance.  The Act did not protect general appraisers from the
President’s general removal power, which could be exercised for any
reason whatsoever.140
It is hard to know precisely what to make of the language in Shurt-
leff assuming for the purposes of that decision that Congress might be
able to restrict the President’s power to remove.  At least three plausi-
ble interpretations come to mind.  First, this language could represent
dicta acknowledging that limitations on the removal power might be
constitutional.  Second, the Court could simply have intended to re-
serve for another day an issue that was not properly presented.  Third,
Shurtleff might be regarded as an early example of the principle that
courts will not deviate from the traditional distribution of authority
unless Congress employs unmistakably clear language clearly signify-
ing that that is its intent,141 an interpretation that implicitly affirms
the constitutional foundation of the removal power.
Two considerations favor one of the interpretations that regards
Shurtleff as being consistent with the unitary executive.  The first is the
fact that the opinion was authored by Justice Peckham, who also au-
thored the ringing endorsement of the unitary executive in Parsons.
The second is that subsequent Supreme Court cases following Shurtleff
regarded the constitutionality of congressionally imposed limits to the
removal power to be an open question.142
McKinley’s willingness to enforce federal law is further demon-
strated by his willingness to send federal troops to restore order dur-
ing a labor dispute in the Coeur d’Alene mining district of Idaho in
the spring of 1899.143  Despite the superficial similarity between Mc-
137 Id. at 314.
138 Id. at 315.
139 Id. at 316.
140 Id. at 314.
141 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242–43 (1985).
142 See Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541, 545 (1922).
143 GOULD, supra note 121, at 165. R
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Kinley’s actions and Cleveland’s use of federal troops to quell the Pull-
man strike, McKinley maintained good relations with organized labor,
and there was no repetition during his term of the problems that had
plagued the second Cleveland Administration.
McKinley’s willingness to assert control of the administration of
the law is also evident in his policies with respect to the civil service.
While McKinley had long supported civil service reform, he faced calls
from his own party to make more positions available for patronage by
scaling back the expansion of the classified service promulgated dur-
ing the waning days of the Cleveland Administration.  In the end, Mc-
Kinley attempted to steer a middle course, pulling back somewhat
from the position adopted by Cleveland, but stopping short of the
wholesale reversal desired by many of his fellow Republicans.  McKin-
ley modestly reduced the scope of civil service protection by ex-
panding the number of federal employees who were exempt from
competitive examinations.  McKinley took a characteristically direct
role in setting these policies.  There can be little question that the key
decisions were made by him and him alone.144
On July 27, 1897, McKinley took the step that Cleveland refused
to take and issued an executive order requiring that “[n]o removal
shall be made from any position subject to competitive examination
except for just cause and upon written charges . . . and of which the
accused shall have full notice and an opportunity to make defense.”145
As the U.S. Civil Service Commission would subsequently make clear,
because this order was adopted pursuant to the President’s general
executive authority rather than the Civil Service Act of 1883, the de-
termination of what constituted proper cause rested solely with the
President.146  Lower courts rejected attempts to turn McKinley’s exec-
utive order into a limit on the removal power, reasoning that aside
from prohibiting dismissals for failure to make political contributions
or to render political service, the Civil Service Act of 1883 did not
place any restrictions on the removal power: “It leaves the appointing
power as free as before its passage to make removals at will, save only
for refusal to contribute to political funds or neglect to render politi-
cal service.”147  Although regulations such as the 1897 executive order
could limit the manner in which subordinates could exercise the re-
144 Id. at 167–68.
145 14 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 24 (1898); see also GOULD, supra note 121, R
at 54 (noting that “McKinley ordered that the removal process be made more open,
with written notice and just cause required”).
146 15 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 19–20 (1899).
147 Page v. Moffett, 85 F. 38, 40 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898); accord Carr v. Gordon, 82 F.
373, 377 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897) (recognizing that nothing in the Civil Service Act limits
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moval power on behalf of the President, such regulations “cannot give
to office holders vested rights in their offices.”148  The Supreme Court
gave its approval to this position in Keim v. United States,149 in which
the Court relied on its previous decisions in Ex parte Hennen150 and
Parsons v. United States151 to hold that the fitness of a federal employee
to remain in office is a matter “peculiarly within the province of those
who are in charge of and superintending the departments, and until
Congress by some special and direct legislation makes provision to the
contrary, we are clear that [it] must be settled by those administrative
officers.”152
But the clearest example of presidential control was McKinley’s
supervision of the conduct of the Spanish-American War, which repre-
sents the single most significant event of his presidency.  Not only did
the war liberate Cuba from Spain; when combined with the earlier
annexation of Hawaii, the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philip-
pines as American territory also marked the United States’ arrival on
the scene as an imperial and colonial power.
All men close to the White House agreed that McKinley “ran the
war on the American side.”153  According to one contemporary: “In all
the movements of the army and navy the President’s hand is seen.”154
Another contemporary commented: “From the first, President McKin-
ley assumed a close personal direction, not only of the organization of
the forces but of the general plan of operations.  He was Commander-
in-Chief not merely in name but in fact.”155
By using the telephone and telegraph, McKinley was able to use
“remote voice communication for the first time to project presidential
presence into the battle zone on a near real time basis while he re-
the power of removal aside from the prohibition on dismissals for failing to support
political campaigns).
148 Page, 85 F. at 40; accord Carr, 82 F. at 379 (construing McKinley’s 1897 order as
an exercise of the President’s right to regulate himself and his subordinates in the
exercise of the removal power and that such restrictions may be made or unmade at
the President’s pleasure).
149 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
150 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 676–77 R
(discussing Hennen).
151 167 U.S. 324 (1897); see supra notes 106–14 and accompanying text (discussing R
Parsons).
152 Keim, 177 U.S. at 296.
153 GOULD, supra note 121, at 91. R
154 Id. (quoting George B. Cortelyou Diary (June 8, 1898) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of George B. Cortelyou, box 52)).
155 Id. (quoting Letter from Charles Emory Smith to Elihu Root (Aug. 12, 1903)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry C. Corbin)).
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mained in Washington.”156  McKinley would often check in at the War
Room headquarters to see how things were going, and “[b]y the Presi-
dent’s orders, he was to be awakened at any hour of the night if im-
portant intelligence should come in.”157  Gould adds: “Day by day,
and sometimes on an hour-to-hour basis, the president oversaw the
war.  In so doing, he laid the foundation for the modern presi-
dency.”158  When the war was easily won, McKinley was just as involved
in the peace negotiations as he had been in battlefield strategy.  The
“president’s guiding hand [was to be] seen at every point in the
negotiations.”159
In short, the vigor with which McKinley prosecuted the war
greatly strengthened the presidency.  Gould reports:
In conducting the Spanish-American War, McKinley had ex-
panded the powers and authority of his office.  Some months later,
signing an order to shift American installations that lay outside the
United States, he observed: “It seems odd to be directing the trans-
fer of navy yards, naval stations &c in Cuba.” . . . In bearing and
manner, in action and policy, [McKinley] would become something
of an imperial tutor to the American people.160
McKinley relied upon the War Power in administering Puerto
Rico and Cuba after they were conquered and in suppressing an insur-
rection in the Philippines.161  He also sent troops to China during the
Boxer Rebellion without congressional authorization.162  His skillful
use of the War Power “facilitated the accretion of power in the execu-
tive and in the federal government generally,” and he showed how
“broadly and creatively” his office could be used.163
Gould concludes that “[b]y 1901 the nation had an empire and a
president whose manner and bearing anticipated the imperial execu-
tives of six decades later.”164  In the process, McKinley “transformed
156 Id. at 92–93 (quoting Richard T. Loomis, The White House Telephone and Crisis
Management, U. S. NAVAL INST. PROC., Dec. 1969, at 63, 64–65).
157 Id. at 93 (quoting DeB. Randolph Keim, The President’s War, FRANK LESLIE’S
POPULAR MONTHLY, June 1900, at 107, 120).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 118 (quoting George B. Cortelyou Diary (July 30 & 31, 1898) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of George B. Cortelyou, box
52)).
160 Id. at 121 (quoting Draft of Letter from McKinley to Commission for the Evac-
uation of Cuba with Cortelyou’s Note of McKinley’s Remark (Dec. 6, 1898) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, George B. Cortelyou Papers, box 70)).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 221–22.
163 Id. at viii.
164 Id.
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the presidential office from its late-nineteenth-century weakness into a
recognizable prototype of its present-day form.”165  By the time Mc-
Kinley died in office of an assassin’s bullet, a contemporary journalist
was able to write that “in the legislative branch of the Government, it
is the executive which influences, if it does not control, the action of
Congress; while the power originally vested in the executive alone has
increased to an extent of which the framers of the Constitution had
no prophetic vision.”166
IV. THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency on September 14,
1901, after the assassination of McKinley.  The take-charge style that
would become the hallmark of his Administration did not immedi-
ately appear.  Roosevelt held his first cabinet meeting on September
20, during which he immediately asked all members of McKinley’s
cabinet to stay on and received reports on the varied business of their
departments.167  Secretary of State Hay, who had worked for Lincoln
and been close to Garfield, was devastated when his friend McKinley
became the third President to fall to an assassin’s bullet.  He tried to
resign, but Roosevelt asked him to remain.168  As time passed, how-
ever, there were “frequent shifts in cabinet personnel.”169  After Hay’s
health failed in 1905, Roosevelt asked the exceptionally able Secretary
of War, Elihu Root, to assume the position.170
Roosevelt came to office at a time when the presidencies of
Grover Cleveland and William McKinley had produced “a gradual rise
in presidential power . . . culminating in the emergence of the mod-
ern office under McKinley.”171  Roosevelt took this condition and sup-
plemented it with the personal presidency: the people’s attachment to
the person and not the constitutional office of the presidency.  He was
“visible and controversial . . . in a personalized way,”172 and his per-
sonal appeal and that of his family gave him a “capacity to keep the
nation entertained and involved in his conduct.”173
165 Id. at 152.
166 Id. at 243 (quoting Henry Litchfield West, The Growing Powers of the President, 31
THE FORUM 23, 25 (1901)).
167 LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1 (1991).
168 Id. at 17.
169 Id. at 16.
170 Id. at 174.
171 Id. at 10.
172 Id. at 19.
173 Id. at 225.
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Through his charisma, he made the presidency the voice of the
nation and the government, and he led people to think that as Presi-
dent, he was protecting them from a do-nothing, status quo Congress.
His biographer says that Roosevelt “personalized the office in a way
that had not occurred since Andrew Jackson.”174  It is no accident that
Roosevelt’s role models were Jackson and Lincoln, and he repeatedly
expressed his allegiance to “the Jackson-Lincoln theory of the Presi-
dency.”175  As Roosevelt said, the course he “followed, of regarding
the executive as subject only to the people, and, under the Constitu-
tion, bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Con-
stitution does not explicitly forbid him to render the service, was
substantially the course followed by both Andrew Jackson and Abra-
ham Lincoln.”176  Roosevelt rejected the opposite course, which he
denigrated as the “narrowly legalistic view that the President is the
servant of Congress rather than the people, and can do nothing, no
matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly
commands the action.”177  Roosevelt chose to follow the path of “Old
King Andrew,”178 as President Jackson “had never hesitated ‘to cut any
red tape that stood in the way of executive action.’”179  Roosevelt also
greatly admired Alexander Hamilton, who believed in strong execu-
tive and national power.  He thus saw his vision of the presidency as
going back to the beginnings of the nation.180  Unsurprisingly,
Roosevelt had a very low opinion of Congress as an institution, regard-
ing it as “indecisive and irresolute,” and “he distrusted the motives of
his opponents in both houses.”181  Roosevelt liked to
appeal[ ] over the heads of the Senate and House leaders to the
people, who were masters of both of us.  [He] continued in this way
to get results until almost the close of [his] term; and the Republi-
can party became once more the progressive and indeed the fairly
radical progressive party of the Nation.182
174 Id. at ix.
175 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 464 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1920)
(1913).
176 Id. at 362.
177 Id.  Roosevelt alluded here to presidents like Buchanan and Taft whose princi-
ple of governance “represents not well-thought-out devotion to an unwise course, but
simple weakness of character and desire to avoid trouble and responsibility.” Id. at
365.
178 EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 278 (2001).
179 Id. (quoting GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, MEMORIES OF A PUBLISHER, 1865–1915, at
145–47 (1915)).
180 ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 65. R
181 GOULD, supra note 167, at 11. R
182 ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 352. R
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As President, Roosevelt expanded the scope of presidential power
beyond what anyone had theretofore imagined.  In his view, the exec-
utive branch was the dominant and not merely a coordinate branch of
the federal government.  Like Lincoln before him, Roosevelt believed
that the President’s role was not limited to seeing to it that the laws
passed by Congress were faithfully executed.  As Roosevelt later ex-
plained in his autobiography, he regarded the President as “a steward
of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for
the people.”183  Under this stewardship theory, “it was not only his
right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation de-
manded.”184  Theodore Roosevelt’s biographer, Lewis Gould, de-
scribes Roosevelt’s stewardship theory of presidential power as follows:
His authority “was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibi-
tions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress
under its [c]onstitutional powers.”  There was no need to wait for
“some specific authorization” to take a needed action in the public
interest.  Instead, the chief executive should act, “unless such action
was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”  As Roosevelt
phrased it in his autobiography, “I did not usurp power, but I did
greatly broaden the use of executive power.”185
Gould goes on to note that in “his autobiography, Roosevelt as-
serted that he had been prepared to act under ‘the Jackson-Lincoln
theory of the presidency’ because ‘occasionally great crises arise which
call for immediate and vigorous executive action.’”186  Roosevelt was
to accuse his successor, William Howard Taft, of subscribing to the
James Buchanan theory of the presidency because of Taft’s apostasy in
disagreeing with Roosevelt’s stewardship theory.  Taft admired
Roosevelt’s goals, but “thought a president should observe the law
strictly and not construe his authority as broadly as Roosevelt had
done.”187  It turned out that during “the time they had worked to-
gether, [Roosevelt and Taft] had few occasions to sit down and go
over their contrasting philosophies of the presidency.”188
A believer in the Progressive faith in expert administration,
Roosevelt’s style was “to select qualified subordinates and let them ex-
ercise their own judgment.”189  A contemporary English observer said
that Roosevelt had “gathered around him a body of public servants
183 Id. at 357.
184 Id.
185 GOULD, supra note 167, at 197 (quoting ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 357). R
186 Id. at 69–70 (quoting ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 464). R
187 Id. at 272.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 197.
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who are nowhere surpassed,” and questioned “whether they are any-
where equalled, for efficiency, self-sacrifice, and an absolute devotion
to their country’s interests.”190  Gould reports:
Theodore Roosevelt was a gifted and often effective presiden-
tial administrator.  He usually evoked a high morale from his imme-
diate subordinates, who relished the chance to work for such an
inspiring executive.  His men admired Roosevelt for his willingness
to consult them and for his support when they faced a crisis or criti-
cism.  Roosevelt handled a great deal of business each day with
speed and thoroughness.  His ability to read quickly and his reten-
tive mind enabled him to move through large amounts of informa-
tion easily.  He also possessed the capacity to make up his mind
promptly and decisively.  He did not spend time reconsidering the
actions he had taken.  When the president’s interest was engaged,
his administrative talents were impressive.191
In sum, Roosevelt was a hands-on administrator who was very much in
control of the executive branch.
Given the expansiveness of his views on presidential power, it is
no surprise that Roosevelt’s actions indicate strong support for the
unitary theory of the presidency.  Roosevelt maintained strict control
of his cabinet, reducing them to mere “‘echoes and adulators.’”192
Roosevelt also wielded the removal power freely, on several occasions
summarily discharging several companies of troops.193  Furthermore,
and of greatest relevance to this series of articles, Roosevelt’s Eighth
Annual Message specifically proposed “that all existing independent
bureaus and commissions . . . be placed under the jurisdiction of ap-
propriate executive departments,” arguing that it was “unwise from
every standpoint, and results only in mischief, to have any executive
work done save by the purely executive bodies, under the control of
190 Id. (quoting ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 356). R
191 Id. at 222.
192 Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential
Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483, 490 n.34 (1988) (quoting MARY LOUISE
HINSDALE, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT’S CABINET 272 (1911)).
193 Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message to the Senate (Dec. 19, 1906), in 15 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7329, 7329 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1925) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS]; Theodore Roosevelt, Special
Message to the Senate (Jan. 14, 1907), in 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra, at 7337, 7341;
see also NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 100
n.39 (1932) (suggesting that Roosevelt’s disbandment of two full companies illustrates
that the President’s power of removal over military members was not seriously
restricted).
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the President; and each such executive body should be under the im-
mediate supervision of a Cabinet Minister.”194
Roosevelt was also not afraid as President to take decisive action.
In the area of law enforcement, Roosevelt personally directed investi-
gations into government scandals, naming lawyers to serve as special
assistants to the Justice Department.195  For example, in 1902, he di-
rected that a lawsuit be brought under the Sherman Act to stop a
railroad combination,196 and he “directed that suitable action should
be taken to have the question judicially determined.”197  In a legal
investigation regarding rebates, Roosevelt told his Attorney General:
“Please do not file the suit until I hear from you.”198  The White
House later told the Attorney General that the suit “should be aban-
doned.”199  In 1903, Roosevelt took vigorous action in response to al-
legations that postal officials were taking bribes and kickbacks in
exchange for promotions, instructing the official initially assigned to
look into the scandal “that I wished nothing but the truth and that I
wished the whole truth and care not a rap who is hit.”200  Eventually
Roosevelt appointed Democrat Holmes Conrad and Republican
Charles J. Bonaparte as special prosecutors to pursue the matter.  The
investigation ultimately implicated Assistant Attorney General John
Tyner as well as Charles Emory Smith and Perry S. Heath, who had
been the Postmaster General and First Assistant Postmaster General
during the McKinley Administration.201
In 1905, Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Philander Knox, ap-
pointed Democrat Francis J. Heney to investigate a land fraud scandal
implicating former Commissioner of the General Land Office Binger
Hermann.202  Roosevelt’s use of special prosecutors does not pose the
194 Theodore Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1908), in 14 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 193, at 7198, 7229; see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT R
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 681 (Octagon Books 1972) (1941) (describing Roosevelt’s
plea to Congress to place all independent bureaus and commissions under the juris-
diction of the appropriate executive departments); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presiden-
tial Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 482
(1994) (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS-
SION 110 (1955)).
195 GOULD, supra note 167, at 114. R
196 Id. at 51.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 218.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 113.
201 Id. at 113–14.
202 See EASTLAND, supra note 7, at 8; Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A R
View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2313–14 (1998).  Tyner was acquitted. See Smaltz,
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same problem for the unitary executive as the independent counsels
appointed during the post-Watergate era, since these special prosecu-
tors were subject to presidential control.203
The stewardship theory found particularly strong expression in
Roosevelt’s actions on conservation issues.  Roosevelt and his Chief of
the Bureau of Forestry, Gifford Pinchot, concluded that they could
place enormous amounts of western land to the nation’s forest
reserves despite the absence of any statutory authority for doing so.
Roosevelt created eighteen national monuments during his presi-
dency, and he withdrew 66,000,000 acres from public entry in 1906
alone.204  Ultimately, Congress adopted an amendment “to limit the
president’s power to create forest reserves.”205  This “was more than
just a sign of western impatience over conservation policy; it also
demonstrated a general congressional dislike for the president’s asser-
tion of executive power.”206
Edmund Morris says of Roosevelt that “he understood better than
any President before him . . . the executive order.”207  Roosevelt would
use an executive order to circumvent Congress if it “persisted in de-
priving” him of what he needed or wanted.208  Roosevelt also admired
vigorous executive actions taken by others.  In the summer of 1903,
after reading of how the Governor of Indiana had ended a race riot,
Roosevelt wrote the Governor to praise him for “the admirable way in
which [he] vindicated the majesty of the law by [his] recent action in
reference to lynching.”209  On another occasion, the President be-
came enchanted with the idea of telling the Nicaraguans that an 1846
supra, at 2314.  Although Hermann was forced to resign, he was ultimately exoner-
ated. See Vi Lewis, Into the Sunshine: The Controversial Binger Hermann, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
July 2002, at 29, 29–30.
203 See Joshua M. Perttula, The Political Price of the Independent Counsel Law, 25 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 257, 262 (1998) (“Unlike the current independent counsel, . . . the
federal prosecutors of the past were appointed and controlled by the executive.”).
Indeed, Presidents both preceding and succeeding Roosevelt removed special prose-
cutors.  Although the removals were politically controversial, no one challenged the
President’s legal authority to effect them. See EASTLAND, supra note 7, at 14, 16 R
(describing the dismissal of special prosecutors by Presidents Grant and Truman);
Smaltz, supra note 202, at 2312–13, 2317 (discussing the two occasions on which R
Roosevelt appointed special prosecutors).
204 GOULD, supra note 167, at 202. R
205 Id. at 245.
206 Id.
207 MORRIS, supra note 178, at 477. R
208 Id. at 518.
209 GOULD, supra note 167, at 118 (quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to R
Winfield T. Durbin (Aug. 6, 1903), in 3 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 542
(Elting E. Morison et al. eds., 1951)).
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treaty gave the United States the right to go ahead with the building
of a canal across the isthmus; this “thesis appealed to Roosevelt’s
broad concept of executive power.”210
Another aspect of Roosevelt’s support for the unitary executive
was his policy with respect to the civil service.  Roosevelt was a long-
time advocate of civil service reform, having served as a Civil Service
Commissioner during both the Harrison and the second Cleveland
Administrations.  Like McKinley, Roosevelt had to balance the pub-
lic’s desire for civil service reform with GOP demands for patronage
hiring.  Gould reports:
During his presidency, the classified civil service—positions that
were subject to competitive examination—grew from just over 46
percent of the total government service to 66 percent by the time he
stepped down.  The number of classified positions increased by
more than 116,000, and Roosevelt broadened the number of agen-
cies and bureaus that were under civil-service rules.  In general,
Roosevelt issued and enforced regulations to curb federal employ-
ees from direct involvement in partisan affairs or political
campaigns.211
As noted earlier, because the Civil Service Act did not purport to limit
the removal power, expanding the classified service enhanced, rather
than restricted, the President’s control over the administration of the
law by insulating executive officials from senatorial courtesy.
In addition, Roosevelt issued an executive order clarifying that
the previous order issued by McKinley requiring that removals only be
made for “just cause” was only meant to guard against the type of po-
litically motivated removals prohibited by the statute and not to im-
pose any other substantive limits on the removal power.  Roosevelt’s
order declared that the term “just cause,” as used in the executive
order issued by McKinley “is intended to mean any cause, other than
one merely political or religious, which will promote the efficiency of
the service.”212  The Civil Service Commission emphasized that this
declaration made clear that “[t]he right of removal . . . remains, as it
has always been, discretionary on the part of the appointing officer,”
subject only to the limitation that it not be for political or religious
considerations and that the person removed be provided with ade-
210 Id. at 95.
211 Id. at 199.
212 Theodore Roosevelt, Declaration of the Meaning of Section 8, Rule II (May 29,
1902), microformed on CIS Presidential Executive Orders and Proclamations 1902-EO-
173 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
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quate notice and opportunity to be heard.213  Lower courts would sim-
ilarly affirm that the Civil Service Act of 1883 was “never intended to
limit the power of removal except for the single cause of failure to
contribute money or services to a political party” and that “[a]ny other
conclusion would, encourage inefficiency and incompetency in office,
and be fruitful of insubordination.”214  This conclusion was further
bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Shurtleff, which, al-
though begun during the McKinley years, was handed down during
Roosevelt’s presidency.  Frustrated by his inability to redress gross in-
competence, Roosevelt subsequently weakened the original order still
further by making even these mere procedural protections discretion-
ary for removals made in the presence of the President or department
head.215
Another distinctive feature of the Roosevelt Administration was
the President’s penchant for appointing commissions, often without
statutory authority, to advise him on various subjects.  The most im-
portant of these commissions became known as the Keep Commission
after its chair, Charles Keep.  This commission “addressed the issue of
how well the federal government functioned.”216  Gould reports:
The Keep Commission did accomplish worthwhile results on its
own, and it established an important precedent for future efforts to
make the federal government more efficient.  The commission
saved public money through its exposure of lax practices, it re-
formed some procedures, and it introduced order into the routine
business of the bureaucracy.  The panel began an examination into
how supplies were acquired, and it raised the question of salaries
and pensions for governmental employees. Above all, it asserted the
principle that the president should be in control of the management of the
executive agencies.  In that sense the Keep Commission was a notable fore-
runner of the reforms that created the modern structure of the presidency.217
213 20 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 19 (1904); see also 22 U.S. CIV. SERV.
COMM’N ANN. REP. 145 (1905) (noting that the Commission would not review the
circumstances of a removal unless “it is alleged . . . that the removal was . . . made for
political or religious reasons or that a greater penalty than usual had been imposed”);
Frug, supra note 46, at 956 (stating that the Executive merely had to “have had a R
legitimate, non-political reason for removal”).
214 United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 24 App. D.C. 95, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1904), appeal
dismissed, 203 U.S. 461 (1906); see also Frug, supra note 46, at 969–70 (stating that R
there was no “judicial role in reviewing the basis of executive removals”).
215 22 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 71 (1905); see also LEWIS MAYERS, THE
FEDERAL SERVICE 496 (1922) (stating that Roosevelt weakened the procedural require-
ments after witnessing misconduct so egregious that he did not think the employee
merited the protective procedure).
216 GOULD, supra note 167, at 220. R
217 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
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Obviously, Theodore Roosevelt was a hands-on administrator who
maintained close control over his subordinates in the executive
branch.  Congress certainly understood that these commissions repre-
sented Roosevelt’s effort to reduce Congress’s “control over appoint-
ments and key departments.”218
Roosevelt’s take-charge style can be perhaps best encapsulated in
one symbolic act that his cabinet took at the start of Roosevelt’s sec-
ond term.  The entire cabinet resigned before the second term began
as if to embody through this act where the true authority for their
positions rested.  By “returning to Roosevelt the power of appoint-
ment—or reappointment,” his cabinet demonstrated that he had ulti-
mate authority not only over their offices but also over their agencies
and employees.219
We saw in The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century how
the Monroe Doctrine, like Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation
before it, was a broad exercise of the executive power conferred on
the President by the Vesting Clause of Article II.220  The Roosevelt
Administration was to engage in a similar use of “the executive Power”
when it proclaimed the famous Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine.  Under the Roosevelt Corollary, not only did the United
States take it upon itself to say hands off the Americas to all European
powers; the United States also asserted the responsibility to keep or-
der in the Americas itself.221  Roosevelt described the doctrine the fol-
lowing way: “[I]f the United States sought to say ‘Hands Off’ to the
powers of Europe, then sooner or later we must Keep order our-
selves.”222  Secretary of State Elihu Root elaborated that “[w]hat we
will not permit the great Powers of Europe to do, we will not permit
any American republic to make it necessary for the great Powers of
Europe to do.”223  Gould notes that as “an idea, the Roosevelt Corol-
lary suggested the United States had a greater innate political capacity
than did its Latin neighbors, and it did so in the context of a strong
assertion of presidential power.”224  The Roosevelt Corollary, together
with Roosevelt’s work in laying the foundation for the digging of the
218 Id.
219 MORRIS, supra note 178, at 368. R
220 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1513–14. R
221 GOULD, supra note 167, at 80, 175, 179. R
222 Id. at 175 (quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root (May 20 and
June 7, 1904), in 4 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 801, 821–22 (Elting E.
Morison et al. eds., 1951)).
223 Id. at 176 (quoting DEXTER PERKINS, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 1867–1907, at 429
(1937)).
224 Id. at 179.
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Panama Canal225 and his vigorous assertion of U.S. rights in the Perdi-
caris affair,226 combined to give his Administration’s foreign policy a
distinctively assertive air.
We have seen that Theodore Roosevelt greatly admired Presi-
dents Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln, and like them he be-
lieved firmly that the executive branch was an independent
interpreter of the Constitution and not bound meekly to follow the
Supreme Court.  Roosevelt said:
I grew to realize that all that Abraham Lincoln had said about the
Dred Scott decision could be said with equal truth and justice about
the numerous decisions which in our own day were erected as bars
across the path of social reform, and which brought to naught so
much of the effort to secure justice and fair dealing for workingmen
and workingwomen, and for plain citizens generally.227
In sum, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt went far be-
yond the theory of the unitary executive in the claims it made of presi-
dential power.  Not only did Roosevelt claim a presidential power to
remove and direct subordinates, Roosevelt’s stewardship theory of
presidential power also claimed an inherent authority to act in the
absence of statute wherever action was not forbidden.  As a result,
Roosevelt’s vision of the presidency far exceeded the claim of inher-
ent presidential power made during the Truman Administration in
the Steel Seizure Case,228 which was, we believe, justifiably rejected by
the Supreme Court.  Although Lincoln was allowed to wield such pow-
ers in the spring of 1861,229 that exercise of power was justified, if at
all, only in light of the crisis that confronted the nation.  As a result,
the stewardship theory of presidential power has properly been con-
signed to the dustbin of history.  The powers Roosevelt was claiming
cannot be safely vested in the hands of any one individual.
One can reject the excesses of the stewardship theory while still
praising the Roosevelt Administration’s contribution to asserting and
maintaining the unitariness of the executive.  The fact that Roosevelt
may have overreached should not obscure the fact that under
Roosevelt there certainly was no acquiescence to any diminution of
the President’s powers of removal and control over law execution.
225 Id. at 212.
226 Id. at 136.
227 ROOSEVELT, supra note 175, at 82. R
228 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
229 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 722–26. R
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V. WILLIAM H. TAFT
William Howard Taft’s view of presidential power was considera-
bly more modest than Roosevelt’s, and Taft did not follow Roosevelt
at all in appealing “over the head of Congress to the people.”230  Taft
attacked the stewardship theory as “an unsafe doctrine,” and he dis-
agreed with Roosevelt’s view that
the Executive is charged with responsibility for the welfare of all the
people in a general way, that he is to play the part of a Universal
Providence and set all things right, and that anything that in his
judgment will help the people he ought to do, unless he is expressly
forbidden not to do it.231
Taft was appalled that Roosevelt had, for example,
appointed a number of extralegal, unsalaried commissions and de-
nied the right of Congress to limit him in seeking advice from them.
[Roosevelt had] also used executive agreements with abandon and
denied the right of the Senate to advise him on his executive duties,
although it of course must approve nominations and treaties.232
Taft believed that “[t]he true view of the Executive functions
is . . . that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly
and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly im-
plied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary
to its exercise” appearing “either in the Federal Constitution or in an
act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.”233  Critically, Taft goes
on to say that “[t]here is no undefined residuum of power which he
can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest.”234
Taft’s biographer, Paolo Coletta, argues that Taft had “a juridical
rather than political conception of the presidency.”235  Taft revealed
this in a letter he sent to William Kent where he said:
[W]e have a government of limited power under the Constitution,
and we have got to work out our problems on the basis of law.  Now,
if that is reactionary, then I am a reactionary. . . .  Pinchot is not a
lawyer and I am afraid he is quite willing to camp outside the law to
accomplish his beneficent purposes.  I have told him so to his
face. . . .  I do not undervalue the great benefit that he has worked
230 PAOLO E. COLETTA, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 10 (1973).
231 WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 144 (1925).
232 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 12. R
233 TAFT, supra note 231, at 139–40. R
234 Id. at 140.
235 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 12. R
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out, but I do find it necessary to look into the legality of his
plans.236
Taft expressed his belief in “following a limited, legal concept of
presidential leadership”237 in a letter of January 22, 1912, that he sent
to Otto T. Bannard, an old friend.  Taft alluded to his upcoming bat-
tle for reelection against Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
and said:
I am afraid I am in for a hard fight without any knowledge of mili-
tary strategy, and with very little material for organization, but I am
going to stay in anyhow. . . . I believe I represent a safer and saner view of
our government and its Constitution than does Theodore Roosevelt, and
whether beaten or not I mean to continue to labor in the vineyard for those
principles.238
Taft thought his role as President was “to consolidate and to put
upon a sound legal foundation the changes Roosevelt had made.”239
Taft “construed congressional conservation statutes more narrowly
than did the courts, took a limited view of the power of the presidency
itself, and was determined to regularize what he considered to be
Roosevelt’s extralegal methods regardless of the results for conserva-
tion.”240  He thus “regularized and legitimatized the work begun
under Roosevelt” while repudiating his method and the spirit in
which his actions were taken.241
Coletta contrasts Taft with Roosevelt by saying that:
If Roosevelt could not achieve his purpose on the basis of some con-
stitutional or legal power, he would ask if a contemplated move
were anywhere prohibited.  If it was not, he would act.  Trained in
the law, Taft took a conservative and legalistic approach to govern-
ment.  He must find authority in the Constitution or in law prior to
acting.  There was no “undefined residuum of power” which he
could use merely because the public interest required it.242
Taft argued that Roosevelt should not be elected to a third term
in 1912 because “one who so little regards Constitutional principles,
especially the independence of the judiciary; and one who is so natu-
236 Id. at 88–89 (quoting WILLIAM HENRY HARBAUGH, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY
384 (1961)).
237 Id. at 223.
238 Id. (quoting Letter from Howard Taft to Otto T. Bannard (Nov. 5, 1911) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William Howard Taft))
(emphasis added).
239 Id. at 17.
240 Id. at 81–82.
241 Id. at 83.
242 Id. at 263.
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rally impatient of legal restraints and of due legal procedure, and who
has so misunderstood what liberty regulated by law is, could not be
safely trusted with successive Presidential terms.”243  Before long, “Taft
was calling Roosevelt a ‘dangerous egotist’ and a ‘demogogue’ [while]
Roosevelt [was] calling the man he made President a puzzlewit and
fathead.”244
It would be a mistake, however, to construe Taft’s criticism of
Roosevelt’s stewardship theory as indicating any lack of support for
the unitary theory of the executive.  Once a power was delegated to
the President, Taft acknowledged that “[t]he grants of Executive
power are necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the
Executive within a field of action plainly marked for him.”245  Thus,
once power was delegated to the Chief Executive, the President
should be given broad and plenary control over those powers.
Although Taft never had the opportunity to comment directly on
the removal power or the unitary executive while he was President,
the defenses of the President’s power to remove expressed afterwards
in his book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers,246 and later in his
masterful and scholarly opinion in Myers v. United States247 leave no
doubt whatsoever that given the opportunity, he would have indicated
his strong support.  Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Myers represents
one of the cornerstones of unitary executive scholarship, and there
can be no question but that the author of Myers was a vigorous de-
fender of the unitary executive.  In Myers, Chief Justice Taft explicitly
asserts that “[t]he vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws,” and he further
notes that “the natural meaning of the term ‘executive power’ granted
the President included the appointment and removal of executive sub-
243 Id. at 233.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 140.
246 As Taft eloquently stated:
It was settled, as long ago as the first Congress, at the instance of
Madison, then in the Senate, and by the deciding vote of John Adams, then
Vice-President, that even where the advice and consent of the Senate was
necessary to the appointment of an officer, the President had the absolute
power to remove him without consulting the Senate.  This was on the princi-
ple that the power of removal was incident to the Executive power and must
be untrammeled.  In the administration of Andrew Johnson, the Republican
Congress regarded the President as an apostate and a traitor to Republican
principles.  With a two-thirds majority in each House, it sought to reverse
this principle as to the power of removal by the tenure of office act.
TAFT, supra note 231, at 56. R
247 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Taft, C.J.).
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ordinates.”248 Myers is a masterpiece of judicial craftsmanship, and its
author fully appreciated and supported the legal and historical argu-
ments in favor of the unitary executive.
The manner in which Taft exercised removal power manifests its
importance in unifying the execution of the law.  One of the most
politically costly episodes was the squabble between Forestry Bureau
Chief Gifford Pinchot and Interior Secretary Richard Ballinger.  As a
holdover from the previous administration, Pinchot still supported
Roosevelt’s willingness to bring lands within the national forest system
despite the absence of authorizing legislation.  Ballinger’s background
as an attorney led him to favor Taft’s belief that such actions were
improper without statutory sanction.249  When Taft resolved this rift in
federal policy by siding with Ballinger, Pinchot, who was an idealist250
with a “penchant for martyrdom,”251 attempted to take the matter to
Congress and the people.  The crux of Pinchot’s allegations was that
Ballinger had given preferential treatment to a former client in recog-
nizing homestead claims to certain coal-bearing lands.  Taft had no
choice but to remove him from office, saying:
[I]f I were to pass over this matter in silence, it would be most de-
moralizing to the discipline of the executive branch of the
government.
By your own conduct you have destroyed your usefulness as a
helpful subordinate of the government, and it therefore now be-
comes my duty to direct the secretary of agriculture to remove you
from your office as the forester.252
The furor became so great that the controversy became known as
the “American Dreyfus case.”253  A congressional investigation ensued
that ultimately exonerated Ballinger.254  Congressional supporters of
248 Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
249 See COLETTA, supra note 230, at 82–98 (detailing the Ballinger-Pinchot affair). R
250 See id. at 87 (noting that Pinchot had been called “Sir Galahad of the wood-
lands” and a “fanatic”); id. at 91–92 (noting Taft’s recognition that Pinchot’s “zeal was
so great he tended to think that any man who differed as to method was corrupt”).
251 Id. at 92; see also id. at 94 (describing Pinchot’s unabashed and almost gleeful
reaction upon being removed).
252 Id. at 94 (quoting Letter from Howard Taft to Gifford Pinchot (Jan. 7, 1910)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William Howard
Taft)).
253 Id. at 95.
254 Id.  Interestingly, the affair was prolonged by a rather curious set of circum-
stances.  The special agent who initially leveled the charges against Ballinger had pub-
lished his claims in Collier’s Weekly. Id. at 90. Collier’s hired future Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis to defend against a potential libel suit.  Brandeis was able to show
that Taft could not have based his decision to fire Pinchot on a report prepared by
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conservation attempted to pass a resolution calling for Ballinger’s re-
moval, but it failed to receive the support of either the committee or
the full Senate.  Ballinger eventually resigned, citing health
reasons.255
Taft’s support for the unitary executive is also evident in his poli-
cies towards the civil service.  His belief in efficiency made him a mod-
est supporter of civil service reform.  He began in 1910 by extending
the classified service to cover consular officers, subordinate diplomatic
officials, and first-class and second-class assistant postmasters and
clerks.  He followed that in 1912 by extending civil service protection
to 20,000 skilled workers in navy yards and 35,000 third-class and
fourth-class postmasters.256
Taft also issued an executive order in 1912 reaffirming the previ-
ous executive orders issued by McKinley and Roosevelt regarding the
civil service and restoring the procedural protections removed by
Roosevelt for removals made in the presence of the President or a
department head.257  As the Civil Service Commission explained, the
Taft executive order continued not to impose any substantive limits
on the removal power:
The rules are not framed on a theory of life tenure, fixed per-
manence, nor vested right in office. . . .
. . . Appointing officers, therefore, are entirely free to make
removals for any reasons relating to the interests of good adminis-
tration, and they are made the final judges of the sufficiency of the
reasons.258
This requirement was ultimately codified by the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act, which incorporated the requirement limiting removals to “such
cause as will promote the efficiency of [the civil] service.”259  The leg-
Attorney General George Wickersham, as Taft claimed.  Instead, Taft relied upon a
preliminary report prepared by a subcabinet official in the Department of the Interior
who was a well known Ballinger loyalist.  This revelation was publicly regarded as vin-
dicating Pinchot. Id. at 96–97.
255 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 816 (Russell & Russell
1960) (1938).
256 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 137–38.  In accordance with the recommendations R
of the Civil Service Commission, Taft declined Attorney General Wickersham’s re-
quest to extend the classified service to cover all assistant attorneys. Id. at 138.
257 William H. Taft, Amendment to the Civil Service Rules (Feb. 8, 1912),
microformed on CIS Presidential Executive Orders and Proclamations 1912-EO-1471
(Cong. Info. Serv.).
258 29 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP 21–22 (1912).
259 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 3, 37 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513(a) (2000)).  This language was borrowed from the Postal Service Appropria-
tions Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555.
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islative history provides little insight into what this standard required
and as such did not provide any basis for questioning the President’s
power to remove.260  On the contrary, the fact that the statute incor-
porated the same language used in the executive orders raises the op-
posite inference.261  As a result, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act has never
been construed as interfering with the President’s removal power in
any way.262  On the contrary, as Gerald Frug has concluded, “[t]he
legislative and executive branches continued to affirm the importance
of executive discretion as established by the Decision of 1789, a joint
position broken only by the constitutional crisis over the Tenure of
Office Act of 1867.”263
Taft’s interest in executive reorganization provides further evi-
dence of his support for presidential control over the administration
of the law.  Taft “lamented the proliferation of departments and . . .
asserted the need of a thorough reorganization of the executive struc-
ture.”264  He hoped that “[b]y similar grouping of related functions
he could thus control the administrative agencies of the
government.”265
The Taft Administration enjoyed some modest success in under-
taking administrative reorganizations of the Departments of State,
War, and the Navy as well as the reorganization of the Customs Service
by executive order.266  He launched a broader initiative in 1910 when
he obtained funding for a Commission on Economy and Efficiency.267
Taft was appalled by the overlap in agency responsibilities and the use
of inconsistent record keeping and accounting systems.  Taft was thus
the first President “to have the federal administration studied in detail
as one mechanism.”268
A related problem was the President’s inability to control the
budget process.  Until 1909, each executive agency submitted its own
budget proposal, which the Treasury Secretary would compile into a
“Book of Estimates.”  The inaccuracy of these estimates and the lack of
coordination in the budget process had forced Congress to enact a
260 See Frug, supra note 46, at 958; Merrill, supra note 48, at 236; Stephen G. Vas- R
kov, Comment, Judicial Review of Dismissals of Civil Service Employees for Off-Duty Miscon-
duct: The Approach of the Federal Circuit, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 439, 459 (1985).
261 Frug, supra note 46, at 958. R
262 See MAYERS, supra note 215, at 498; Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise R
of Appellate Powers in Adverse Action Appeals, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 331 (1970).
263 Frug, supra note 46, at 958–59. R
264 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 132. R
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1910, ch. 384, 36 Stat. 703, 703.
268 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 130. R
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seemingly incessant stream of supplemental appropriations.  Frus-
trated with this situation, Congress enacted an appropriations rider
directing the Treasury Secretary to transmit a detailed statement of
the Book of Estimates to the President so that
he may . . . advise the Congress how in his judgment the estimated
appropriations could with the least injury to the public service be
reduced so as to bring the appropriations within the estimated reve-
nues, or, . . . that he may recommend to Congress such loans or new
taxes as may be necessary to cover the deficiency.269
Budget reform also became a major agenda item for the Commis-
sion on Economy and Efficiency.  The Commission’s report recom-
mended a sweeping reorganization of the executive branch,
standardization of the federal government’s accounting practices, sig-
nificant decreases in the number of federal employees, and a marked
reduction in public works projects.  It also proposed that the current
budget system be abolished and that instead each executive depart-
ment submit its estimates to the President, who would integrate the
proposals into a coherent national budget.270  Taft forwarded the
Commission’s recommendations to Congress and ordered the depart-
ment heads to prepare budget estimates in the manner recom-
mended by the Commission in addition to the traditional one to be
forwarded directly to Congress.271
The Commission’s proposal met with a frosty reception on Capi-
tol Hill.  As Coletta notes: “Congress spurned Taft’s recommendations
largely because they weakened its power over the purse and reduced
the areas of control its committees had over federal finances and ad-
ministrative policies.”272  Rather than act on the report’s recommen-
dations, Congress responded by attaching a rider to a pending
appropriations bill directing executive officials to submit budget esti-
mates “only in the form and at the time now required by law, and in
no other form and at no other time.”273  Taft signed the measure, but
ignored its provisions and attached to the traditional Book of Esti-
mates a presidential budget of the type recommended by the Commis-
sion.274  In defense of his actions, Taft pointed out that “[t]he
President is the constitutional head of an organization that is conti-
nental in scope” who bore the constitutional duty to send to Congress
269 See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1909, ch. 299, § 7, 35 Stat. 945, 1027.
270 H.R. DOC. NO. 62-854, at 186–98 (1912).
271 Id.
272 COLETTA, supra note 230, at 130. R
273 Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 350, § 9, 37 Stat. 360, 415.
274 S. DOC. NO. 62-1113 (1913).
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“a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures”
and to make such recommendations to Congress as “he shall judge
necessary and expedient.”275  Congress essentially nullified Taft’s ac-
tions by ignoring his budget proposal.276
Despite their lack of success, Taft’s efforts to strengthen the Presi-
dent’s control over the administration of the law were important steps
in the long process of consolidating the President’s authority to exe-
cute the law.  As Leonard White notes:
The work of the Keep Committee and of President Taft’s Com-
mission on Economy and Efficiency . . . are the visible symbols not
only of a transfer of initiative for administrative reform from the
legislative to the executive branch, but also of the tipping of the
constitutional balance from Congress to the President of the United
States.  This shift was momentous and was not reversed.277
In sum, William Howard Taft was more a lawyer and a judge at
heart than he was a vigorous executive.  In his book, Our Chief Magis-
trate and His Powers, and in his scholarly and masterful opinion in My-
ers v. United States, Taft made his name as the President who wrote at
the greatest length and in the most depth to defend the President’s
possession of the removal power and the theory of the unitary execu-
tive.  His support for the Commission on Economy and Efficiency also
represents an important assertion of the President’s authority to exe-
cute the law.  Thus, despite his relatively modest vision of presidential
power, neither Taft’s words nor deeds are properly regarded as acqui-
escing in any diminution of the unitary executive.
VI. WOODROW WILSON
Presidential support for the unitary executive continued during
the administration of Woodrow Wilson.  That Wilson would emerge as
a major champion of presidential power came as something of a sur-
prise.  His doctoral thesis, which became a well known and widely ac-
claimed 1885 book entitled Congressional Government,278 remains one
275 Id. at 5–6.
276 LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENT 199–200 (4th ed. rev. 1991) [hereinafter FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS];
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 29–30 (1975) [hereinafter FISHER,
SPENDING POWER]; 3 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
1471–78 (1974); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION
56–58 (1964); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Re-
viving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 954–55 (1994).
277 WHITE, supra note 35, at 92. R
278 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLIT-
ICS (Meridian 1956) (1885). See generally Thomas O. Sargentich, The Limits of the Par-
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of the classic endorsements of parliamentary government.  Written in
the wake of a series of relatively weak Presidents that had been domi-
nated by the Reconstruction Congresses, Congressional Government dis-
misses the presidency as a weak office, concerned with “mere
administration” and with the Chief Executive reduced to little more
than “the first official of a carefully-graded and impartially regulated
civil service system.”279  Beneath the President were arrayed the vari-
ous executive departments, each operating with relative indepen-
dence such that “the President cannot often be really supreme in
matters of administration.”280  In short: “Our latter-day Presidents live
by proxy; they are the executive in theory, but the Secretaries are the
executive in fact.”281  Even the cabinet secretaries “are not in fact the
directors of the executive policy of the government.”282  True control
of the administration lay with Congress.283  And congressional policy
with respect to administration was dictated by the standing commit-
tees,284 which were vulnerable to special interest pressures and unre-
sponsive to the popular will.285
In addition, Congressional Government asserted that the constitu-
tional commitment to the separation of powers was a “grievous mis-
take” and a “radical defect in our Federal system” that prevented
either the President or Congress from emerging as the “supreme ulti-
mate head . . . which can decide at once and with conclusive authority
what shall be done at those times when some decision there must
be.”286  Under the best of circumstances, the division of authority led
to deadlock; in times of duress, it led to a “paralysis in moments of
emergency” that can be “fatal.”287  At this point, Wilson thought that
the best way to make the federal government more responsive to the
public will would be to adopt a more parliamentary style of govern-
ment, in which members of Congress also served as heads of executive
departments and the government was subject to votes of no confi-
liamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 684–88,
691–92 (1993) (providing a concise overview of the evolution of Wilson’s views on the
proper roles for the President and Congress).
279 WILSON, supra note 278, at 170. R
280 Id. at 173.
281 Id. at 49.
282 Id. at 174.
283 Id. at 177 (“In so far as the President is an executive officer he is the servant of
Congress; and the members of the Cabinet, being confined to executive functions,
are altogether the servants of Congress.”).
284 Id. at 170, 174, 179–80.
285 Id. at 70–72.
286 Id. at 186–87.
287 Id. at 186.
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dence.288  Under such a vision, Congress would clearly emerge as the
locus of federal power, and administrative head would no longer be a
primary part of the presidential portfolio.
Over time, however, Wilson’s views on the proper allocation of
power between the presidency and Congress evolved.  The examples
of a vigorous presidency set by Grover Cleveland, William McKinley,
and especially Theodore Roosevelt changed Wilson’s thinking.  Ken-
drick Clements, Wilson’s biographer, notes that:
By 1908, after his own experience of executive power at
Princeton and after seven years of Theodore Roosevelt’s vigorous
national leadership, Wilson was ready to find in the presidency the
possibilities of leadership and national unification that he had so
long sought.  “We have grown more inclined,” he said that year in a
series of published lectures delivered at Columbia University, “to
look to the President as the unifying force in our complex system,
the leader both of his party and of the nation.”
The president’s leadership of his party gave him influence over
Congress, Wilson argued in 1908, but more importantly his stand-
ing as the interpreter of the country’s instinctive wishes and desires
made him a unique national figure . . . .289
The transformation of Wilson’s views are manifest in the rather
striking shift in tone and focus taken in Wilson’s second master work,
Constitutional Government in the United States, which was published in
1908.290  Wilson noted that the country “ha[d] grown more and more
inclined . . . to look to the President as the unifying force in our com-
plex system.”291  Wilson elaborated:
His is the only national voice in affairs.  Let him once win the admi-
ration and confidence of the country, and no other single voice can
withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him.
His position takes the imagination of the country.  He is the repre-
sentative of no constituency, but of the whole people.292
Wilson continued:
If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it,
he is irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so
much as when its President is of such insight and calibre. . . . It is for
this reason that it will often prefer to choose a man rather than a
288 Id. at 79, 188–89.
289 KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, THE PRESIDENCY OF WOODROW WILSON 7 (1992).
290 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1908).
291 Id. at 60.
292 Id. at 68.
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party.  A President whom it trusts can not only lead it, but form it to
his own views.293
Wilson’s change in heart can best be explained by his desire for
vigor in government.  Simply put, by 1908 he had concluded that the
President was better institutionally situated than Congress to provide
the necessary leadership.  Although Wilson had previously viewed ad-
ministration as essentially a mechanical process of carrying out politi-
cal decisions made by Congress, he came to appreciate that
administrative actions were themselves an important source of public
law.294  As such, all administration needed to be subject to presidential
control.295
Clements describes Wilson’s attitude as one of “glorification of
the presidency,” in which the Chief Executive possessed “extraordi-
nary potential power deriving from his triple functions as party leader,
symbol of national unity, and interpreter of the wishes of the peo-
ple.”296  These views would only strengthen during Wilson’s service as
Governor of New Jersey, which set the stage for his election as Presi-
dent.  It was “a remarkable change from Wilson’s earlier belief that
leadership should be lodged in the legislature and was a slightly omi-
nous foretaste of the ‘imperial presidency’ of half a century later.”297
These commitments were evident in the way that Wilson con-
ducted his Administration.  Wilson had long recognized the constitu-
tional foundations of the President’s removal power.  Even Wilson’s
early, pro-parliamentary writings condemned the Tenure of Office Act
as “repugnant . . . to the original theory of the Constitution.”298  The
manner in which Wilson wielded the removal power manifests that
this belief was no mere paper commitment.  Wilson did not hesitate to
293 Id.
294 CLEMENTS, supra note 289, at 6–7. R
295 In fact, Wilson went so far as to suggest the sole purpose of the cabinet was to
relieve the President of the burdens of day-to-day administration. WILSON, supra note
290, at 76.  If cabinet members did their jobs properly, their departments “may pro- R
ceed with their business for months and even years together without demanding [the
President’s] attention.” Id. at 67.  Wilson’s views in this regard no doubt reflected the
Progressive era’s faith in technocracy and the feasibility of separating politics from
administration.  Regardless of the ultimate merits of this approach, there can be little
doubt that it embraces the belief that the bureaucracy must be highly responsive to
presidential control.
296 CLEMENTS, supra note 289, at 8. R
297 Id.
298 WILSON, supra note 278, at 52; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: R
THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHN-
SON 260 (1992) (demonstrating that Wilson had acknowledged the dangers of con-
gressional usurpation).
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dismiss cabinet officials or put them in a situation where they felt they
needed to resign.  Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan resigned
believing that Wilson was unnecessarily pushing America into World
War I.  William C. Redfield, the first Secretary of the Department of
Commerce, resigned, believing Wilson was not supportive enough of
business.  And, most dramatically, Wilson fired Secretary of State Rob-
ert Lessing.299  Indeed, Wilson was to fight with his cabinet for acting
independently of him even when he was incapacitated by his stroke.300
And perhaps most importantly, Wilson directed his Postmaster Gen-
eral to dismiss Frank S. Myers as Postmaster First Class.  Although the
removal of a fairly minor federal official would not ordinarily be note-
worthy, in this case it would provide the basis for the Supreme Court’s
most important decision regarding the removal power: Myers v. United
States.301  The Wilson Administration also successfully defended the
removal power before the Court of Claims, which declined to over-
turn a removal decision on the grounds that the decision whether to
exercise the removal power lay solely with the proper officials of the
proper department.302  Thus, as one commentator observed at the
time: “It may be said with entire accuracy . . . that the law in its present
state offers no obstacle to the removal of an employee for inefficiency
and that responsibility for failure to make such removal . . . rests
wholly upon the administrative officer.”303
In addition, Wilson opposed numerous congressional attempts to
infringe upon his authority to execute the laws.  For example, on May
13, 1920, Wilson vetoed an appropriations bill which subjected the
printing of magazines by executive agencies to the prior approval of
the Joint Committee on Printing as “an invasion of the province of the
Executive.”304  As Wilson further asserted:
The Congress and the Executive should function within their re-
spective spheres. . . . The Congress has the power and the right to
grant or deny an appropriation, or to enact or refuse to enact a law;
but once an appropriation is made or a law is passed, the appropria-
tion should be administered or the law executed by the executive
branch of the Government.  In no other way can the Government
be efficiently managed and responsibility definitely fixed.305
299 CLEMENTS, supra note 289, at 94–95. R
300 Id. at 198–99.
301 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
302 Kellom v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 174 (1920).
303 MAYERS, supra note 215, at 498. R
304 Woodrow Wilson, Veto Message (May 13, 1920), reprinted in 59 CONG. REC.
7026, 7026 (1920).
305 Id., reprinted in 59 CONG. REC. 7026, 7026 (1920).
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This same veto message also criticized a provision of a previous appro-
priations act giving the Public Buildings Commission, a body that in-
cluded four members of Congress, absolute control over the
allotment of all space in federal buildings in the District of
Columbia.306
Even more significant was Wilson’s veto of the Budget and Ac-
counting Act the following month.307  This Act would have largely im-
plemented the recommendations of Taft’s Commission on Economy
and Efficiency by authorizing presidential coordination of the budget
process through the newly created Bureau of the Budget.  The Act
would also have established a General Accounting Office (GAO)
headed by the Comptroller General, which would have had the power
to conduct audits to verify that the administration allocated federal
funds in accordance with the appropriations legislation enacted by
Congress.  To insure that the Comptroller General and the GAO pos-
sessed the independence from the executive branch needed to con-
duct a proper audit, the Act would have made the Comptroller
General removable only by concurrent resolution, a legislative device
that merely required the assent of both houses of Congress and did
not require the President’s signature.  Had the Act stopped there, it
might not have drawn Wilson’s ire.  Unfortunately, the Act also as-
signed to the Comptroller General the responsibilities of pre-approv-
ing all expenditures and of adjusting accounts that were previously
assigned to the comptrollers and the auditors of the Treasury Depart-
ment—responsibilities that were clearly executive in nature.308
Despite his avid support for the proposal, Wilson nonetheless ve-
toed this measure on the grounds that it shielded an officer wielding
executive power from direct presidential removal.  As Wilson noted in
306 Id., reprinted in 59 CONG. REC. 7026, 7026–27 (1920) (criticizing the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Act of 1920, ch. 86, § 10, 40 Stat. 1213, 1270
(1919)); see also Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congres-
sional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 600 (1953) (explaining that
Wilson vetoed the bill on the ground that the provision vested executive functions in
a congressional committee).
307 Woodrow Wilson, Veto Message (June 4, 1920), in 17 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 193, at 8851 (vetoing H.R. 9783, 66th Cong. (1920)). R
308 See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 60; 3 GOLDSMITH, R
supra note 276, at 1478–79; 2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at 809–11; GEORGE W. PEPPER, R
FAMILY QUARRELS: THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE, THE HOUSE 120 (1931); SMALL, supra
note 193, at 137; Cornelius P. Cotter & J. Malcolm Smith, Administrative Accountability R
to Congress: The Concurrent Resolution, 9 W. POL. Q. 955, 958 (1956); Louis Fisher, Con-
gress and the Removal Power, 10 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 63, 66–67 (1983); Ginnane,
supra note 306, at 575; Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 10 B.U. R
L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1930).
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his veto message, “the Congress is without constitutional powers to
limit . . . the power of removal derived from the Constitution.”309  Wil-
son reasoned: “It has . . . always been the accepted construction of the
Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this kind carries
with it, as an incident, the power to remove.”310  Consequently, Wilson
concluded: “Regarding as I do the power of removal from office as an
essential incident to the appointing power, I cannot escape the con-
clusion that the vesting of this power of removal in the Congress is
unconstitutional and therefore I am unable to approve the bill.”311
Thus even in a situation such as this, where adopting the contrary
position would have had the practical effect of greatly enhancing the
President’s power, Wilson remained true to the theory of the unitary
executive.
Wilson made other efforts to centralize his control of the execu-
tion of the laws.  His initial efforts to reorganize the government foun-
dered in the face of strong congressional opposition.  However, the
exigencies of World War I finally led to the passage of the Overman
Act of 1918, which authorized Wilson to coordinate and consolidate
executive agencies by executive order.312  Armed with this authority,
Wilson issued twenty-four executive orders that, among other things,
placed the work of all law officers under the supervision of the Attor-
ney General and centralized control of all health activities under the
Secretary of the Treasury.313  Although the Overman Act limited the
reorganization power to war-related agencies and prohibited the abo-
lition of any agency, it did lay the foundation for the reorganization
proposals that were to follow.314
The Wilson Administration also bore witness to the birth of three
additional independent agencies: the Federal Reserve Board, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), and the U.S. Shipping Board.315  The
309 Wilson, supra note 307, at 8852. R
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Overman Act, ch. 78, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 40 Stat. 556, 556–57 (1918).
313 Exec. Order No. 2877 (May 31, 1918), microformed on CIS Presidential Execu-
tive Orders and Proclamations 1918-EO-2877 (Cong. Info. Serv.); S. REP. NO. 75-1236,
at 5 (1937).
314 BARRY D. KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW DEAL 190
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1963) [hereinafter KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZA-
TION]; DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSI-
BILITY 184 (1966); Barry D. Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 [hereinafter Karl, Presidential Power].
315 Congress also created a Water Power Commission that would be the predeces-
sor to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC).  Unlike the successor agencies, which were created as independent
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members of each of these bodies were protected by the same removal
restrictions contained in the amended Interstate Commerce Act, lim-
iting removals to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”316  In-
terestingly, the statute establishing the Federal Reserve Board failed to
include any removal limits whatsoever.317
Like Cleveland, Wilson offered no objections to the creation of
these independent agencies or the inclusion of the restrictions on his
removal power.  As during the Cleveland Administration, however, it
would be dangerous to read too much into Wilson’s failure to object.
As we have noted earlier, it is doubtful that Congress intended the
language in the original Interstate Commerce Act to preclude the
President from removing commissioners over disagreements over pol-
icy.318  As Robert Cushman, the leading early commentator on the his-
tory of the independent regulatory commissions, has noted, the for-
cause removal protections of the Interstate Commerce Act were re-
garded “more as a protection to the public by providing a way to get
rid of objectionable commissioners than as a limitation on Presiden-
tial authority.”319  In addition, removal provisions prompted little dis-
cussion, suggesting that Congress did not view these restrictions as a
key to determining the commissions’ independence.320  The scant leg-
islative history that does exist suggests that Congress probably did not
have any clear idea of the relationship between the independent agen-
cies and the President.321  If anything, the legislative history suggests
that Congress regarded the removal provisions in the FTC Act as a
check on the Commission’s power, not the President’s, and that Con-
agencies, the original Water Power Commission was comprised entirely of cabinet
officers and thus was without question an executive agency. See Federal Water Power
Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063.
316 Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 728, 729; Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718.
317 See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 261 (establishing the
Federal Reserve Board without specifying any removal restrictions).
318 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 797–99.  Even commentators who are some- R
what more skeptical of the unitary executive agree with this conclusion. See Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 110–12. R
319 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 62. R
320 Id. at 196 (regarding the FTC); id. at 240 (regarding the U.S. Shipping Board).
321 Id. at 153 (noting that the independence of the Federal Reserve Board was
“never clearly settled”); id. at 222 (noting that “Congress has never worked out any
clear idea” regarding “the relations between the Federal Trade Commission and the
President”); id. at 239 (noting that the legislative history sheds “little light upon the
President’s relation to the proposed [Shipping] Board”).
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gress thought about the FTC’s independence in terms of freedom
from partisanship rather than freedom from presidential control.322
In fact, during consideration of the FTC Act, Wilson insisted that
the Commission remain relatively weak, reflecting his view that the
Commission was “an executive agency charged with executive and ad-
ministrative duties” and that “the commission was merely to supple-
ment existing law-enforcement agencies.”323  Wilson’s theory seems to
have won the day, as he “secured the inclusion in the Federal Trade
Commission Act of the clause authorizing the President to direct the
commission to make certain investigations.”324  Cushman goes on to
note:
Throughout the discussions of this whole period there runs an un-
derlying assumption that the commission’s policy, if not actually di-
rected from the White House, at least conforms to the President’s
wishes, that the President cannot escape responsibility for the com-
mission’s policy, and that an incoming President objecting to such
policy should change it, if not by the actual issuance of orders to the
commission, at least by making of suitable appointments.325
The conclusion that Congress intended these new commissions
to operate subject to presidential control is further reinforced when
the removal provisions are read in light of the statutes’ other provi-
sions.  For example, the Federal Reserve Board as constituted in 1914
included both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of
the Currency as ex officio members specifically to insure that the ex-
ecutive branch would be able to exert an appropriate degree of con-
trol over monetary policy.326  Similarly, the FTC Act specifically
authorized the President to direct the FTC’s investigatory activities.327
322 Id. at 195–96, 198–99.
323 Id. at 97.
324 Id. at 222–23.
325 Id. at 226.
326 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 261; see also CUSHMAN,
supra note 194, at 153–55, 683 (demonstrating the vital interest that the executive R
branch had in the Board’s control of policies affecting currency and credit); LOUIS
FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 156 (1st ed. 1981) (“The Federal Reserve
Board  was originally composed of seven members, including the secretary of the trea-
sury and the comptroller of the currency as ex officio members.”). The Treasury
Secretary and Comptroller of the Currency were not removed from the Board until
1935. See infra note 509 and accompanying text. R
327 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 6(d), 38 Stat. 717, 721; see
also CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 192–94, 199, 222 (discussing the debates over the R
provision allowing the President to direct the Commission to make an investigation);
FISHER, supra note 326, at 156 (noting that the FTC took over investigations from the R
Bureau of Corporations).
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Moreover, the Act creating the U.S. Shipping Board clearly envisaged
that the Board would exercise important managerial duties under the
direction of the President.  In fact, the year after the U.S. Shipping
Board was established, the exigencies of World War I led Congress to
enact legislation giving the President new powers to control shipbuild-
ing,328 authority which he promptly delegated to the Board.329  The
Board acknowledged that it would exercise “solely as the agent of the
President,”330 and it was universally regarded as such throughout the
conduct of World War I.331  After the war ended, Congress would
transfer some of the President’s authority back to the Board.332  The
clear role for presidential involvement in these commissions’ opera-
tions vitiates any suggestion that they were intended to be indepen-
dent of presidential control.
Moreover, Wilson’s treatment of these new institutions under-
scored that he did not regard them as independent of his authority.
As Cushman has concluded, “[t]here is no doubt that Wilson . . . felt
that he was entitled to impress his policies on the independent com-
missions and to expect their conformity to those policies.”333  Accord-
ingly, Wilson did not hesitate to use his power to direct FTC
investigations, launching many of the FTC’s major initiatives.334  Wil-
son also threatened to remove the entire Federal Reserve Board for
disagreeing with his policies.335
But the most compelling explanation for why Wilson failed to ob-
ject to these provisions is the Supreme Court’s decision in Shurtleff.336
The removal language included in these new statutes was identical to
328 Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation Act of 1917, ch. 29, 40 Stat. 182.
329 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 241. R
330 U.S. SHIPPING BD. FOURTH ANN. REP. 6 (1917), quoted in CUSHMAN, supra note
194, at 241. R
331 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 248. R
332 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 2(a)(1), 41 Stat. 988, 988.  Although
Congress at that time considered transferring control of the Shipping Board to a cabi-
net secretary, it retained the Board as an independent agency, complete with the
attendant restrictions on removal.  Congress did amend the law so that the Board’s
Chairman would thereafter be selected by the President rather than the Board itself.
Id. § 3(a), 41 Stat. at 989.  Unfortunately, the debates surrounding this reorganization
shed precious little light on what Congress perceived to be the proper relationship
between the Board and the President. See CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 245, 247–49. R
333 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 681. R
334 Id. at 222–23.  In fact, both Wilson and the Congress appeared to regard the
FTC in many ways as an adjunct to the Department of Justice, id. at 196–98, and both
seemed to believe that the President possessed a general power to direct FTC activity
above and beyond his statutory authority, id. at 223.
335 Id. at 681, 685; Moreno, supra note 194, at 483 & n.109. R
336 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 57  8-DEC-04 13:46
2004] the  unitary  executive 57
the language held in Shurtleff as not placing any limits on the Presi-
dent’s power to remove.337  Therefore, Congress was doubtless aware
that under Supreme Court precedent, including the same language in
the FTC Act and the Shipping Act appears to make the members of
the bodies created by those statutes removable at will.  This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the fact that in 1908, five years after Shurtleff,
Congress amended the statute at issue in Shurtleff to make explicit that
general appraisers of customs could be removed for cause and for no
other reason.338  The decision to employ language identical to that used
in Shurtleff rather than the language used in the amended customs
statute would thus appear to be no accident and raises the strong in-
ference that Congress did not intend to limit the President’s power to
remove members of the FTC or the U.S. Shipping Board.339  In light
of Shurtleff, the FTC was not truly an independent agency and would
not become one until the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.340
The eventual emergence of Wilson’s views regarding the central-
ity of the institution of the presidency and his strong opposition to
repeated congressional attempts to interfere with his authority to exe-
cute the laws appear to provide strong support for the unitary execu-
tive.  Although three new independent agencies were created under
his administration without his objection, the evidence shows that
neither Congress nor Wilson regarded these commissions to be inde-
pendent of presidential control.  Congress did include the key lan-
guage identified by Shurtleff as signaling Congress’s intention to limit
the removal power in the two statutes establishing Boards to facilitate
the resolution of railway labor disputes.341  That said, Wilson’s overall
record viewed as a whole is more than sufficient to overcome any sug-
gestion that Wilson acquiesced to any derogation of his authority to
control the execution of the law notwithstanding his failure to object
to these relatively minor independent agencies.
337 Id. at 314–15.
338 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, sec. 3, § 31, 35 Stat. 403, 406.
339 See CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 240. R
340 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
341 See Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 306(b), 41 Stat. 456, 470 (creating a
Railroad Labor Board whose members “may be removed by the President for neglect
of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause” (emphasis added)); Newl-
ands Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 103, 108 (creating a Board of Mediation and
Conciliation headed by a Commissioner “who shall be removable by the President
only for misconduct in office” (emphasis added)).
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VII. WARREN G. HARDING
The presidency of Warren Harding is consistently ranked as one
of the worst, if not the worst, in our nation’s history.342  A congenial
man who abjured conflict, Harding was by nature most comfortable
remaining outside the fray and conciliating divergent interests.  This
outlook made him deeply suspicious of strong presidential power,
which he believed could only lead to troubled relations with Congress,
as it had during the Wilson Administration.  As a result, he attempted
to pay respect to Congress’s prerogatives by adopting a narrow con-
ception of presidential power.  This vision turned the presidency into
a largely ceremonial office whose main purpose was to serve as a be-
loved source of national pride.  There was little room in it for political
leadership.343  Harding’s legacy was ultimately consumed by a series of
scandals, which culminated in the conviction and imprisonment of
one of his cabinet secretaries for accepting bribes for the oil leases in
Teapot Dome.344  If ever there were a President who might have been
expected to abandon the unitary executive, it was Harding.
Viewed in this light, Harding’s record in defending the Presi-
dent’s authority to execute the laws may be regarded as something of
a pleasant surprise.  Harding did not hesitate to take steps to ensure
that the independent agencies acted in accord with the administra-
tion’s policy agenda.  His actions included communicating his pre-
ferred policy positions to members of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC)345 and the Shipping Board,346 requiring commis-
sioners to submit their undated resignations before receiving their ap-
342 EUGENE P. TRANI & DAVID L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF WARREN G. HARDING
189–90 (1977).  For a review of past presidential rankings and the presentation of an
updated ranking of presidencies (in which Harding tied for next-to-last), see James
Lindgren & Steven G. Calabresi, Rating the Presidents of the United States, 1789–2000: A
Survey of Scholars in Political Science, History, and Law, 18 CONST. COMM. 583 (2001).
343 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 37.  The few occasions during which Har- R
ding attempted to exercise leadership on policy issues were typically ill conceived and
ended in disaster. See id. at 59 (describing Harding’s reluctance to push for the vision
he described in his initial address to Congress); id. at 76–78, 80–81 (discussing Har-
ding’s failed attempt to push ship building subsidies through Congress).
344 Id. at 179–85.
345 Moreno, supra note 194, at 483 & n.111 (citing 2 ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, THE R
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
455 (1931)).
346 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 249–50, 254; WILSON K. DOYLE, INDEPENDENT R
COMMISSIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 17 (1939).
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pointments,347 and ignoring the statutory provisions purporting to
limit presidential removal authority and threatening to remove Ship-
ping Board members who disagreed with his policies.348  Even more
important were his efforts to reconstitute the independent agencies
with members more in tune with his pro-business orientation.  Har-
ding made a number of transformative appointments to the ICC, the
Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Tariff Commission, and the FTC that
effectively brought the regulatory program of the Progressive era to
an end.349  Harding did fail to object when Congress included re-
moval restrictions when establishing a commission to investigate a se-
ries of coal strikes.350  Such a minor deviation does not seem sufficient
to constitute acquiescence when viewed in light of Harding’s overall
record with respect to the independent agencies.
Believing that promoting efficiency would make the government
more responsive to business, Harding also embraced efforts to reor-
ganize the executive branch.351  He appointed his good friend Walter
F. Brown as the Chair of the Joint Congressional Committee on Reor-
ganization established at the end of the Wilson Administration.  The
plan Brown developed called for wholesale consolidation of the fed-
eral bureaucracy into ten departments.352  Most importantly for our
purposes, the proposal reiterated the position first advanced by Teddy
Roosevelt and recommended that the independent agencies be con-
solidated into the executive departments.353  This plan prompted a
spate of bureaucratic infighting that rendered its enactment a practi-
cal impossibility.  Although some cabinet members were able to
achieve some limited success in modernizing the operations of their
departments, plans to impose more extensive changes were eventually
ended by Harding’s untimely death and the advent of the Coolidge
Administration, which did not share Harding’s interest in executive
branch reorganization.354
347 Moreno, supra note 194, at 483 & n.111 (citing 2 ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, THE R
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
458 n.209 (1931)).
348 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 252, 254, 685. R
349 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 49–50, 86–87. R
350 Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 248, § 1, 42 Stat. 1446, 1446 (creating a United States
Coal Commission whose members “may be removed by the President for neglect of
duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause” (emphasis added)).
351 See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA 413–16 (1969).
352 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 83–84. R
353 S. REP. NO. 75-1236, at 5 (1937); Moreno, supra note 194, at 483 nn.112–13 R
(citing TYRUS G. FAIN ET AL., FEDERAL REORGANIZATION: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, at
xxix (1977)).
354 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 84. R
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But the most important step Harding took to bolster the unitary
executive was the completion of the effort to establish a Bureau of the
Budget initiated by Taft and continued by Wilson.  Under the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921,355 “[t]he Bureau of the Budget was part
of the executive branch, reporting to the president.  The budget di-
rector was not to take instruction from cabinet officers but only from
the president, which gave the director the authority to plan a responsi-
ble budget without constant interference.”356  The impact on the Pres-
ident’s ability to control his administration was palpable and
immediate.  Under the leadership of the very able Charles Dawes, the
Bureau of the Budget was able to save over one billion dollars during
its first year of operation.357  Even more importantly, the Bureau al-
lowed the President to exert far more control over federal spending
than ever before.358
Ironically, Harding’s greatest achievement in asserting the Presi-
dent’s authority to execute the law was simultaneously his greatest fail-
ure.  Attached to the legislation creating the Bureau of the Budget was
a provision creating the General Accounting Office headed by a
Comptroller General appointed to a fifteen-year term and removable
by joint resolution rather than by concurrent resolution as proposed
during the Wilson Administration.359  Because a joint resolution nec-
essarily requires the President’s signature to be effective, this provi-
sion guaranteed presidential participation in any removals.  The use
of a joint resolution, however, prevented the President from initiating
the removal of the Comptroller General and from exercising the re-
moval power without congressional consent.  These were precisely the
problems that induced Wilson to veto the previous version of the
Budget and Accounting Act, notwithstanding his avid support for the
bill.  Harding failed to follow suit and signed the Act into law.360
Harding’s failure to object to the limits on the President’s power
to remove the Comptroller General undeniably constituted a blow to
the unitary executive.  At worst, however, Harding’s approval of the
Budget and Accounting Act represents something of a mixed bag.
The case can be made that the simultaneous creation of the Bureau of
the Budget greatly enhanced the President’s ability to execute the
laws and control the executive branch.  To his credit, Harding did use
355 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, §§ 207–211, 42 Stat. 20, 22.
356 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 62. R
357 Id. at 47–48, 64.
358 Id. at 47.
359 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 § 303, 42 Stat. at 23–24.
360 See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 60; 2 HAYNES, supra R
note 255, at 811; Fisher, supra note 308, at 67; Warren, supra note 308, at 30. R
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the full capabilities of the Bureau of the Budget to assert his control
over executive agencies, establishing firm control over the budget pro-
cess and requiring agencies to submit all legislative proposals that
might involve presidential spending to the Bureau of the Budget for
clearance.361  Harding’s reorganization proposal also recommended
that the newly created General Accounting Office be transferred into
the Treasury Department.362  This initiative was ultimately doomed by
Congress’s failure to embrace any aspect of Harding’s reorganization
plan.
Ultimately, Harding’s legacy would be undone by his decision to
include in his cabinet two personal friends who subsequently became
enmeshed in scandal.  Ironically, most of Harding’s major executive
and judicial nominees were men of outstanding talent and ability.
Harding appointed the very talented Charles Evans Hughes to be Sec-
retary of State, and he named the brilliant Andrew W. Mellon Secre-
tary of the Treasury.  Rising star Herbert Hoover was named Secretary
of Commerce, and the formidable William Howard Taft was nomi-
nated to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Harding’s biogra-
phers, Eugene Trani and David Wilson, observe: “For quality it would
be hard to surpass men such as Hoover, Hughes, and [Agriculture
Secretary Henry] Wallace.”363  It is thus ironic that two bad appoint-
ments—Albert Fall as Secretary of the Interior and Harry Daugherty
as Attorney General—would forever besmirch the reputation of an ad-
ministration led by an otherwise distinguished cabinet.  Mercifully,
Harding died unaware of the damage that his friends’ improprieties
would do to his reputation.364
On the whole, Harding’s record in defending the unitariness of
the executive is somewhat equivocal.  Notwithstanding his rather con-
strained vision of the proper scope of presidential power, Harding did
take a number of steps to defend the President’s authority to execute
the law, as evidenced by his willingness to dominate the independent
agencies and to populate the executive branch with an able cabinet
staffed by giants like Charles Evans Hughes and Andrew Mellon.  Even
more important is Harding’s role in creating the Bureau of the
Budget, which is regarded by many as one of his Administration’s
more significant achievements365 and which represents the precursor
to the agency that has become the presidency’s primary mechanism
361 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 276, at 1489–95; Cross, supra note 192, at 490. R
362 S. REP. NO. 75-1236, at 5 (1937).
363 TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 43. R
364 Id. at 191.
365 Id. at 106.
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for centralizing control of the administration of the law: the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).
At the same time, it is undeniable that Harding’s failure to main-
tain Wilson’s objections to the restrictions on the removal of the
Comptroller General constitutes a clear failure of a President to de-
fend the unitariness of the executive branch.  Also somewhat trouble-
some is Harding’s reluctance to enforce the mandates of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act of 1919.  Harding was
the first President burdened with having to balance the political un-
popularity of Prohibition and the obligation to enforce the law.  The
contradiction between his public support for Prohibition on the one
hand, and the implications of his personal habits and the almost farci-
cal level of enforcement on the other hand do not do Harding much
credit.366  When viewed in light of the overall historical record, how-
ever, these episodes provide at most modest support for the claim that
Harding acquiesced to a non-unitary executive branch.  Unfortu-
nately, what little good Harding was able to accomplish in his brief
two years in office has largely been eclipsed by the Teapot Dome scan-
dal, which surfaced after his death and which is described in the next
section.
VIII. CALVIN COOLIDGE
Warren Harding’s death elevated Calvin Coolidge to the presi-
dency.  A reticent man who reflected many of the values of his rural
New England roots, “Silent Cal” was the antithesis of the activist Presi-
dent.  On the contrary, Walter Lippmann reported that his “political
genius . . . was his talent for effectively doing nothing.”367
Coolidge’s reluctance to assume national leadership or to impose
his will on Congress, however, did not translate into reluctance to de-
fend the President’s prerogatives.  Coolidge was more than willing to
fight to assert the President’s sole right to control the execution of the
federal laws.  For instance, the degree of influence Coolidge exerted
over the independent agencies indicates that he envisioned them as
being subject to his will.  Reportedly believing that the FTC and other
commissions “should subordinate their judgment to the opinions of
the Executive” and that “they properly were mere agencies to register
366 Id. at 179.
367 Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 59 n.249 (2002) (quoting White House, Calvin Coolidge, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/cc30.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004)).
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the policies of the administration,”368 Coolidge attempted to domi-
nate the independent agencies by influencing the rediscount policy of
the Federal Reserve Board, dictating policy to the U.S. Shipping
Board, requiring that commissioners submit undated letters of resig-
nation before appointing them, and threatening to remove commis-
sioners who disagreed with his policies.369  The fact that the
threatened removal of these commissioners failed to evoke any con-
gressional protests suggests that Congress also did not regard the stat-
utory removal restrictions as vitiating any of the President’s
constitutional powers.370  He “moved carefully but firmly to create a
protectionist majority on the Tariff Commission,” removing one com-
missioner and appointing another to be an ambassador to give him-
self a vacancy to fill.371  A third low-tariff commissioner was driven to
resign in 1928 as Coolidge established complete control over the com-
mission.372  The fact that from 1927 to 1929 Congress made expendi-
tures of appropriations with respect to the Merchant Marine
conditional on approval by the President and not the U.S. Shipping
Board further contradicts any suggestion that Congress thought that
the independent agencies should exercise their authority completely
independently of executive control.373  Congress would create two mi-
nor independent agencies without drawing any objection from
Coolidge.374
Coolidge further exerted control over the independent agencies
by appointing commissioners who were sympathetic to his pro-busi-
ness policies.  These efforts culminated with the appointment of Wil-
368 See 69 CONG. REC. 3031 (1928) (statement of Sen. Carter Glass), quoted in
ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 459 n.209 (1931); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 681 R
(finding presidential domination of certain agencies to be essential); Moreno, supra
note 194, at 483 (noting that Coolidge envisioned the role of administrative entities as R
subordinate to the President’s power).
369 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 685; DOYLE, supra note 346, at 18; 2 HAYNES, supra R
note 255, at 765; Moreno, supra note 194, at 483. R
370 See CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 255. R
371 ROBERT H. FERRELL, THE PRESIDENCY OF CALVIN COOLIDGE 70 (1998).
372 Id.
373 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 258–59. R
374 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 253, 336–37 (creating the
Board of Tax Appeals whose members “may be removed by the President for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or ineligibility, but for no other reason”
(emphasis added)); Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 4, 44 Stat. 577, 579 (1926) (creating
the Board of Mediation whose members “may be removed by the President for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or ineligibility, but for no other cause”
(emphasis added)).
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liam E. Humphrey to the Chairmanship of the FTC.375  Humphrey
bragged about the impact of his appointment, noting that “[i]f [the
FTC] was going east before, it is going west now.”376  He added:
Do you think I would have a body of men working here under me
that did not share my ideas about these matters?  Not on your life.  I
would not hesitate a minute to cut their heads off if they disagreed
with me.  What in the hell do you think I am here for?377
These rather extreme statements by Humphrey are important be-
cause they reveal the extent to which the independent agencies were
in tune with Coolidge’s basic policies.  It is clear that both Harding
and Coolidge moved very aggressively to turn the direction of the in-
dependent agencies around 180 degrees.  While the merits of the lais-
sez-faire policy they pursued are open to dispute, there can be no
question but that Harding and Coolidge ensured that these agencies
acted in accordance with the vision determined by the President not-
withstanding the supposed statutory guarantees of independence.
Humphrey’s aggressive statements about his own role in implement-
ing Coolidge’s laissez-faire policies certainly help to explain why FDR
was so eager to remove him in the litigation that ultimately became
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.378
Coolidge also used his control over the executive branch and the
new powers vested in the President by Harding’s creation of the Bu-
reau of the Budget to rein in the federal debt.  As President, he saw
the federal debt drop from $22.3 billion in 1923 when he took office
to $16.9 billion in 1929 when he left office, a dramatic reduction in-
deed.379  Robert Ferrell, Coolidge’s biographer, reports:
In holding down government expenditures and saving enough
money to retire the debt, Coolidge employed several devices, one of
which was the Bureau of the Budget.  The very fact that the bureau’s
statisticians and accountants were screening the proposed expenses
of cabinet departments and the independent agencies gave comfort
to the parsimonious president.  The bureau’s experts also could
watch for special proposals by those well-known spendthrifts, the
members of Congress.  When the president presented his annual
375 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 71. R
376 Id. at 72 (quoting G. Cullom Davis, The Transformation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 49 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 437, 449 (1962)).
377 Id. (quoting G. Cullom Davis, The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission,
49 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 437, 449 (1962)).
378 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
379 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 167. R
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budget he could feel fairly sure that it was as low as he properly
should go, and not a crazy quilt of special interest propositions.380
Thus, the Bureau of the Budget proved its usefulness to the presi-
dency from its inception, thus compensating for Harding’s agreement
to removal limits for the Comptroller General.
The most significant step that the Coolidge Administration took
to defend the unitary executive was its role in briefing and arguing
Myers v. United States.381  The Coolidge Administration’s role in Myers
began when the Administration continued to defend Wilson’s re-
moval of Frank Myers in defiance of the statutory restriction on the
removal of postmasters.382  In the brief and oral argument presented
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Solicitor General James M. Beck offered a
series of ringing statements on the very exact controversy that is the
subject of these articles.  Beck’s brief argued that “[f]rom the Begin-
ning of the Government removal has been recognized as essentially an
executive function.”383  The Constitutional Convention did not dis-
cuss the removal power because its members thought it was “axiomatic
that the power to remove was an executive power and that it was in-
cluded within the grant of ‘executive power’ to the President and the
special grant that he should ‘take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.’”384  Beck further observed:
There is, however, a very significant difference between the first sec-
tions of Art. I and Art. II, respectively.  Art. I, § 1, provides: “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.”  Art. II, § 2, provides: “The executive Power shall be
vested in a President.”  It does not use the words “herein granted,”
nor does it speak of a class of powers as the preceding section, but it
speaks of the “executive powers;” and the executive power, as un-
derstood at that time in the science of government, always included
both the power to appoint and the power to remove.385
Beck’s brief goes on to recount the entire history of the removal
power from the Decision of 1789 of the First Congress up through the
controversy in the Jackson and Johnson Administrations, and it quotes
the many Attorney General opinions defending a unilateral presiden-
tial power of removal.386  The brief is a ringing defense of the unitary
380 Id. at 168.
381 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
382 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 88–106 (1926) (reprinting extract from
brief for the United States and oral argument of Solicitor General James M. Beck).
383 Id. at 99.
384 Id. at 100.
385 Id. at 100–01.
386 Id. at 104–06.
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executive that makes every constitutional argument for that outcome
that can be made.
Beck reiterated many of these positions during oral argument.
He said: “In my judgment, the President can remove any one in the
Executive Department of the Government.”387  Beck went on to say
that the executive power was
not granted to an Executive Department.  That is, again, a very sig-
nificant thing.  They might have limited it.  But they said: “The ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in a President of the United States”—
distinguishing him from all other servants of the Executive Depart-
ment, and making him the repository of this vast, undefined grant
of power called “the executive power.”  Then they went on to say
what that power was—not in any way attempting to classify or enu-
merate it; but they simply gave its objective, and that was “to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
It was common sense in the days of the Fathers, when our coun-
try was a little one; it is common sense today, when we are the great-
est nation in the world; when we have, as I say, 800,000 employees of
the State—that the President cannot take care that the laws are
faithfully executed, unless he has the power of removal, and the
summary power of removal, without any interference or curb upon
him.  And that has been shown again and again in our history.388
In sum, Beck’s brief and oral argument before the Court in Myers
was a paean to the theory of the unitary executive as set out in this
series of articles.  One could not have asked for a more ringing reaffir-
mation of the theory than was provided by the Coolidge Administra-
tion.  At a few points Beck hinted at narrower grounds of decision, but
he provided all of the raw material needed to construct a great opin-
ion defending the constitutional basis of the removal power.
The majority opinion in Myers was written by Chief Justice and
former President Taft, over the powerful dissents submitted by Justices
Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis.  The consistency of the previous
Presidents’ refusal to accept congressionally-imposed limits on presi-
dential removals played a large role in Chief Justice Taft’s opinion.  In
light of the opposition offered by Presidents Jackson, Grant, Cleve-
land, Wilson, and Coolidge, any limits on “the independent power of
the President to remove . . . can not be said really to have received the
acquiescence of the executive branch of Government,”389 just as this
series of articles claims.  The whole Myers episode is undoubtedly the
387 Id. at 92.
388 Id. at 93–94 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
389 Id. at 172.
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 67  8-DEC-04 13:46
2004] the  unitary  executive 67
Coolidge Administration’s defining moment with respect to the the-
ory of the unitary executive, and it can fairly be said that the Adminis-
tration ranks up there with Andrew Jackson’s and Grover Cleveland’s
as one of the staunchest defenders of the President’s removal power
in history.
Another major controversy of the Coolidge years came as a result
of the Administration’s need to address the burgeoning Teapot Dome
scandal, which had broken out during the Harding Administration.
Coolidge responded by appointing two special prosecutors to try the
cases that arose from the scandal: one a Republican, future Supreme
Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, and the other a Democrat, Atlee
Pomerene.390  These two individuals were fully removable by Coo-
lidge,391 although this episode represents the only instance in history
in which a special prosecutor was confirmed by the Senate.392
Roberts and Pomerene ably prosecuted the scandal, with no im-
pairment of Coolidge’s powers of control over the executive branch.
Because one special prosecutor was from each major political party,
public trust in the government was restored.  The prosecution would
eventually culminate in the conviction of Secretary of the Interior Al-
bert Fall, who became the first cabinet officer ever sentenced to
prison for malfeasance in office.393  Coolidge’s handling of the Tea-
pot Dome scandal was thus a model of what a strong President with
integrity could do to clean up a government scandal that had not hap-
pened on his watch.  Future presidents might do well to emulate his
example of two executive branch co-prosecutors, one from each ma-
jor political party.394
Unfortunately for Coolidge, Congress was not content to let him
prosecute these cases.  It also wanted to become involved in the re-
moval of the executive branch officers implicated by the scandal.395
Thus, the Senate debated a series of resolutions calling for the Presi-
dent to demand the resignation of Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby
390 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 46.  Pomerene was not Coolidge’s first choice.  He R
first appointed Thomas W. Gregory, who had been Attorney General during the Wil-
son Administration.  Gregory disqualified himself after it came to light that he had
previously been on the payroll of one of the targets of the investigation. Id.
391 See Act of Feb. 8, 1924, ch. 16, 43 Stat. 5, 6; KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT
JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 14 (1992).
392 See EASTLAND, supra note 7, at 8. R
393 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 47; TRANI & WILSON, supra note 342, at 185. R
394 See Smaltz, supra note 202, at 2326 (noting that both Roosevelt and Coolidge R
appointed prosecutors from each party).
395 Indeed, it was the tenacity of the congressional investigation that produced the
information that led to the conviction of Secretary Fall. TRANI & WILSON, supra note
342, at 184–85. R
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for his role in the Teapot Dome affair, which consisted solely of his
decision to transfer jurisdiction over the oil reserves to Fall.  Although
several Senators objected that the Senate had no right “to require the
President to accede to [the Senate’s demand] and dismiss the man,”
the Senate adopted a resolution calling for Denby’s removal by a vote
of forty-seven to thirty-four.396
Coolidge rebuffed the Senate resolution, announcing that “[n]o
official recognition can be given to the passage of the Senate Resolu-
tion relative to their opinion concerning members of the Cabinet or
other officer under executive control.”397  Coolidge regarded it “as a
vital principle of our Government” that “[t]he dismissal of an officer
of the Government . . . other than by impeachment, is exclusively an
executive function,” supporting his argument by quoting both Cleve-
land’s statement regarding the Duskin suspension and the seminal
statements offered by Madison in the Decision of 1789.398  This annex-
ing of the “opinions of Presidents James Madison and Grover Cleve-
land” gave a bipartisan ring to Coolidge’s claim of a unilateral
presidential removal power.399  Ultimately, despite Coolidge’s sup-
port, both Denby and Daugherty resigned because, as Denby indi-
cated, their continuance in the Cabinet was proving an
embarrassment to the President.  While continuing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Senate’s resolutions, Coolidge regretfully ac-
cepted their resignations for purely prudential reasons, assuring
Denby: “You will go with the knowledge that your honesty and integ-
rity have not been impugned.”400
396 See 65 CONG. REC. 2223–45 (1924) (covering the debate and evidence consid-
ered by the Senate before voting); see also FERRELL, supra note 371, at 44, 46–47 R
(describing the build up and circumstances to Denby’s resignation); FISHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 84 (noting that even though President Coo- R
lidge refused to officially recognize the act, Denby resigned several days later); 2
HAYNES, supra note 255, at 817–18 (chronicling the debate between Senators Borah R
and Glass); Warren, supra note 308, at 33 (noting the language of the bill and Coo- R
lidge’s official response).
397 Warren, supra note 308, at 33–34. R
398 Calvin Coolidge, Statement, Passage of Resolution in the Senate Calling for the
Resignation of Secretary of the Navy Denby (Feb. 11, 1924), in 18 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 193, at 9366, 9366.  For discussions of the Decision of 1789 and the Duskin
suspension, see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1472–73 & n.53, 1491–92 (Decision
of 1789); and Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 22, at 793–96 (Duskin suspension).
399 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 46. R
400 2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at 819–21. See generally FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL R
CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 84 (noting Hoover’s argument that the Senate cannot R
demand a resignation because it is an executive function); Warren, supra note 308, at R
33–34 (noting that Coolidge regarded the presidential removal power as vital to our
system of government).
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Coolidge responded in a similar fashion to the Senate’s March
12, 1924, resolution calling for an investigation of the Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue.  Although Coolidge acknowledged “[w]hatever may be
necessary for the information of the Senate or any of its Committees
in order better to enable them to perform their legislative or other
constitutional functions ought always to be furnished willingly and ex-
peditiously by any Department,” he complained that “the attack which
is being made on the Treasury Department goes beyond any of these
legitimate requirements” and threatened to upset the “comity be-
tween the Executive departments and the Senate.”401  Coolidge
emphasized:
The constitutional and legal rights of the Senate ought to be
maintained at all times.  Also the same must be said of the Executive
departments.  But these rights ought not to be used as a subterfuge
to cover unwarranted intrusion.  It is the duty of the Executive to
resist such intrusion and to bring to the attention of the Senate its
serious consequences.  That I shall do in this instance.402
The Coolidge Administration also had to defend itself against a
special Senate committee investigating Jess W. Smith, a confidant of
Attorney General Harry Daugherty who had taken bribes, only to com-
mit suicide as his transgressions began to come to light.403  The com-
mittee never secured any concrete evidence against Daugherty, who
was acquitted in both of his trials (albeit in the second by a single
vote).  Coolidge stood by Daugherty for a time, but became increas-
ingly concerned by the mounting evidence that Daugherty was on the
verge of a nervous breakdown.  Coolidge eventually demanded
Daugherty’s resignation, and after Daugherty somewhat pugnaciously
refused to resign, Coolidge summarily dismissed him.404  This was in
essence a presidential removal, and it was to be the most spectacular
removal of the Coolidge years.
The fact that the resignations of Denby and Daugherty precluded
further conflict with Congress over control of the removal power does
nothing to dissipate the significance of Coolidge’s opposition to Con-
gress’s action.  Particularly when combined with his assertion of con-
trol over the independent regulatory agencies, his Administration’s
401 Calvin Coolidge, Special Message to Senate (Apr. 11, 1924), in 18 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 193, at 9390, 9391. R
402 Id. at 9391; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at 821–24 (discussing the attacks R
by the Senate on executive branch officials in 1924); Warren, supra note 308, at 34 R
(calling the episode a contest by the Executive to maintain his constitutional
integrity).
403 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 49. R
404 Id. at 48–50.
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opposition to congressional attempts to limit the removal power
clearly represents another link in the chain of presidential defenses of
the unitary executive.
There was another, somewhat idiosyncratic issue during the Coo-
lidge years with respect to the President’s power and duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed: the enforcement of the Eight-
eenth Amendment and the Volstead Act of 1919 implementing Prohi-
bition.  Ferrell reports: “Curiously, many contemporary and later
Americans described Prohibition as the most outrageous example of
government intrusion into the social lives of citizens, but in reality,
enforcement of Prohibition was so light as to have been virtually non-
existent.”405  In short, “[f]ederal enforcement [of Prohibition] was a
joke.”406  In this regard, Coolidge was no worse than the vast majority
of politicians.  Members of Coolidge’s cabinet, such as Secretary of
State Kellogg and Treasury Secretary Mellon, were known to drink
illegally, and stories of violations by members of Congress were le-
gion.407  The States, for their part, “behaved shamelessly,” simply
“pass[ing] the task of enforcement to the federal government.”408
Most political leaders were ambivalent about enforcement.  They had
only supported Prohibition out of political expediency and were more
than happy to abandon it if convenient.  As a result, they were content
to follow “an exquisitely inattentive course toward enforcement, sens-
ing that Prohibition would either gather support and make itself effec-
tive or lose support and go down to defeat.”409  Eventually, the latter
would prove to be the case, eventually rendering the willingness or
lack of willingness to enforce Prohibition moot.
The Coolidge Administration also bore witness to the creation of
another independent agency in 1927: the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC).410  The Act creating the FRC represented a compromise be-
tween the House, which favored a regime in which the commission
and the Secretary of Commerce shared authority, and the Senate,
which preferred vesting all of the regulatory responsibilities in an in-
dependent agency.  The legislation ultimately adopted gave the FRC
the initial authority to allocate frequencies, set technical standards,
405 Id. at 101–02.
406 Id. at 106.
407 Id. at 104–05.
408 Id. at 106.
409 Id. at 105–06.
410 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.  On the history of the FRC’s creation,
see CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 299–310; John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: R
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Regulation of Technology, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1071, 1103–09 (2000).
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 71  8-DEC-04 13:46
2004] the  unitary  executive 71
and issue licenses.411  After one year, those responsibilities were to be
transferred to the Secretary of Commerce, after which time the FRC
would turn into a part-time appellate body to review the Secretary’s
decisions.412  The interim nature of the FRC’s authority raises serious
questions as to the Commission’s independence.  Congress extended
the initial division of authority through the end of the Coolidge Ad-
ministration by granting a pair of one-year extensions413 and eventu-
ally gave the FRC permanent status during the initial year of the
Hoover Administration.414  In the wake of the landmark decision in
Myers, Congress did not even maintain the pretense of including any
restrictions on the President’s power to remove commissioners.
Finally, the Coolidge years saw Secretary of State Kellogg disavow-
ing the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine.  Ferrell reports
that Kellogg stated outright that “the United States had no right to use
the Monroe Doctrine to enforce Latin American good behavior.”415
Kellogg “explained that under the Monroe Doctrine, the rights and
interests of the United States were ‘against Europe and not against the
Latin Americas.’  The Doctrine ‘is not a lance; it is a shield.’”416  The
Coolidge Administration thus effected a significant change of direc-
tion in U.S. foreign policy.  The fact that Coolidge could superintend
such a change of course attests to the strength of the President’s au-
thority, not its weakness.
In sum, the Coolidge Administration took a wide range of steps
to defend the unitariness of the executive, most importantly by litigat-
ing and winning the great case of Myers v. United States.  There can be
no question that an administration which litigated and won Myers did
not acquiesce in any diminution of the unitary executive for purposes
of this Article.
IX. HERBERT C. HOOVER
Herbert Hoover reached the White House after lengthy service as
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to Presidents Harding and Coo-
lidge.  Although Hoover shared Coolidge’s reticence about interfer-
ing with the prerogatives of Congress, that reticence did not stop him
from continuing his predecessors’ defense of the President’s authority
411 Radio Act of 1927 § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163–64.
412 Id. § 5, 44 Stat. at 1164.
413 See Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 263, 45 Stat. 373; Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 701, 45
Stat. 1559.
414 Act of Dec. 18, 1929, ch. 7, 46 Stat. 50.
415 FERRELL, supra note 371, at 142. R
416 Id.
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to execute the law.  In fact, his opposition to infringements upon the
unitariness of the executive branch began long before his inaugura-
tion.  While a member of the Coolidge Administration, Hoover had
questioned the constitutional propriety of conferring executive pow-
ers upon independent agencies, arguing that “there should be single-
headed responsibility in executive and administrative functions.”417
Hoover elaborated:
The necessarily divided minds of the best board in the world
has always resulted in failure in executive work.  Every member must
have a four-way independent responsibility.  He is responsible for
every act of the board to the country as a whole, to his particular
constituency, to his political party and finally to Congress.  There is
only one responsibility that he does not have and that is to the Presi-
dent of the United States, who, at least under the spirit of the Constitution,
should be vested with all administrative authority.418
Hoover reiterated these views after assuming the presidency.  Ad-
dressing the problem of departmental reorganization in his First An-
nual Message, Hoover urged that all executive administrative activities
should be placed under single-headed responsibility.  “Indeed,” Hoo-
ver concluded, “these are the fundamental principles upon which our
Government was founded, and they are the principles which have
been adhered to in the whole development of our business structure,
and they are the distillation of the common sense of generations.”419
Consistent with these views, Hoover assumed full responsibility for all
executive policies, issuing directives to the ICC regarding passenger
rates and railroad consolidation.420  Hoover’s biographer, Martin
Fausold, reports that Hoover asserted his authority over Andrew Mel-
lon, the strong-willed Secretary of the Treasury, by ordering Mellon’s
department “to publish all large governmental refunds of gift, estate,
and income taxes[, which] was an important repudiation of the secre-
tary’s earlier policies.”421  There was no question that Hoover was a
hands-on administrator fully in charge of his own Administration.
417 Reorganization of the United States Shipping Board and United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation: Hearings on H.R. 5369, H.R. 5395, H.R. 8052, Before the
House Comm. on the Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong. 14 (1926) (statement of
Herbert C. Hoover).
418 Id. at 13–14 (statement of Herbert C. Hoover) (emphasis added); see also
CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 262–64, 707–08 (arguing that division of control and R
responsibility produced conflict and confusion).
419 Herbert Hoover, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,
1929 PUB. PAPERS 404, 432 (Dec. 3, 1929); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 703 R
(arguing for presidential authority over administrative agencies).
420 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 681–82, 685; DOYLE, supra note 346, at 18. R
421 MARTIN L. FAUSOLD, THE PRESIDENCY OF HERBERT C. HOOVER 56 (1985).
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Even Congress appears to have concurred in the view that Presi-
dents should be the heads of the administrative system.  Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States,422 Congress delib-
erately omitted any removal restrictions when it replaced the original
Federal Power Commission (FPC) with a five-member commission.423
When asked why the removal provisions first enacted in the Interstate
Commerce Act were deleted from the bill, the House sponsor of the
legislation replied that such a provision was unnecessary because the
Supreme Court had already decided that the President “can remove
any public official at any time for malfeasance in office.”424
Hoover again defended the removal power when the Senate “re-
considered” its votes to confirm three nominees to the FPC because of
intervening allegations of corruption.  Hoover denounced the Sen-
ate’s action as an attempt “to encroach upon the Executive functions
by removal of a duly appointed executive officer under the guise of
reconsideration of his nomination.”425  The Senate ignored Hoover’s
protestations and, upon reconsideration, reconfirmed two of the
nominees, but rejected the nomination of George Otis Smith.426  In
the end, Hoover prevailed when the Supreme Court invalidated the
Senate’s action, holding that the Senate’s rules did not permit such
reconsiderations.427  But even had the Court ruled otherwise, it would
422 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
423 Act of June 23, 1930, ch. 573, 46 Stat. 797 (amending the Federal Power Act).
The original FPC was composed entirely of cabinet secretaries. See Federal Water
Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063.
424 72 CONG. REC. 10,332 (1930) (statement of Sen. Parker); see also CUSHMAN,
supra note 194, at 293–94 (noting that Congress had Myers in mind when omitting a R
provision restricting the President’s removal power).
425 Herbert Hoover, Message to the Senate of the United States, 1931 PUB. PAPERS
12, 13 (Jan. 10, 1931), reprinted in United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 28 n.3 (1932); see
also CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 294–95 (noting that the President disapproved of R
the Senate’s decision regarding the rejection of Smith); 2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at R
826 (referring to Hoover’s statement as a declaration of independence).
426 74 CONG. REC. 3939–40 (1931).  Congress also considered appropriations legis-
lation that would have withheld salary payments to any officials whose nominations
were being reconsidered by the Senate. Id. at 2140 (proposal by Sen. Wheeler); id. at
3320–23 (amendment by Rep. LaGuardia).  However, neither of these proposals were
enacted into law.  2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at 827; Fisher, supra note 308, at 70. R
427 See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).  It should be emphasized that
because the Court found the Senate’s actions improper as matter of statutory con-
struction, it did not reach the constitutional issues surrounding the President’s re-
moval power. See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 683 (noting that Hoover’s R
struggle with the Senate was for control over the policy of the commission); FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 84 (“A unanimous Court held that . . . R
the Senate may not . . . reconsider and possibly reject the nomination.”); 2 HAYNES,
supra note 255, at 824–27 (noting that the Court read the opinion without dissent); R
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not have weakened the moment of Hoover’s opposition for the pur-
poses of coordinate construction.
Hoover did temporarily accede to Congress’s attempt to involve
itself in the execution of the laws when he signed the Economy Act of
1932.428  This Act permitted Hoover to reorganize any administrative
agency, including the independent regulatory commissions, by execu-
tive order.429  Hoover was an avid supporter of executive reorganiza-
tion.  Fausold reports that while Hoover had trouble in handling
electoral politics, “he was in his element in the world of administra-
tion.  The Hoover presidency would accommodate twentieth century
ideas of executive reorganization and the managerial presidency.”430
Hoover embraced the Progressive vision of expert, nonpolitical ad-
ministration and he sought to make it a reality,431 and he was eager to
continue the work begun by Teddy Roosevelt’s Keep Commission and
William Howard Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency.432
His experience reorganizing the Commerce Department under Presi-
dents Harding and Coolidge gave Hoover confidence in his ability to
bring the same benefits to the entire executive branch.433
However, in accordance with Hoover’s suggestions,434 the Act
provided that executive reorganization orders were subject to a one-
house legislative veto, whereby either house could overturn the order
by passing a resolution within sixty days of its issuance.435  In fact,
when Hoover submitted a series of reorganization proposals to Con-
gress after his defeat in the 1932 elections, the Democratically-con-
trolled Congress vetoed every one of them, ostensibly on the grounds
PEPPER, supra note 308, at 101–03 (explaining the Senate’s attempt to reconsider the R
confirmation of the FPC nominees); Fisher, supra note 308, at 69–70 (noting that the R
Senate was rejected unanimously after instituting the court action).
428 The Economy Act of 1932 was enacted as a rider to the Legislative Appropria-
tions Act, ch. 314, 47 Stat. 382 (1932).
429 Id. § 403(1), 47 Stat. at 413; see also Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 3 R
(noting that reorganization was subject to veto by either house of Congress).
430 FAUSOLD, supra note 421, at 54. R
431 Id. at 56.
432 Id. at 54.
433 Id. at 55.
434 Herbert Hoover, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,
1929 PUB. PAPERS 404, 432 (Dec. 3, 1929); Herbert Hoover, Special Message to the
Congress on the Reorganization of the Executive Branch, 1932–33 PUB. PAPERS 56, 58
(Feb. 17, 1932).
435 Economy Act of 1932, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414.
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that the incoming President ought to have the latitude to effect his
own reorganization.436
Hoover’s tolerance for the legislative veto proved to be short
lived.  Just before leaving office, Hoover vetoed a bill requiring that a
joint committee of Congress approve all refunds in excess of $20,000
as an improper infringement of the President’s power to execute the
laws.437  As the opinion authored by Attorney General William D.
Mitchell that Hoover attached to his veto message intoned, “[t]he
Constitution of the United States divides the functions of the Govern-
ment into three great departments—the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial—and establishes the principle that they shall be kept sepa-
rate, and that neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial branch
may exercise functions belonging to the others.”438  The legislative
veto provision contained in this legislation, however, “violates this con-
stitutional principle” by “attempt[ing] to entrust to members of the
legislative branch, acting ex officio, executive functions in the execu-
tion of the law.”439  Anticipating the bicameralism requirement ac-
knowledged in INS v. Chadha,440 Mitchell alternatively argued that
even if the approval of tax refunds were regarded as a legislative func-
tion, “the proviso in this bill is equally obnoxious to the Constitution
because a joint committee has not power to legislate, and legislative
power can not be delegated to it.”441  Mitchell extended this reason-
ing to criticize the one-house legislative veto contained in the Econ-
omy Act of 1932, charging that “[t]he attempt to give to either House
of Congress, by action which is not legislation, power to disapprove
administrative acts, raises a grave question as to the validity” of that
provision as well.442  Although this one legislative veto provision “may
436 76 CONG. REC. 2125–26 (1933); see FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra
note 276, at 142 (stating that the House rejected all of Hoover’s initiatives with a R
single vote); FISHER, supra note 326, at 130 (discussing how Congress delegated reor- R
ganization powers to the executive branch in the 1930s but rejected Hoover’s propos-
als to reorganize the executive branch); LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123–25 (1992) (noting that Hoover’s executive
proposals were rejected or ignored); KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note
314, at 190 (“Hoover requested the authority sometime earlier . . . . In any case, his R
efforts at reorganization were vetoed.”); MORGAN, supra note 314, at 184 (noting that R
the Democratic House vetoed all eleven reorganization bills).
437 Herbert Hoover, Veto of a Bill to Supply Deficiency and Supplemental Appro-
priations, 1932–33 PUB. PAPERS 968, 969 (Jan. 24, 1933).
438 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 58 (1933).
439 Id.
440 462 U.S. 919, 948–51 (1983).
441 37 Op. Att’y Gen. at 58.
442 Id. at 63–64.
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not be important itself,” Mitchell recognized that “the principle at
stake [was] vital,”443 because “[t]o acquiesce in legislation having a
tendency to encroach upon the executive authority results in estab-
lishing dangerous precedents.”444  No President since Washington
had acquiesced in such encroachments, Mitchell noted, and Hoover
would not be the first.445
Congress apparently acceded to these concerns.  When it reen-
acted the President’s reorganization authority during the closing days
of the Hoover Administration, Congress again authorized the Presi-
dent to transfer or abolish any executive agency or independent
agency, prohibiting only the complete abolishment of a department.
In so doing, it discarded the legislative veto provided by the 1932 Act,
substituting the less restrictive requirement that the reorganization or-
ders lie before Congress for sixty days before they became active.446
In addition, Hoover faced the same issue with the faithful execu-
tion of the laws and Prohibition faced by his predecessors.  By 1931, it
appeared there had been a complete breakdown in the enforcement
of Prohibition by both the federal government and the states.447  In
stark contrast to Harding and Coolidge, Hoover met this challenge by
dutifully attempting to enforce the law.  Fausold observes:
443 Id. at 65.
444 Id. at 64.
445 Id. at 64–65 (noting examples in which Presidents Washington, John Adams,
Jefferson, Madison, John Quincy Adams, Jackson, Buchanan, Grant, Hayes, and Wil-
son had resisted congressional encroachments upon the executive power); see also
Ginnane, supra note 306, at 600–01 (stating that Hoover followed Mitchell’s advice in R
vetoing the bill as unconstitutional); H. Lee Watson, Comment, Congress Steps Out: A
Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1975) (noting
that Congress removed a concurrent resolution provision from the 1934 Urgent Defi-
ciency Act after Attorney General Mitchell advised Hoover to veto the act).
446 Treasury and Post Office Appropriations Act, ch. 212, § 16, 47 Stat. 1489,
1517–19 (1933).  Presumably, such an order could only be overridden by formal legis-
lation, passed by both houses and either signed by the President or passed over his
veto. See generally FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 142 (noting R
that the burden was on Congress to prevent an order to reorganize); FISHER, supra
note 326, at 130 (noting that Hoover issued executive orders consolidating fifty-eight R
governmental activities); FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 436, at 124 (“Congress could R
shorten the time period by passing a concurrent resolution of approval . . . .”); MOR-
GAN, supra note 314, at 185 (“[Congress] adopted an amendment offered by Senator R
James F. Byrnes . . . which deleted the power of either house to disapprove executive
orders and simply provided that such orders should lie before Congress for sixty days
while in session.”); Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 3 (noting that the au- R
thority to reorganize was given to Hoover for the express purpose of carrying out the
“policy of Congress”).
447 FAUSOLD, supra note 421, at 125. R
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The president dealt conscientiously with the issue of prohibi-
tion.  He increased the number of federal enforcement personnel
and upgraded their qualifications.  He transferred the federal su-
pervision of prohibition from the Treasury to the Justice Depart-
ment.  He implored states to assume proper concurrent
enforcement responsibility.  Most important, however, was the presi-
dent’s appointing the Wickersham Commission of distinguished
Americans to critically consider . . . the more effective organization
of our agencies of investigation and prosecution.448
One major question is why Hoover chose to stick with support of
Prohibition even when he knew it was not working.  Fausold reports:
Hoover’s explanation of his commitment to prohibition, even
as it failed during his administration, was his constitutional responsibil-
ity as president.  The great lawyer Elihu Root told him that the presi-
dent’s mere suggestion of repeal would undermine the
enforcement of the amendment in those places where it had been
successful.  More important, the Constitution provided no role for
the president in the amendment process.449
Other factors in Hoover’s retention of Prohibition were undoubt-
edly political motivations, his austere Quaker background, and the
fact that prohibition for Hoover was a social ordering device with a
noble motive that appealed to the President’s conservative tempera-
ment.450  Thus, it was Hoover’s fate that he would only “fan[ ] the fires
of the prohibition debate among Republicans by standing firm on the
enforcement of the amendment, even when most Republicans and
the vast majority of Americans favored its drastic revision, if not its
repeal.”451  Regardless of the political advisability of his position, there
can be no doubts as to the faithfulness with which Hoover faithfully
executed the laws on Prohibition.
Finally, just as the Monroe and Roosevelt Administrations in-
voked “the executive Power” to formulate U.S. foreign policy, so too
did the Hoover Administration become known for the Stimson Doc-
trine, named after Hoover’s eminent Secretary of State, Henry L.
Stimson, which was directed at the ongoing conflict between China
and Japan.  The Doctrine announced that the United States would
not recognize any treaty that was inconsistent with any existing trea-
ties, such as the Kellogg and Nine Power pacts.452  Vigorous presiden-
tial direction of foreign affairs represents another confirmation of
448 Id. at 125–26.
449 Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
450 Id. at 127–29.
451 Id. at 195.
452 Id. at 180.
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Hoover’s willingness to assert his authority over the execution of fed-
eral law.
In retrospect, it is clear that Hoover believed in a hierarchical
administrative structure for the executive branch with the President at
the top.  He had opposed independent agencies prior to becoming
President, and in his actions as President he asserted control over the
whole of the executive branch.  He appears to have prevailed in his
battle with Congress over the legislative veto, just as he had prevailed
in his conflicts with Congress over the independent agencies and the
removal power.  Whenever Hoover was confronted with congressional
attempts to intrude upon the unitariness of the executive branch, he
offered his strong opposition.  Even with respect to the nation’s ill-
fated experiment with Prohibition, Hoover faithfully discharged his
constitutional duty.  Therefore, by the end of the Hoover Administra-
tion, no President had yet acquiesced in any encroachment upon his
sole authority to execute the laws.
X. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
The scope of presidential power exploded during the presidency
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  One of the first critical issues facing
FDR when he assumed office on March 4, 1933, was how to deal with
the crisis of the Great Depression.  What followed was a burst of activ-
ity during the first hundred days of FDR’s Administration that was the
quintessence of “executive energy rapidly applied.”453  Roosevelt aug-
mented his formal legislative program with weekly press conferences
and regular national radio addresses, which would later become
known as fireside chats.454  Although he offered few definitive state-
ments on the issue, his aggressive actions to combat the Depression
left little doubt that his vision of presidential power was expansive.455
“The hectic pace of the Hundred Days . . . left many breathless,” but it
established Roosevelt’s leadership and put the presidency in the spot-
light where he wanted it to be.456  FDR’s presidency was to demon-
strate “the indispensable ingredient of political leadership.”457  By
mobilizing the country, Roosevelt greatly augmented his power and
placed the presidency at center stage in national politics.
453 GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 36 (2000).
454 Id. at 36.
455 PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 21–22 (1996).
456 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 54. R
457 Id. at 288.
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In the process, Roosevelt pioneered a revolutionary new vision of
administration that rejected the vision of the Progressive movement,
which idealized expert administrators who were insulated from polit-
ics.458  Instead, Roosevelt envisioned a more pluralist vision of admin-
istration, in which “[t]he key to effective administration was less its
expertise than its ability to connect with the public.”459  His goal was
to make administration more political, rather than less.460  The pri-
macy of politics over technocracy is evident in Roosevelt’s decision to
employ a special session of Congress rather than a series of executive
orders as the vehicle for implementing the first hundred days, which
Professor Barry Karl, a major student of administrative history, regards
as “perhaps the most crucial decision of Roosevelt’s presidency and
the most characteristic.”461  Leonard D. White, whose books this series
of articles has relied upon, was another one of the administrative law
scholars inspired by FDR’s radically new approach to problems of pub-
lic administration.  Under this new vision, the ideal administrators are
“permanent officials . . . who are able by their personal leadership to
mediate between the technician, the politician, and the public.”462
The administrative structure that Roosevelt used to employ his
pluralist vision was chaotic.  Roosevelt often set up administrators in
competition with one another in contrivances that “baffled his con-
temporaries and puzzled scholars, who came up with the term ‘com-
petitive bureaucracy’ to describe his work.”463  FDR’s administrative
systems worked well by encouraging subordinates to compete with
one another to solve the problems Roosevelt had put before them.
Roosevelt was something of an administrative genius, and this pluralist
approach to administration, coupled with his keen eye for picking
able subordinates, allowed FDR to get a great deal done.  At the same
time, the open structure of the Administration allowed FDR to keep
“the power of decision for himself.  One searches the record of
Roosevelt’s presidency in vain to find a major issue that ‘got away’
from him.  The failures of his presidency resulted from bad judgment,
not inattention.”464  Roosevelt’s biographer, George McJimsey, re-
458 For the classic statement of this perspective, see JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS 28 (1938).
459 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 292. R
460 See id. at 286–87, 289–93.
461 BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at
232 (1983), cited in MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 286. R
462 LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
17 (1939), cited in MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 291. R
463 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 122, 286–87. R
464 Id. at 287.
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ports: “Even by the end of his second term, there had developed a
kind of celebration of executive leadership and government by admin-
istration” such that “[b]ureaucracy seemed the wave of the future”
and the task of the President “was to employ pluralistic methods to
make bureaucracy an instrument of democracy.”465  In the end, how-
ever, Roosevelt was never to “create a political-administrative structure
that would securely and predictably achieve his vision.”466  FDR’s ad-
ministrative style remained susceptible to all of the classic vulnerabili-
ties and complexities of pluralism.  Mobilizing citizen constituencies
often simply provided them with the opportunity to redirect govern-
ment resources toward their own purposes.467  FDR might receive low
marks for rational management and political maneuvering in adminis-
tration, but he kept a steady flow of information and options that al-
lowed him always to reserve the power of decision for himself.468
Roosevelt wasted little time in centralizing his control over the
execution of the laws.  During the opening months of his Administra-
tion, Roosevelt issued an executive order transferring all of the gov-
ernment’s legal authority to the Justice Department.469  As we will
subsequently discuss at some length,470 Roosevelt also transferred the
Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury Department to the newly cre-
ated Executive Office of the President so that it could become the
President’s principal means for asserting his control over the entire
executive branch.  Accordingly, Roosevelt directed the Bureau to keep
him informed about the various agencies’ activities, to advise the
agencies on administrative organization and practice, and to review
agencies’ substantive policy proposals and congressional testimony.471
These moves were of monumental importance in increasing presiden-
465 Id. at 290–91.
466 Id. at 295.
467 Id. at 293–95.
468 Id. at 286–87.
469 Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 901 note (West 1996), available at http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/codifi-
cation/executive_order/06166.html; Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal
Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
1049, 1056 (1978); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control
over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 265 (1994); James R. Harvey III,
Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Cli-
ents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1582 (1996).
470 See infra note 613 and accompanying text. R
471 Exec. Order 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576, 577 (1938–1943); see also Cross, supra note
192, at 491 & n.44 (stating that Roosevelt gave the Bureau of the Budget authority to R
evaluate  substantive policy proposals made by agencies and to review testimony of
administrators given to Congress).
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tial control over the administration of the law.  Both the Bureau of the
Budget and the Justice Department were to become key agencies by
which the President controlled the executive branch.
Roosevelt also issued a series of executive orders banning racial
discrimination in government procurement.  As Frank Cross has ob-
served, in so doing Roosevelt “issued a direct order to members of the
executive branch regarding their administration of federal law.”472
The initial order, which required that a specific nondiscrimination
provision be included in all defense contracts, was somewhat vague as
to its legal basis, citing “the authority vested in [the President] by the
Constitution and the statutes.”473  Although a later order, which al-
lowed the nondiscrimination provision to be incorporated by refer-
ence, relied on other grounds,474 Roosevelt’s third and final
nondiscrimination order, which extended the requirement to all gov-
ernment contracts, again invoked his authority under “the authority
vested in [the President] by the Constitution and the statutes,” as well
his power as Commander-in-Chief.475  As one commentator has noted:
“Even the most adventuresome commentators have been unable to
unearth the statutes upon which President Roosevelt claimed to have
based his antidiscrimination orders.”476  It thus seems clear that
Roosevelt based these executive orders on the constitutional authority
conferred upon him by Article II.477
472 Cross, supra note 192, at 492. R
473 Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957, 957 (1938–1943).
474 Exec. Order No. 9001, tit. II, pmbl. & § 2, 3 C.F.R. 1055, 1056 (1938–1943)
(invoking the statutory authority conveyed by the first War Powers Act of 1941 as well
as the President’s authority as the Commander-in-Chief).
475 Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280, 1280 (1938–43).
476 Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of
Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 729 (1972).
477 See William H. Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Govern-
ment Contract Work, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 244–49 (1963) (concluding that Executive
Order No. 8802 was primarily based on the constitutional authority given to the Presi-
dent by the Article II Vesting Clause, bolstered by the Commander-in-Chief and Take
Care Clauses); cf. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466 (5th
Cir. 1977) (concluding that Roosevelt issued these orders pursuant to his “war mobili-
zation powers”); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168–69
(3d Cir. 1971) (noting that Executive Order 8802 “contained no specific statutory
reference” and also concluding that Roosevelt issued these orders pursuant to his
“war mobilization powers”); Robert S. Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Govern-
ment Contracts, 43 VA. L. REV. 837, 861–62 (1957) (supporting the constitutional foun-
dation of the orders without specifying any particular basis); Note, Executive Order
11,246 and Reverse Discrimination Challenges: Presidential Authority to Require Affirmative
Action, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 376, 382–83, 387 (1979) (concluding that Roosevelt’s order
was issued under his constitutional national defense power rather than under any
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Roosevelt also rebuffed congressional attempts to interfere di-
rectly with the execution of the laws.  On May 19, 1937, Congress
passed a joint resolution to establish a commission to control the
United States’ participation in the 1939 New York World’s Fair be-
cause it was composed of six members of Congress and three cabinet
members.  Roosevelt vetoed the legislation, citing an Attorney Gen-
eral opinion concluding that permitting a commission composed
largely of members of Congress to appoint executive staff and to ad-
minister public expenditures constituted “an unconstitutional inva-
sion of the province of the executive.”478
Four years later, Roosevelt reacted strongly when the House Un-
American Activities Committee attempted to force the President to
remove three “crackpot, radical bureaucrats” it believed were unfit for
continued government employment479 when it attached a rider to the
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act prohibiting the use of federal
funds to pay their salaries.480  Given the importance of the supple-
mental appropriations provided under the bill, Roosevelt had little
choice but to sign the bill.  Roosevelt nonetheless registered his objec-
tions in a signing statement condemning the rider as “not only unwise
statutory authority). But see Andrée Kahn Blumstein, Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way:
The Case for Delimiting Presidential Power Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 921, 924 (1980) (suggesting that Roosevelt based the executive orders on the
War Powers and Defense Production Acts).
478 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Veto of a New York World’s Fair Appropriation as an
Invasion of the Province of the Executive (May 19, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 206 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) [hereinaf-
ter PUB. PAPERS OF FDR] (quoting 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 61, 62 (1937)); Ginnane, supra
note 306, at 601–02. R
479 89 CONG. REC. 474, 479, 486 (1943).  The Chairman, Representative Martin
Dies, had submitted a list of thirty-nine suspected subversives to Attorney General
Biddle in 1941, but the Roosevelt Administration ignored it.  Dies’s original list was
pared down to three after a series of hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations. H.R. REP. NO. 78-448, at ii (1943).  The House
debated for two months over the propriety of using its control of appropriations to
effect a removal, but in the end voted 318 to 62 in favor of the rider.  89 CONG. REC.
4605 (1943).  The Senate initially objected to the rider, but finally yielded to the
House’s intransigence by a vote of forty-eight to thirty-two. Id. at 7014. See generally
John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1975) (describing the dilemma faced by President Roosevelt).
480 Specifically, this rider provided:
No part of any appropriation . . . shall be used, after November 15,
1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the personal
services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss
Lovett, unless prior to such date such person has been appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
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and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.”481  Since “[t]his rider is an
unwarranted encroachment upon the authority of both the executive
and judicial branches,” Roosevelt concluded that “[i]t is not, in my
judgment, binding upon them.”482  Not wanting to dignify Congress’s
intrusion upon his removal power any further, Roosevelt declined to
submit these officials’ names for confirmation as suggested by the
rider.  The disbursing officers stopped paying them, however, and
within six months, all three had left government service.483  Moreover,
when the three affected officials brought an action in the Court of
Claims complaining, among other things, that the rider “attempts to
effect legislative removal of plaintiff, and is therefore an unconstitu-
tional encroachment on executive power,”484 Attorney General Biddle
declined to defend the constitutionality of the statute, and Congress
was forced to employ special counsel to argue its position.485  The
Court of Claims sided with the officials, resolving the case on noncon-
stitutional grounds.486  The suit would not ultimately be resolved until
the Truman Administration, when the Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in United States v. Lovett.487  The prolonged nature of the proceed-
ings should not obscure the fact that the Roosevelt Administration
strongly defended the President’s power to remove throughout the
litigation.488
Roosevelt also asserted his control over the independent agencies
as well as the executive departments.  Despite the fact that the Water
Power Act clearly provided that after the President designated the first
Chairman of the FPC the Commission would select its own chairman,
Roosevelt successfully pressured George Otis Smith into resigning and
designated Frank R. McNinch as his successor in order to make the
481 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President Condemning Rider Prohibit-
ing Federal Employment of Three Named Individuals (Sept. 14, 1943), in 12 PUB.
PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 385, 386. R
482 Id. at 386.
483 Ely, supra note 479, at 4. R
484 Id. at 16–17 (citing Record at 5–6, 19–21, 15–16, United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946) (Nos. 809–811)).  The damages they suffered being almost insignifi-
cant, they were primarily interested in clearing their own names. Id. at 5, 8.
485 H.R. REP. NO. 78-1117, at 3–4 (1944); see Ely, supra note 479, at 10–11. R
486 United States v. Lovett, 66 F. Supp. 142, 146 (Ct. Cl. 1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).
487 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
488 Moreover, the constitutional issues would arise again when the Supreme Court
reviewed the Court of Claims’s decision during the Truman Administration. See Yoo
et al., supra note 11. R
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FPC fully responsive to his policies.489  Roosevelt further dominated
the FPC when he instructed it to cooperate with other branches of the
executive department.490  Moreover, just as Congress did not include
any restrictions on the presidential removals when it created the FPC
in 1927, it also failed to include any such restrictions when it created
the Securities and Exchange Commission491 and the Federal Commu-
nications Commission.492  Apparently, with one minor exception,493
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers, Congress
did not believe that such restrictions were worth the effort.
Franklin Roosevelt’s most important assertion of control over an
independent agency came with his attempted removal of the by-now
notorious, right-wing FTC Chairman, William E. Humphrey.
Humphrey refused several requests from Roosevelt that he resign.  As
FDR said in the final such request:
You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my
mind go along together on either the policies or the administering
of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for
the people of this country that I should have a full confidence.494
When Humphrey still refused Roosevelt’s request that he resign,
FDR finally informed him on October 7, 1933, that “[e]ffective as of
this date you are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of
the Federal Trade Commission.”495  Roosevelt’s summary removal of
Humphrey made clear that the Roosevelt Administration had no
doubts as to the President’s power to remove any official exercising
executive authority.  Evidently, Congress agreed, offering not a single
word of protest to Roosevelt’s actions, and the Senate confirmed
Humphrey’s replacement without incident.496
489 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 295–96, 682; DOYLE, supra note 346, at 18.  Thus R
ended the tenure of the official whom Hoover had so staunchly defended during the
Senate’s attempt to reconsider his confirmation. See supra notes 425–26 and accom- R
panying text.
490 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 686. R
491 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885.
492 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 4, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066–67.
493 See Amendment to Railway Labor Act, ch. 691, § 4, 48 Stat. 1185, 1193–94
(1934) (replacing the Board of Mediation with the National Mediation Board while
maintaining the requirement that members “may be removed by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or ineligibility, but for no other
cause” (emphasis added)).
494 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, to William Humphrey (Aug. 31, 1933), re-
printed in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
495 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, to William Humphrey (Oct. 7, 1933), re-
printed in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
496 See CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 226, 682; DOYLE, supra note 346, at 18. R
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The reactionary Humphrey was not to go quietly, however.
Humphrey sued for his salary, and his lawsuit was litigated after his
death by his executor, Samuel F. Rathbun, all the way up to the Su-
preme Court.  The Roosevelt Administration briefed and argued
Humphrey’s Executor, adopting a very strong pro-unitary executive
stance.  Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s sweeping opinion in
Myers, the Roosevelt Administration’s brief argued that the restrictions
on the removal power in the FTC Act constituted “a substantial inter-
ference with the constitutional duty of the President to ‘take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.’”497
The administration reinforced its basic points in its oral argu-
ments.  First, the administration argued the case was directly con-
trolled by Shurtleff v. United States.  The administration noted that the
removal provisions of the FTC Act were identical to the removal provi-
sions held in Shurtleff not to impose any restrictions on the President’s
power to remove.  The cases were claimed to be almost exactly
alike.498
The administration bolstered its argument by noting that in 1908,
five years after Shurtleff was decided, Congress had amended the stat-
ute at issue in Shurtleff so that it would clearly state that general ap-
praisers could be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office ‘and no other’ cause.”499  Congress had extended
similar protection to six other minor offices.500  These amendments
provided the clear statement that Shurtleff held necessary before a stat-
ute would be construed as limiting the removal power.  The failure to
include the words “and no other cause” in the FTC Act meant that
under Shurtleff, the FTC Act should not be construed as interfering
with the President’s generalized power of removal.  The administra-
tion relied here upon the following statement of Chief Justice Taft in
Myers:
Since the provision for an Interstate Commerce Commission, in
1887, many administrative boards have been created whose mem-
bers are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
497 Brief for the United States at 23, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935) (No. 667).
498 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1935) (giving the
argument of Solicitor General Reed).
499 Id. at 612 (quoting Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 205, § 3, 35 Stat. 403, 406) (empha-
sis added).
500 Id. at 612–13 (noting Congress’s attempt to give statutory removal protection
to members of the Commission of Mediation and Conciliation, the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, the Railroad Labor Board, the United States Coal Commission, the Board of
Mediation, and the National Mediation Board).
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\80-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 86  8-DEC-04 13:46
86 notre dame law review [vol. 80:1
consent of the Senate, and in the statutes creating them have been
provisions for the removal of the members for specified causes.
Such provisions are claimed to be inconsistent with the indepen-
dent power of removal by the President.  This, however, is shown to
be unfounded by the case of Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
(1903). . . . This is an indication that many of the statutes cited are
to be reconciled to the unrestricted power of the President to re-
move, if he chooses to exercise his power.501
The administration was thus on strong ground in contending that,
under the construction given in Shurtleff to statutory language identi-
cal to that contained in the FTC Act, Federal Trade Commissioners
could be removed at will.502
The administration’s second argument in its brief and oral argu-
ment was that if the FTC Act were read as restricting Roosevelt’s au-
thority to dismiss Humphrey, then the Act was unconstitutional under
Myers v. United States.  This was a relatively straightforward application
of Myers, a mere nine years after that great case had been decided.
Astonishingly, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously against the
Roosevelt Administration in a fourteen-page opinion that confined
Myers to purely executive agencies, of which the Court said the FTC
was not one.503  Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, distin-
guished Shurtleff by noting that the statute at issue in that case did not
provide for a specific term of years for general appraisers.  The hold-
ing in Shurtleff that general appraisers were removable at will was thus
driven by the fear that had the Court decided otherwise, general ap-
praisers would enjoy what amounted to life tenure.  Such concerns
would not arise, however, with respect to the FTC Act, which com-
bined a provision stating that an official could only be removed for
cause with a provision limiting that official’s term of office to a speci-
fied term of years.  When that was the case, the Court deemed it more
appropriate to presume that the relevant officials were entitled to
hold their offices for the entire statutory term unless they were re-
moved for cause.504
This limitation of Shurtleff seems highly suspect.  It is especially
strained as an interpretation of congressional intent underlying the
FTC Act, since when that Act was enacted in 1914, the 1903 decision
in Shurtleff suggested that the mere presence alone of for-cause re-
501 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 171–72 (1926).
502 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 612–18 (giving the argument of Solicitor General
Reed); Brief of the United States at 9, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (No. 667).
503 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28.
504 Id. at 622–26.
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moval provisions did not deprive the President of his general power to
remove at will.
The second part of Humphrey’s Executor, distinguishing Myers v.
United States, was even more remarkable.  Here the Court distin-
guished Myers as applying only to purely executive branch offices like
that of a first-class postmaster.  The FTC, according to Justice Suther-
land, was not a purely executive entity, because it also exercised quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial functions.  Such entities could be insu-
lated, according to the Court, from presidential exercises of the re-
moval power, and the Court promised in future cases to explain which
entities were purely executive and governed by Myers and which were
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial and governed by Humphrey’s
Executor.505
505 Id. at 626–32.  Interestingly, the author of Humphrey’s Executor apparently did
not believe that it definitively resolved the constitutionality of the independent agen-
cies.  No friend of the independent regulatory commissions, Justice Sutherland had
previously opposed the independence of the FTC on constitutional grounds while a
Senator, joined in the majority in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and au-
thored the formalist opinion in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
Justice Sutherland added to the confusion during the oral argument in Isbrandtsen-
Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1936), a subsequent case involving the U.S.
Shipping Board.  As Robert Cushman reports:
Mr. James W. Ryan . . . was urging upon the Court the argument . . . that
the United States Shipping Board could not constitutionally be put by execu-
tive order or by act of Congress in the executive branch.  The Shipping
Board, he argued was not an “executive” agency and could not be an “execu-
tive” agency because it was not in the executive branch of the government.
Justice Sutherland, who had been sitting back in his chair . . . leaned
forward quickly when he heard this.
“Did you say that the Shipping Board was not in the executive branch of
the government?”  He spoke as though he did not believe he had heard
correctly, and several other Justices smiled condescendingly at counsel as
though he were making a farfetched proposal.
“Yes, your Honor,” Mr. Ryan replied.
“What makes you think that?  Where do you find any legal basis for such
a conclusion?” the Justice wished to know.
“Why, in your Honor’s opinion in the Humphrey case, this Court held
that the Federal Trade Commission and similar regulatory agencies were not
in the executive branch of the government.  The Shipping Board fell within
the same general category as the Federal Trade Commission and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.”  Mr. Ryan then proceeded to read certain
portions of that opinion.
“What branch of the Government do you think the Shipping Board was
in, if it was not in the executive branch?” the Justice wanted to know.
“In the legislative branch, your Honor.”
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All in all, Humphrey’s Executor was a shocking and poorly reasoned
repudiation of the decision nine years earlier in Myers and thirty-two
years earlier in Shurtleff.  It seems inconceivable that either the Myers
or Shurtleff Courts would have decided Humphrey’s Executor the same
way.  The most likely explanation is that Humphrey’s Executor repre-
sents another example of the hostility towards the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration exhibited by many Supreme Court decisions of that period.
Naturally, Congress’s interest in imposing removal restrictions re-
vived after Humphrey’s Executor.  After the announcement of that deci-
sion, Congress subsequently included removal restrictions in the
legislation establishing the National Labor Relations Board,506 the
U.S. Maritime Commission,507 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.508  In
addition, the legislation that removed the Treasury Secretary and the
Comptroller of the Currency from the Federal Reserve Board im-
posed removal restrictions on the Federal Reserve Board for the first
time.509  The enactment histories of these bills underscore the impor-
tance of the Supreme Court’s decision.  The initial version of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act did not include any removal restrictions,
and Congress ignored the issue until after the issuance of the opinion
in Humphrey’s Executor.510  The Senate specifically postponed consider-
ation of a proposal to restore the removal restrictions to the Federal
Reserve Board pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue.
In return for the loss of presidential control represented by these
changes, the President gained the right to designate the Governor of
the Federal Reserve Board as well as the power to remove him from
the governorship at pleasure.511  The debates regarding the Civil Aer-
onautics Board are perhaps the most revealing.  A number of legisla-
tors, including future President Harry S. Truman, objected that
executive duties could not be given to a body that was independent of
Justice Sutherland shook his head, as though he disagreed, and seemed
to be thinking the question over as the discussion went on to other points.
CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 445–48. R
506 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (giving
members five-year terms subject to removal for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office, but for no other cause”).
507 Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 1985, 1985 (giving
members six-year terms subject to removal for “neglect of duty or malfeasance”).
508 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 201, 52 Stat. 973, 981 (giving members
six-year terms subject to removal for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office”).
509 Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 203(b), 49 Stat. 684, 704 (giving board mem-
bers fourteen-year terms “unless sooner removed for cause by the President”).
510 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 366. R
511 Id. at 169, 174–76.
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presidential direction.512  Although their efforts were initially unsuc-
cessful, they eventually prevailed when Roosevelt used his reorganiza-
tion power to consolidate the Civil Aeronautics Board back into
Commerce Department.513
FDR regarded his defeat in Humphrey’s Executor as a personal af-
front.  Even more importantly, it threatened his ability to coordinate
the execution of the law.514  His subsequent conduct reveals that the
decision did not alter his belief in the President’s power to remove
independent regulatory commissioners.  In March of 1938, despite
the belief of many in Congress that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Act shielded Board members from presidential removal,515 Roosevelt
removed Dr. Arthur E. Morgan as TVA Chairman after Morgan ques-
tioned the integrity of his fellow board members and insisted that he
was answerable only to Congress.  Although Roosevelt conceded that
“[o]bviously the Congress has full power of investigation,” Morgan’s
claim that he was not answerable to the President contradicted the
provision of “the Constitution of the United States declar[ing] that
‘the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States.’”516  Roosevelt also relied on the Take Care Clause,
contending:
It would violate my constitutional duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed if I should leave unsupported charges hanging
indefinitely over the heads of two officials who have cooperated in
the difficult task of divided authority and thereby permit a recalci-
trant non-cooperative officials further freedom to sabotage Govern-
ment operations at a crucial time.517
512 See id. at 409–15.
513 Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1301 (1938–1943).
514 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 78–81 (1995); REXFORD G. TUGWELL,
THE DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT 392 & n.6 (1957).
515 See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC. 4196 (1938) (statement of Sen. Johnson of Cal.); see also
Edward S. Corwin, The President as Administrative Chief, 1 J. POL. 17, 55–56 (1939),
reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 72, 107 (Richard Loss ed.,
1976) (discussing the intent of Congress in drafting a separate removal provision in
the TVA).
516 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of
the Removal of the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7
PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 153, 162–63. R
517 Id. at 162; see also id. at 151–52 (“I cannot . . . abdicate my constitutional duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”); id. at 153 (“Under the Constitution
of the United States, the Chief Executive is directly charged to ‘take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.’”); id. at 156 (“As Chief Executive constitutionally responsible
for the faithful execution of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, I could not ignore
charges of dishonesty, bad faith and conspiracy in administration.”).
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Roosevelt also drew support from an Attorney General opinion
concluding that Morgan could be removed under Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor because the TVA was neither quasi-legislative nor
quasi-judicial and because the TVA Act did not disclose any congres-
sional intent to restrict the removal of TVA board members.518  There-
fore, Roosevelt consistently asserted his constitutional authority to
control the independent agencies and remove their members even in
the face of judicial authority to the contrary.  This time, however, the
courts would uphold Roosevelt’s actions.519
With respect to the civil service, during the Roosevelt Administra-
tion, courts continued to rule that the Civil Service Act did not inter-
fere with the President’s power to remove.520  This simple analysis is
complicated somewhat by the enactment of the Veterans’ Preference
Act of 1944,521 which provided veterans with preferred access to fed-
eral employment.  It also provided for expanded procedural safe-
guards with respect to removal, requiring that removals be made in
518 Id. at 151 (citing 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 145 (1938)); see also FISHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 65–66 (finding that this case fell in a “field of R
doubt” between the Myers and Humphrey’s decisions); 2 HAYNES, supra note 255, at R
833–35 (giving an overview of the circumstances of Morgan’s dismissal); Fisher, supra
note 308, at 67 (noting that acting Attorney General Robert H. Jackson advised Presi- R
dent Roosevelt in 1938 that the statute did not give Congress exclusive power to re-
move TVA board members).
519 The courts upheld Roosevelt’s removal of Morgan on the grounds that the
TVA Act did not limit removals of Board members to specified causes.  Morgan v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 736–37 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d, 115 F.2d 990
(6th Cir. 1940).  The TVA Act provided that any board member “found by the Presi-
dent of the United States” to have applied a “political test or qualification” or other-
wise have made “appointments and promotions . . . on the basis” of any other criteria
except “merit and efficiency . . . shall be removed from office by the President of the
United States.”  Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, ch. 32, § 6, 48 Stat. 58, 63
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831e (2000)).  The courts held that this language did not
indicate with sufficient clarity that Congress intended to limit the President’s power of
removal to that specified cause. Morgan, 28 F. Supp. at 736–37 (citing Shurtleff); Mor-
gan, 115 F.2d at 992–93 (“Had it been the intention of the Congress to curtail the
removal power of the President, it may be assumed that the Congress would not have
been at a loss for a formula unequivocally expressing such purpose.”).  Subsequent
judicial and executive authority has reaffirmed this holding. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1944); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the
President Upon Signing a Bill Amending the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 1959
PUB. PAPERS 566 (Aug. 6, 1959); 11 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 135 (1987).
520 See Love v. United States, 108 F.2d 43, 46, 49 (8th Cir. 1939); Levine v. Farley,
107 F.2d 186, 190–91 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 682, 685
(1934); Howard C. Westwood, The “Right” of an Employee of the United States Against
Arbitrary Discharge, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 212 (1938).
521 Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387.
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writing with a chance to reply and, most importantly, giving veterans
the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commission.522
Although some have suggested that the Act provided the impetus for
more searching judicial scrutiny of the substance of removal deci-
sions,523 such a conclusion is belied by the fact that the Act employed
the same standard for dismissal as the Lloyd-Lafollette Act, which had
consistently been recognized as not placing any substantive limits on
the removal power.524  The legislative history of the Veterans’ Prefer-
ence Act gave no indication that Congress intended to adopt a differ-
ent standard.525  As a result, after the enactment of the Veterans’
Preference Act, courts continued to limit their review to procedural
compliance and decline to review the underlying substance.526  Courts
would subsequently hold that insubordination represented sufficient
cause under the Veterans’ Preference Act to justify removal.527  Since
the freedom to discharge officers who fail to carry out the President’s
instructions is the very essence of the removal power,528 the Veterans’
Preference Act appears to be completely consistent with the unitary
executive.  These considerations suggest that the additional protec-
tions provided by the Act were driven by a desire to help returning
veterans reintegrate into society rather than a desire to limit executive
discretion over removals.529
Finally, Roosevelt intermittently resisted Congress’s attempt to
encroach upon the President’s executive authority through the use of
the legislative veto.  At various points during his tenure, Roosevelt
signed legislation containing legislative vetoes without entering any
objections to the practice.530  However, when facing the legislative
522 Id. § 14, 58 Stat. at 390–91.
523 See Frug, supra note 46, at 976, 983; Kathleen V. Buffon, Comment, Removal for R
Cause from the Civil Service: The Problem of Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV.
207, 224 (1979).
524 See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text. R
525 See Merrill, supra note 48, at 236; Vaskov, supra note 260, at 459. R
526 See Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 470, 471 (D.D.C. 1947); Culligan v. United
States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, 223 (1946).  More searching review would not begin until after
the period reviewed by this Article. See Yoo et al., supra note 11. R
527 See DeBusk v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 790 (1950). See generally Annotation,
What Is a “Cause as Will Promote the Efficiency of the Service,” as a Basis, under 5 U.S.C.S.
§ 7512, of Adverse Action Against a Preference Eligible Government Employee or His Disbar-
ment for Future Appointment, 25 A.L.R. FED. 443, 464–65 (1975) (collecting cases hold-
ing insubordination sufficient cause for removal).
528 David P. Currie, President Harrison and the Hatch Act, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 7, 10 n.24
(2002).
529 See Frug, supra note 46, at 959. R
530 For example, Roosevelt signed the legislation that would eventually provide
the basis for the decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), subjecting the Attor-
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veto provision in the Lend Lease Act,531 Roosevelt entered his consti-
tutional objections in an unpublished legal opinion entrusted to the
care of Attorney General (and future Supreme Court Justice) Robert
H. Jackson.532  Roosevelt offered a more public protest when con-
fronted with legislation requiring that all naval real estate acquisitions
be submitted to the Naval Affairs Committees for approval.533  FDR
warned that permitting such committee vetoes would “disregard prin-
ciples basic to our form of government.”534  Although Roosevelt
signed the bill, in his view, “[e]fficient and economical administration
can be achieved only by vesting authority to carry out the laws in an
independent executive and not in legislative committees.  This act, in
my opinion, impinges deeply upon this fundamental principle of
good government embodied in the Constitution.”535
Thus, while Roosevelt’s opposition to the legislative veto was not
absolute, when viewed in light of his centralization of control over the
executive branch, his drive to dominate the independent agencies, his
defenses of the removal power, and his veto of the 1937 New York
ney General’s decisions to suspend deportation proceedings to a legislative veto.
Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672; see also Louis Fisher,
The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aug. 1993, at 273,
281 [hereinafter Fisher, Legislative Veto] (noting President Roosevelt’s acquiescence to
the legislative veto included in the Lend Lease Act); Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers:
Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 80 (1990) (discussing the phenom-
enon of Presidents signing legislative vetoes into law); Ginnane, supra note 306, at R
582–83 (referencing an opinion of the Attorney General which justified Roosevelt’s
agreement to a legislative veto as cooperative and for the benefit of the nation).
531 Ch. 11, § 3(c), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941).
532 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Apr. 7, 1941),
reprinted in Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353,
1357–59 (1953) (objecting to the legislative veto as a violation of U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7); see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 436, at 125, 134–35; Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra R
note 530, at 281–82; Watson, supra note 445, at 1015–16.  Roosevelt’s rejection of the R
legislative veto represents a particularly strong defense of the unitary executive in that
in issuing this opinion he apparently overruled the position taken by his Attorney
General. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for
a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 348 (1993) (citing DOUGLAS W. KMIEC,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 53–57
(1992)); Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17,
27–28 n.24; Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 437, 449 n.23 (1993).
533 Act of Apr. 4, 1944, ch. 165, § 1, 58 Stat. 189, 190; Act of Jan. 28, 1944, ch. 5,
§ 1, 58 Stat. 7, 8; see Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 530, at 282; Ginnane, supra note R
306, at 602–03. R
534 See 90 CONG. REC. 6154 (1944), cited in Watson, supra note 445, at 1018–19. R
535 Id.  For a discussion of Roosevelt’s eventual assent to the use of a legislative
veto in the Reorganization Act of 1939, see infra note 611 and accompanying text. R
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World’s Fair Commission, it becomes clear that Roosevelt offered
strong enough resistance to Congress’s attempts to invade the proper
province of the presidency to foreclose any inference of acquiescence.
At times, such as in signing the Lend Lease Act discussed above and in
the debates surrounding the Reorganization Act of 1939 discussed be-
low, political necessity forced Roosevelt to blunt the force of his con-
stitutional objections.  Nonetheless, such practical concessions do not
properly form the basis for inferring presidential capitulation to devia-
tions from the unitary executive for the purposes of coordinate
construction.
Equally important is the manner in which Roosevelt transformed
the presidency as an institution.  FDR was the quintessential activist
President, and the American people were forever after to view of the
presidency in a different light.  Although later Presidents would ex-
pand presidential authority still further, as McJimsey notes, “Roosevelt
started the momentum.”536  Indeed, his views on presidential power
became even more expansive following the onset of World War II.
Roosevelt followed Lincoln’s example and adopted a prerogative the-
ory of the presidency in which the President could act without specific
authorizing legislation during times of emergency.537
XI. THE BROWNLOW COMMITTEE AND THE REORGANIZATION
ACT OF 1939
The event during the Roosevelt Administration with the greatest
significance for the unitary executive was the debate over the Brown-
low Committee’s proposal to reorganize the executive branch, which,
as Elena Kagan has pointed out, “established the infrastructure under-
lying all subsequent attempts by the White House to supervise admin-
istrative policy.”538  When Roosevelt announced his intention to
reorganize the executive branch in January 1937, few expected that he
would face significant opposition.  Politically, Roosevelt seemed al-
most invincible.  His recent electoral college landslide appeared to be
a ringing endorsement of both his leadership and his New Deal poli-
536 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 296. R
537 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Asking for Quick Action to
Stabilize the Economy (Sept. 7, 1942), in 11 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at R
356, 364 (asking Congress to take action to stabilize prices and promising that if Con-
gress failed to take the action desired, it would be necessary to take action under the
President’s emergency war powers); see Cross, supra note 192, at 491; Monaghan, R
supra note 70, at 29. R
538 Kagan, supra note 31, at 2275. R
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cies.539  By 1937, the need for executive reorganization was also appar-
ent.  The explosion of agencies spawned by the New Deal, driven in
large part by Roosevelt’s own improvisational style of management,
had made an already unwieldy executive branch virtually
unmanageable.540
Despite his desire to make broader use of his reorganization au-
thority under the 1933 Act during his first term, concerns about the
economy made it impossible for him to focus his attention on the task.
Consequently, Roosevelt was only able to use the power sparingly
before it expired on March 3, 1935, submitting only twenty-seven reor-
ganization orders consolidating a number of agencies.541  This relative
inattention did not reflect lack of interest.  Roosevelt feared that the
bureaucrats were combining with key members of Congress to pursue
their own ambitions by catering to special interest groups to the detri-
ment of national policy.542
In order to address these concerns, Roosevelt created a Commit-
tee on Administrative Management, commonly known as the Brown-
low Committee, to develop a new proposal to reorganize the executive
branch,543 while also encouraging both Houses of Congress to estab-
lish Select Committees on Government.544  Consisting of “distin-
539 See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM, 1937–1940, at 3, 33, 213 (1993);
KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at 247–49; KARL, supra note 461, at R
132–33, 156; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
1932–1940, at 195–96 (1963); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal State and the Anti-Bureau-
cratic Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY 77, 87–88 (Robert Eden ed., 1989);
Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP.
CT. REV. 163, 186; Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 26. R
540 S. REP. NO. 75-1236, at 4–6 (1937); DAVIS, supra note 539, at 19–20; FISHER, R
supra note 326, at 130–32; KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at R
182–83; Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 10. R
541 S. REP. NO. 75-1236, at 7 (1937); FISHER, supra note 326, at 131. R
542 DAVIS, supra note 539, at 19–20; KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note R
314, at 195–99; see also Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 30, 32 (recognizing R
the influence of interest groups on career politicians).
543 Franklin D. Roosevelt, White House Statement on the Appointment of a Com-
mittee to Formulate a Plan for the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Mar. 22, 1936), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 144; 3 R
GOLDSMITH, supra note 276, at 1496–99; KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note R
314, at 204–09; T.H. WATKINS, RIGHTEOUS PILGRIM 556–57 (1990); Karl, Presidential R
Power, supra note 314, at 182–83. R
544 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Letters to the Vice President and the Speaker of the
House in Reference to the Foregoing Plan (Mar. 22, 1936), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR,
supra note 478, at 145; see also MORGAN, supra note 314, at 185 (“[E]ach house estab- R
lished a Select Committee on Government Organization and provided that the two
committees should meet together as a joint committee to consider the President’s
message.”).
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guished political scientists and public administrators,”545 the
Brownlow Committee commenced its work in 1936.  After nearly a
year of intensive analysis and the active input of Roosevelt,546 the
Brownlow Committee issued its recommendations on January 8,
1937.547
Laying out a vision aptly described as “Jacksonian,”548 the Report,
in the words of one commentator, sounded “a clarion call for exclu-
sive presidential control of government reorganization.”549  As the Re-
port observed:
It was . . . not by accident but by deliberate design that the founding
fathers set the American Executive in the Constitution on a solid
foundation.  Sad experience under the Articles of Confederation,
with an almost headless Government and committee management,
had brought the American Republic to the edge of ruin. . . . Conse-
quently, there was grim purpose in resolutely providing for a Presi-
dency which was to be a national office. The President is indeed the one
and only national officer representative of the entire nation.  There was
hesitation on the part of some timid souls in providing the Presi-
dent with [the powers enumerated in the Constitution]. . . . But this
reluctance was overcome in the face of need and a democratic exec-
utive established.550
545 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 172. R
546 DAVIS, supra note 539, at 27; KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, R
at 206–12, 244–46; Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 539, at 184. R
547 PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT].
548 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 111 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 1984);
Corwin, supra note 515, at 89; John A. Rohr, Constitutional Legitimacy and the Adminis- R
trative State: A Reading of the Brownlow Commission Report, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS
LEGACY, supra note 539, at 93, 97.  It is interesting to note that a contemporary pam- R
phleteer compared Roosevelt and Jackson and found them to be largely similar. See
CASIMIR W. RUSKOWSKI, IS ROOSEVELT AN ANDREW JACKSON? (1939).
549 Rohr, supra note 548, at 94. R
550 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 547, at 1 (emphasis added).  The Report R
elaborated:
As an instrument for carrying the judgment and will of the people of a
nation, the American Executive occupies an enviable position among the
executives of the states of the world, combining as it does the elements of
popular control and the means for vigorous action and leadership—uniting
stability and flexibility.  The American Executive as an institution stands
across the path of those who mistakenly assert that democracy must fail be-
cause it can neither decide promptly nor act vigorously.
Id. at 3.  So constituted, the Brownlow Committee stated, “the American Executive
must be regarded as one of the very greatest contributions made by our Nation to the
development of modern democracy.” Id. at 2.
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Only by adhering to this vision of “a responsible and effective
chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative
management” could the benefits of a strong and vigorous President
be preserved.551  As McJimsey notes: “The plan was designed for a
‘strong’ president who could master political situations but would
need strong management tools to follow through.”552
Four of the Report’s various recommendations had particularly
strong implications for the unitariness of the executive branch.  First,
the Report recommended that the White House staff and the Bureau
of the Budget be expanded so that they may provide better coordina-
tion of the execution of the laws.553  In particular, the Report envi-
sioned that the Bureau of the Budget could serve as a central clearing
house for all administrative policies, departmental regulations, and
legislative proposals.554
Second, the Report recommended that the independent agen-
cies be integrated into the executive departments.  The independent
agencies, the Report concluded, were inconsistent with the principle
of the separation of powers.  In particular, the Article II Vesting
Clause, in conjunction with the Take Care Clause and the other sec-
tions of the Constitution, “places in the President, and in the Presi-
dent alone, the whole executive power of the Government of the
United States.”555  Consistent with this vision, the early practice was to
place all executive officials in departments, all of which were “directly
under the President in accordance with the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.”556  Independent agencies, however, possessed
wide power to execute the laws without being subject to executive or
even legislative supervision, effectively impairing “the responsibility of
the President for ‘the executive Power.’”557  As such, they had become
“a headless ‘fourth branch’ of government, a haphazard deposit of
551 Id. at 2.  In fact, the Brownlow Committee defined its purpose as investigating
and reporting on “the organization of the duties imposed upon the President in exer-
cising the executive power vested in him by the Constitution of the United States” so
that the President could better fulfill his role as “Chief Executive and administrator
within the Federal system and service.” Id.
552 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 182. R
553 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 547, at 5–6, 16–20. R
554 Id. at 19.
555 Id. at 31.
556 Id.
557 Id. at 32.  The Report further complained that independent agencies
leave the President with responsibility without power.  Placed by the Consti-
tution at the head of a unified and centralized Executive Branch, and
charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, he must
detour around powerful administrative agencies which are in no way subject
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irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers” that did “violence
to the basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be
three major branches of the Government.”558
The problems posed by the independent agencies were more
than just theoretical: “Not only by constitutional theory, but by the
steady and mounting insistence of public opinion, the President is
held responsible for the wise and efficient management of the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government.  The people look to him for leader-
ship.”559  However, independent agencies were increasingly “vested
with duties of administration and policy determination with respect to
which they ought to be clearly and effectively responsible to the Presi-
dent.”560  Therefore, the Report concluded, the government should
return to the department-based organization of 1789 by incorporating
all of the various independent agencies into an executive
department.561
to his authority and which are, therefore, both actual and potential obstruc-
tions to his effective over-all management of national administration.
Id. at 40.
558 Id. at 40; see also id. at 32, 53 (referring to independent agencies as a “headless
‘fourth branch’ of government”).  The Report continued:
The multiplication of these [independent regulatory] agencies cannot fail to
obstruct the effective over-all management of the Executive Branch of the
Government . . . . Every bit of executive and administrative authority which
[independent regulatory agencies] enjoy means a relative weakening of the
President, in whom, according to the Constitution, “the executive Power
shall be vested.”  As they grow in number his stature is bound to diminish.
He will no longer in reality be the Executive, but only one of many executives,
threading his way around obstacles which he has no power to overcome.
Id. at 41.
559 Id. at 40.
560 Id.  The Report elaborated:
We speak of the “independent” regulatory commissions.  It would be more
accurate to call them the “irresponsible” regulatory commissions, for they
are areas of unaccountability. . . . Power without responsibility has no place
in a government based on the theory of democratic control, for responsibil-
ity is the people’s only weapon, their only insurance against abuse of power.
Id.
561 Id. at 31–42, 45–47; see also CORWIN, supra note 548, at 111–12 (noting the R
committee’s criticism of independent commissions and the committee’s reorganiza-
tion proposal); 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 276, at 1522–23 (outlining the Report’s reor- R
ganization plan, which proposed transferring administrative functions of commissions
to the executive department); KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at R
229, 237–42 (describing the development of the Brownlow Committee’s twelve de-
partment recommendation); WATKINS, supra note 543, at 556–57 (stating that the re- R
organization plan would bring each of the sixty-three executive agencies into one of
twelve cabinet-level departments); Corwin, supra note 515, at 96 (noting that the com- R
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Third, reiterating the concerns that led Wilson to veto the origi-
nal Budget and Accounting Act, the Report condemned the combina-
tion of legislative and executive functions in the Comptroller General.
The Committee acknowledged that “[t]o establish strict accountability
of the Executive Branch for the faithful execution of the laws enacted
by the Congress, there must be an independent audit of financial
transactions by an independent officer reporting directly to the Con-
gress who does not exercise any executive authority.”562  Separation of
powers principles nonetheless required a clear segregation of legisla-
tive and executive responsibilities:
The general theory underlying the Constitution is that the Congress
shall be responsible for the determination and approval of the fiscal
policies of the Nation and that the Executive shall be responsible
for their faithful execution. . . . The Congress, as representative of
the people, enacts the laws; the duty of executing them is placed by
the Constitution on the President.563
The Comptroller General, however, was “inconsistent with Execu-
tive responsibility and efficient administration” because many of the
Comptroller General’s duties, such as the mechanics of spending ap-
propriated money, the responsibility of making sure all expenditures
are made in compliance with the applicable laws, the settlement of
accounts, and the establishment of federal accounting systems, were
quintessentially executive duties that should be exercised by an officer
answerable to the President.564  When the Comptroller General exer-
mittee proposed to bring independent agencies “properly” within the discretion and
control of the President); Karl, supra note 539, at 184–85 (noting that the committee R
recommended that independent administrative commissions be abolished and reposi-
tioned in relevant departments); Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies
and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the
Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 698 (1989) (examining agency indepen-
dence issues).  Professor Karl has called the recommendation that the government
should return to the department-based organization of 1789 the most important rec-
ommendation of the Report. KARL, supra note 461, at 157. R
562 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 547, at 15.  As the Report further recognized: R
“[T]he trust residing in the Congress does not end with the enactment of appropria-
tion measures; its responsibility requires also that it possess suitable means with which
to hold the Executive accountable for the faithful and effective execution of revenue
and appropriation laws.” Id.
563 Id.  In support of this conclusion, the Report quoted President Wilson’s May
13, 1920, veto message objecting to a previous congressional attempt to control fed-
eral expenditures after enactment of the relevant appropriations act. Id. (citing Wil-
son, supra note 304).
564 Id. at 22 (“The settlement of accounts and the supervision of administrative
accounting systems are executive functions; under the Constitution they belong to the
Executive Branch of the Government.”).
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cises his executive authority to control expenditures, settle accounts
and claims, and prescribe administrative accounting systems outside
of presidential direction, “he is improperly removed from any execu-
tive direction and responsibility,” and the President was
“depriv[ed] . . . of [the] essential power needed to discharge his ma-
jor executive responsibility.”565  Therefore, “the vesting of such au-
thority in an officer independent of direct responsibility to the
President for his acts, is clearly in violation of the constitutional princi-
ple of the division of authority between the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government.”566  Only by returning the executive
functions exercised by the Comptroller General to the Treasury De-
partment could the federal government come back into line with the
unitary structure erected by the Framers.
Fourth, and finally for our purposes, to accomplish all of these
goals and to guard against the emergence of similar problems in the
future, the Report also suggested that the President have continuing
responsibility for reorganization.567
565 Id.  The Brownlow Committee also maintained that the Comptroller General’s
pre-audit power violated the Take Care Clause as well:
The removal from the Executive of the final authority to determine the
uses of appropriations, conditions of employment, the letting of contracts,
and the control over administrative decisions, as well as the prescribing of
accounting procedures and the vesting of such authority in an officer inde-
pendent of direct responsibility to the President for his acts . . . is contrary to
article II, section 3, of the Constitution, which provides that the President
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Id.
566 Id. (citing Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202–03 (1928)).  It also
avoided the practical problem of permitting a public officer to audit his own ac-
counts, financial acts, and decisions, a situation inconsistent with sound management
and accounting principles. Id. See generally FISHER, supra note 326, at 121 (noting that R
the Brownlow Report criticized the powers of the General Accounting Office in part
because it audited accounts, a legislative function, and approved payments and ad-
justed accounts, an executive function); KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note
314, at 234–35 (describing the Brownlow Report’s recommendation to return budget R
control to the Treasury Department but giving Congress auditing power); Karl, Presi-
dential Power, supra note 314, at 184 (describing President Roosevelt’s concern over R
arrogation of the executive power to the Comptroller General).  The Comptroller
General must have sensed the threat that the Brownlow Committee posed to his posi-
tion.  He initially refused to acknowledge its existence and delayed disbursing funds
for several weeks. See KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at 164–65. R
567 The Report also recommended that the White House staff be enlarged, that
the civil service be expanded to cover more federal employees, and that a National
Resources Planning Board and Departments of Social Welfare and Public Works be
created. BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 547, at 5–6, 9–12, 27–30, 32–36; see also 3 R
GOLDSMITH, supra note 276, at 1521 (discussing the Brownlow Committee’s proposal R
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Roosevelt warmly endorsed the Report and its historic espousal of
the unitariness of the executive branch in his message transmitting it
to Congress on January 12, 1937, calling it “a great document of per-
manent importance.”568  Referring to himself “as one on whom . . .
the constitutional responsibility for the whole of the Executive Branch
of the Government has lain,”569 Roosevelt called on Congress to re-
turn to the structure of “the Executive Branch as it is established
under the Constitution.”570
In particular, Roosevelt agreed with the Committee’s view that
the independent agencies had become a “‘fourth branch’ of the gov-
ernment for which there is no sanction in the Constitution”571 and
which had begun to “defeat the Constitutional intent that there be a
single responsible Chief Executive to coordinate and manage the de-
partments and activities in accordance with the laws enacted by Con-
gress.”572  Therefore, Roosevelt specifically embraced the Report’s
to expand and make permanent the role of the National Resources Planning Board);
KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at 228–44 (describing the Brown- R
low Report’s design for establishing managerial controls); WATKINS, supra note 543, at R
556–57 (noting the Brownlow Report’s proposal to make the National Resources
Planning Board permanent).
568 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Recommendation for Legislation to Reorganize the
Executive Branch of the Government (Jan. 12, 1937), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra
note 478, at 668, 670. R
569 Id. at 668.  His reliance on the Article II Vesting Clause became more explicit
later in his message:
[T]he Presidency was established as a single, strong Chief Executive office in
which was vested the entire executive power of the National Govern-
ment. . . .  What I am placing before you is the request not for more power,
but for the tools of management and the authority to distribute the work so
that the President can effectively discharge those powers which the Constitu-
tion now places upon him.  Unless we are prepared to abandon this impor-
tant part of the Constitution, we must equip the President with authority
commensurate with his responsibilities under the Constitution.
Id. at 672–73; see also Karl, supra note 539, at 185 (noting that Roosevelt, in his De- R
cember 22, 1936, press conference, maintained that the President was the only consti-
tutional executive and that independent agencies might represent an
unconstitutional usurpation of executive authority).
570 Roosevelt, supra note 568, at 669. R
571 Id. at 671; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Summary of the Report of the Com-
mittee on Administrative Management Transmitted with the Preceding Message (Jan.
12, 1937), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 674, 678–79 (quoting the R
Report’s conclusion that independent commissions threaten to become “a headless
fourth branch of the Government, not contemplated by the Constitution, and not
responsible administratively either to the President, to the Congress, or to the
Courts”).
572 Roosevelt, supra note 568, at 670. R
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recommendation that the independent agencies be consolidated into
the executive departments.573
Roosevelt also adopted the Report’s condemnation of the office
of the Comptroller General as an “unconstitutional assumption of Ex-
ecutive power.”574  As Roosevelt observed: “The Presidency was estab-
lished as a single, strong Chief Executive office in which was vested the
entire Executive power of the national Government, even as the legis-
lative power was placed in the Congress and the judicial in the Su-
preme Court and inferior courts.”575  Permitting an officer who was
primarily accountable to Congress to exercise part of that power was
inconsistent with the Constitution.576
If Congress were to centralize the executive power in the Presi-
dent, Congress would not be giving the President an undue amount of
power: it would do nothing more than “go[ ] back to the Constitu-
tion” and return to what the Framers intended.577  As Roosevelt
observed:
In spite of timid souls in 1787 who feared effective government the
Presidency was established as a strong single Chief Executive office
. . . . What I am placing before you is the request not for more
power, but for the tools of management and the authority to dis-
tribute the work so that the President can effectively discharge those
powers which the Constitution now places upon him.578
Therefore, Roosevelt called upon Congress to give its immediate
and expeditious consideration to the Brownlow Report and even
called a special session of Congress during the usual recess period be-
tween November 1937 and January 1938 so that the reorganization
bill and other key pieces of legislation could receive more rapid
consideration.579
573 Id. at 670–72; see also Roosevelt, supra note 571, at 675–76 (noting that R
Roosevelt supported the comprehensive “Five-Point Program” to modernize the
White House business and management organization).
574 Roosevelt, supra note 568, at 671 (quoting BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 547, R
at 52); see also Roosevelt, supra note 571, at 680 (criticizing the Comptroller General R
for his “unconstitutional usurpation of power”).
575 Roosevelt, supra note 568, at 673. R
576 Id. at 671–73.
577 Id. at 674.
578 Id. at 673.
579 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing Legislation to be Recom-
mended to the Extraordinary Session of the Congress (Oct. 12, 1937), in 6 PUB. PA-
PERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 429, 434. See generally DAVIS, supra note 539, at 35 R
(detailing the delivery of the committee report to Congress); 3 GOLDSMITH, supra
note 276, at 1499–500 (describing President Roosevelt’s call for Congress to support R
the Brownlow Report’s recommendations); Hawley, supra note 539, at 77, 87–88 (dis- R
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At first the reorganization bill faced little opposition.  The House
acted first, passing bills providing for the additional White House staff
and restoring the President’s reorganization authority by wide mar-
gins.580  As Roosevelt requested, the House bill did not include a legis-
lative veto provision, requiring only that the reorganization orders lay
before Congress for sixty days.581  The House bill failed to accommo-
date the President’s request that all agencies be subject to the reor-
ganization authority, exempting the independent agencies as well as
four other agencies.582  McJimsey notes that “[c]onservatives disliked
the proposal to do away with the office of comptroller general, which,
in the hands of a Republican appointee, had held up various New
Deal projects.”583
The debate began to heat up when the Senate considered all of
the Brownlow Committee’s recommendations as one bill.584  Coming
cussing reforms during the period, including the reorganization bill, court reform,
party reform, and regional planning associations); Karl, supra note 539, at 185 (not- R
ing Roosevelt’s complete commitment to the Brownlow Report); Rohr, supra note
548, at 94–95 (discussing Roosevelt’s submission of the Report to Congress and his R
strong endorsement of the Report).
580 For the bill providing for six additional presidential assistants, see H.R. 7730,
75th Cong. (1937), and 81 CONG. REC. 7701–02 (1937) (passing the bill 260 to 88).
See also H.R. REP. NO. 75-1177 (1937) (stating that the purpose of the H.R. 1177 was
to “authorize the Chief Executive to appoint six administrative assistants to assist him
in the administrative work of his office”).  For the bill restoring the President’s reor-
ganization authority, see H.R. 8202, 75th Cong. (1937) and 81 CONG. REC. 8874–76
(1937). See also H.R. REP. NO. 75-1487 (1937) (stating that the purpose of H.R. 8202
was to authorize the President to “regroup, consolidate, transfer, or abolish agencies
and functions” according to policies and limitations of the Act).  Two other related
bills, H.R. 8276, 75th Cong. (1937) (making the Comptroller General subject to presi-
dential supervision while transferring his audit functions to a newly established Audi-
tor General), and H.R. 8277, 75th Cong. (1937) (broadening the civil service and
replacing the Civil Service Commission with a Civil Service Administrator), were re-
ported out of Committee, H.R. REP. NO. 75-1587 (1937) (accompanying H.R. 8277);
H.R. REP. NO. 75-1606 (1937) (accompanying H.R. 8276), but were never debated or
brought to a vote on the House floor.  However, their terms were incorporated when
the House debated the Senate’s version of the bill.
581 See MORGAN, supra note 314, at 189.  A floor amendment to add a legislative R
veto was defeated 63 to 104.  81 CONG. REC. 8869 (1937).
582 H.R. 8202, 75th Cong. (1937).  The House rejected floor amendments to add
exemptions for three additional agencies.  81 CONG. REC. 8666–67 (1937) (Rural
Electrification Administration); id. at 8867–68 (Forest Service) (voting 34 to 130); id.
at 8868–69 (Civil Service Commission). See generally KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZA-
TION, supra note 314, at 248 (describing the initial lack of opposition in the House); R
MORGAN, supra note 314, at 184–89 (detailing the floor debates). R
583 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 182. R
584 S. 2970, 75th Cong. (1937).  This bill was later superseded by S. 3331, 75th
Cong. (1938).
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out of committee, the Senate version, like the House version, ex-
empted the independent agencies from the President’s reorganiza-
tion authority and made no provision for a legislative veto.585
Senators from various states banded together in an attempt to shield
their pet programs from the President’s reorganization power, but
their efforts were unsuccessful.586  The Senate also rejected a floor
amendment to reinstate the legislative veto587 before finally passing its
version on March 28, 1938, by a vote of forty-nine to forty-two.588
However, a procedural blunder prevented the floor manager from
substituting the House bill so that it could go to conference.589  The
585 S. REP. NO. 75-1236, at 8–9 (1937).
586 The closest call came when the Senate voted forty-one to forty-one and thirty-
eight to thirty-eight to reject Senator Bennett Champ Clark’s amendments to exempt
the Veterans Administration and then tabled the motion to reconsider by the bare
margin of thirty-eight to thirty-six.  83 CONG. REC. 3823–27 (1938).  The Senate also
voted thirty-three to fifty to reject Senator Key Pittman’s proposed exemption of the
Forest Service, id. at 3818, and voted twenty-one to forty-two to reject Senator Clark’s
amendment to exempt the Bureau of Biological Survey, id. at 3844.  After the failure
of these amendments, Senator Clark and his supporters recognized there was little
chance of attaching any additional exemptions to the bill, and he allowed his amend-
ments to exempt the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, National
Mediation Board, Railroad Retirement Board, Bureau of Animal Industry, National
Park Service, United States Tariff Commission, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of
Public Roads, Bureau of Investigation, Soil Conservation Service, Tennessee Valley
Authority, Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics to
be rejected by voice votes with virtually no debate. Id. at 3844–46.
587 Id. at 3645 (voting thirty-nine to forty-three).
588 Id. at 4204; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 192.  The closeness of the vote was R
surprising.  Despite frenzied efforts by the Administration to ensure its passage, a
number of President Roosevelt’s staunchest supporters voted against the bill. See also
JAMES M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 344–46 (1956) (describing the
attempts of the administration to ensure passage and the opposition to the bill); DA-
VIS, supra note 539, at 213–14 (noting “a good many people who were generally sup- R
portive of the administration” opposed the measure); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, R
at 279 (“108 Democrats bolted the President.  One of the greatest defections in his-
tory, it marked the worst rebuff Roosevelt was ever to suffer in the House.”).
589 The unanimous consent decree which closed debate provided that no further
amendments would be allowed after three o’clock on March 28, 1938, and that after
voting on the pending amendments, “the Senate shall proceed to vote upon the bill
(S. 3331) without further debate.”  83 CONG. REC. 4204 (1938).  As Professor Karl
noted: “Someone pulled [Senator Byrnes’s] coattail to ask a question in the midst of
debate and by the time his attention could be returned to the discussion, it was too
late.” KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at 248–49.  Although Sena- R
tor Byrnes tried to call up the House bill in order to substitute the language of the
Senate bill immediately after the vote, he knew he lacked the votes needed to close
debate.  With his political capital already drained, Senator Byrnes withdrew his mo-
tion after receiving assurances that the Senate bill would receive expedited considera-
tion in the House.  83 CONG. REC. 4205–07 (1938).
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reorganization bill would have to pass the House a second time before
if it were to have any chance of becoming law.
The closeness of the Senate vote revealed how much the political
climate had changed since the House vote in 1937.  Even though the
economy had taken a downturn in the middle of 1937, the sense of
emergency which prevailed in 1933 when Roosevelt was first granted
the reorganization power was missing.590  The failure of several of the
President’s key legislative proposals, such as the Fair Labor Standards
Act, revealed deep divisions in the Democratic party.591  But most im-
portantly, the fight over the court packing plan wasted valuable politi-
cal resources and badly damaged FDR’s prestige.592  In short,
Roosevelt had lost control of Congress.593  Public interest in the reor-
ganization bill was also running sky high, fanned by the efforts of Fa-
ther Charles Coughlin and Frank Gannett’s Committee to Uphold
Constitutional Government.594  The rise of dictatorships in Europe
had made the public wary about granting broad powers to the Presi-
dent.595  McJimsey notes that “[a]s with the Supreme Court reorgani-
zation plan, executive reorganization seemed to threaten the
institutional balance within the government.  This was just the kind of
590 BURNS, supra note 588, at 344; DAVIS, supra note 539, at 36; KARL, supra note R
461, at 157–58; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 185; Hawley, supra note 539, at 88; Karl, R
Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 4. R
591 BURNS, supra note 588, at 311; DAVIS, supra note 539, at 102–04; KARL, supra R
note 461, at 132–33.  Professor Davis also cited the failure of the farm bill and the R
proposal for seven regional planning authorities.  Davis, supra note 539, at 102–03. R
592 Many commentators have argued that it was merely bad fortune that the reor-
ganization plan came up for a vote so soon after the failure of the court packing plan
and that under different circumstances the plan would have passed easily. See, e.g.,
DAVIS, supra note 539, at 100; KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at R
248–49; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, at 277; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 184–85; R
Rohr, supra note 548, at 95.  Other commentators have suggested that it was no acci- R
dent that executive reorganization and the court packing plan arose at the same time,
arguing that both were, along with the National Resources Planning Board proposal
and Roosevelt’s unsuccessful attempt to influence congressional primaries, parts of a
larger plan to concentrate power in the President.  Hawley, supra note 539, at 87–88; R
Karl, supra note 539, at 186, 192.  This Article need not resolve the question, because R
scholars on both sides of the question agree that the court packing fight all but
doomed the reorganization proposal.
593 BURNS, supra note 588, at 346; DAVIS, supra note 539, at 104. R
594 DAVIS, supra note 539, at 213; KARL, supra note 461, at 146; LEUCHTENBURG, R
supra note 539, at 279; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 192. R
595 BURNS, supra note 588, at 344–45; KARL, supra note 461, at 158; R
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, at 278; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 184–85, 192; Karl, R
Presidential Power, supra note 314, at 4.  Even if the concern about dictatorship was R
groundless and based on irrational fear, the public’s belief in it undeniably undercut
the reorganization bill. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, at 278–79. R
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issue that could break down barriers between ‘liberals’ and ‘conserva-
tives.’”596  Finally, the reorganization bill’s opponents were also aided
by large numbers of agency bureaucrats who feared that reorganiza-
tion might cost them their power bases or even their jobs.597
To make matters worse, the two gambits Roosevelt used to try to
turn the tide backfired badly.  First, Roosevelt offered that the reor-
ganization bill’s close victory in the Senate “proves that the Senate
cannot be purchased by organized telegrams based on direct misrep-
resentations.”598  The comment impugned the integrity and sincerity
of both the Senators who voted against the reorganization bill and the
citizens who had made their sentiments known to their
representatives.599
Second, the President called a press conference at two o’clock in
the morning to release a copy of a letter to an anonymous friend dis-
avowing any intention of becoming a dictator.  The letter emphasized:
A: I have no inclination to be a dictator.
B: I have none of the qualifications which would make me a suc-
cessful dictator.
C: I have too much historical background and too much knowl-
edge of existing dictatorships to make me desire any form of dicta-
torship for a democracy like the United States of America.600
Roosevelt also took the opportunity to criticize the legislative
veto.  Although he acknowledged that he would accede to Congress’s
wishes “in the overwhelming majority of cases,” he still felt that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional.601  Reorganization orders had
the force of law and as such must be repealed by conventional legisla-
tion, passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.
Concurrent resolutions, which do not require the President’s signa-
ture, were “merely an expression of congressional sentiment and
596 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 183. R
597 DAVIS, supra note 539, at 24; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, at 278. R
598 See 83 CONG. REC. 4505 (1938) (statement of Rep. Hoffman); see also MORGAN,
supra note 314, at 192 (noting Roosevelt’s press release questioning the integrity of R
Senators voting against the bill).
599 See TED MORGAN, FDR 493 (1985).
600 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Refutes Dictatorship Charges Connected
with the Pending Reorganization Bill (Mar. 29, 1938), in 7 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra
note 478, at 179, 179; BURNS, supra note 588, at 345–46; DAVIS, supra note 539, at R
220–21.
601 Roosevelt, supra note 600, at 181. R
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could not  ‘repeal executive action taken in pursuance of a law.’”602
Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s reassurances did little to quiet the fears of
the people and Congress.603
These factors made the second House debate on the Senate bill
one of the hottest debates in years.604  Representative John O’Connor,
Chairman of the House Rules Committee and a staunch opponent of
the bill, blocked all attempts to pass a rule to govern the debate,605
and the House leadership’s attempt to close debate on the bill
failed.606  Roosevelt began scrambling to avoid defeat, dropping his
opposition to the legislative veto and offering exemptions to the pet
agencies of key constituencies.607  Despite the Roosevelt Administra-
tion’s best efforts, however, the House voted 204 to 196 to recommit
the bill to committee, effectively killing it until the following year.608
Bowing to the inevitable, Roosevelt sent a message to the House lead-
ers thanking them for “the fine fight.”609
The following year, after the furor had died down, Roosevelt sub-
mitted a watered-down version of the reorganization bill.  The Reor-
ganization Act of 1939 provided for the additional White House staff
recommended by the Brownlow Committee, but conceded the most
contentious issues of the year before, exempting a laundry list of agen-
cies from reorganization,610 dropping the provision abolishing the
Comptroller General, and reinstating the two-house legislative veto.611
602 Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 143 (quoting R
Roosevelt’s assurances and noting that the House still was not satisfied); MORGAN,
supra note 314, at 192–93 (discussing the use of concurrent resolutions). R
603 BURNS, supra note 588, at 346; DAVIS, supra note 539, at 221. R
604 MORGAN, supra note 599, at 493. R
605 BURNS, supra note 588, at 345; DAVIS, supra note 539, at 214. R
606 83 CONG. REC. 4616 (1938) (voting 149 to 191).
607 BURNS, supra note 588, at 345; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note R
276, at 143; FISHER, supra note 326, at 93; MORGAN, supra note 314, at 192–93. R
608 83 CONG. REC. 5123–24 (1938); see also FISHER, supra note 326, at 131–32 R
(describing Roosevelt’s attempts to win over the adamantly opposed House of Repre-
sentatives); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 539, at 279 (stating that the 204 to 196 vote R
was the worst defeat Roosevelt ever suffered in the House); MORGAN, supra note 314, R
at 193 (noting that the House’s rejection of the bill was in accord with the public’s
opinion).
609 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message on the Defeat of the Reorganization Bill
(Apr. 9, 1938), in 7 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 478, at 206. R
610 Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 3(b), 53 Stat. 561, 561.  Although exempt
from reorganization, the independent agencies were brought within the President’s
budgetary control. Id. § 201, 53 Stat. at 565.
611 Id. § 5, 53 Stat. at 561–62; see also DAVIS, supra note 539, at 419–20 (noting that R
the revised bill was stripped of the most controversial proposals, including the crea-
tion of a new department of public works, replacement of the Civil Service Commis-
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Even with these changes, the administration needed to put forth ex-
traordinary efforts to get it passed.612
Roosevelt completed the administrative reform process in Sep-
tember 1939, by issuing an executive order forming the Executive Of-
fice of the President, which was divided into six departments,
including the Bureau of the Budget brought over from the Treasury
Department.613  The creation of the Executive Office of the President
was an important legacy of the Roosevelt Administration and one
which would greatly enhance presidential control over the by-now
sprawling executive branch.
The fact that the Brownlow Committee’s proposal ended in com-
promise does nothing to change the implications of this debate for
the existence of a constitutional custom regarding the unitary execu-
tive.  Even though Roosevelt eventually yielded on each of the major
issues, he did begin by vigorously asserting the President’s right to
control all executive functions of the federal government and saw his
views accepted to some extent by both the House and the Senate.
Under the principles of coordinate construction, the mere fact that
Roosevelt in the end bowed to political realities does not dissipate the
force of his initial opposition.  Particularly when viewed along with
Roosevelt’s other efforts to defend the unitariness of the executive
branch, Roosevelt’s abandonment the Brownlow Committee’s initial
recommendations does not represent the type of acquiescence
needed to give rise to an established practice permitting congressio-
nally-imposed restrictions on the President’s power to execute the
laws.
sion, the expansion of the civil service to include all federal jobs not determining
policy, and the abolition of the offices of the Comptroller General and General Ac-
counting); FISHER, supra note 326, at 132, 164 (listing the changes to which Roosevelt R
acquiesced to get the Reorganization Act of 1939 approved by Congress); KARL, EXEC-
UTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 314, at 257 (illustrating the continued role of the R
Comptroller General in legislative oversight); Karl, Presidential Power, supra note 314, R
at 4–5 (describing congressional resistance to President Roosevelt’s request for ex-
panded reorganization authority).
612 The Senate added a crippling amendment by a vote of forty-six to forty-three
before presidential promises to Senator Dennis Chavez and an all-night flight through
a snowstorm by Senator Harry S Truman permitted it to be rejected forty-four to forty-
six on reconsideration. See DAVIS, supra note 539, at 420–21; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL R
CONFLICTS, supra note 276, at 144; FISHER, supra note 326, at 132; MORGAN, supra note R
314, at 194–96; WATKINS, supra note 543, at 587. R
613 MCJIMSEY, supra note 453, at 183. R
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CONCLUSION
Our systematic examination of the practices with respect to the
unitary executive during the third half-century of our Republic thus
leads to a conclusion that is quite at odds with the conventional wis-
dom.  Far from supporting an established practice sufficient to fore-
close arguments in favor of the unitary executive as matter of history,
as some scholars have suggested,614 the record shows that Presidents
throughout this period consistently asserted and defended the Presi-
dent’s sole authority to execute the law.  To the extent that the histori-
cal evidence supports the existence of an established practice in either
direction, it would tend to favor those supporting, rather than those
opposing, the unitariness of the executive branch.
The briefest review of the major events between 1889 and 1945
bearing on the unitary executive confirms this conclusion.  As noted
earlier, one of the signature developments of this period is the in-
creasing reliance on the so-called independent agencies, such as the
ICC, FTC, and the Federal Reserve Board.  Robert Cushman’s classic
study of the independent regulatory commissions demonstrated how
each of the Presidents during this period exerted their authority over
those agencies to ensure that they executed the law in accordance
with administration policy.615  Our own review of the historical record
confirms Cushman’s conclusion.  Backed by the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in McAllister, Parsons, Shurtleff, and especially Myers, every Presi-
dent during this era treated these agencies in the same manner as
purely executive agencies, directing their operations and removing
commissioners who disagreed with the President’s vision for the en-
forcement of the law.  It was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Humphrey’s Executor that there was even a colorable claim that these
commissions were in any way independent of the President.  And even
after Humphrey’s Executor, FDR continued to assert his authority over
the independent agencies and to remove members as he saw fit.
Roosevelt further attempted to resolve the issue by pushing through
the recommendations of the Brownlow Committee that the indepen-
dent agencies should be integrated into the executive departments,
only to see that effort derailed by the change in political winds caused
by the failure of FDR’s court packing plan.
Another development of this period that is often cited as preclud-
ing arguments in favor of the unitary executive is the advent of the
civil service system.  As we have shown, the history of civil service re-
form during this period is completely consistent with the unitary exec-
614 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. R
615 CUSHMAN, supra note 194, at 680–82, 685. R
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utive.  Until 1897, the civil service laws did not even purport to place
any substantive restrictions on the President’s removal power aside
from prohibiting removals for refusing to contribute to political cam-
paigns.  Although subsequent executive orders and statutes provide
that members of the classified service could only be removed for “just
cause,” this requirement was consistently construed by the Presidents,
the Civil Service Commission, and the courts as simply reflecting the
statutory requirement mentioned above and not as creating any sub-
stantive limits on the removal power.  Although such limits would
eventually arise, they would not appear until after this period had run
its course.
In addition, it was during the years between 1889 and 1945 that
Congress attempted to expand the use of the legislative veto as a
means for controlling the execution of the law.  As the Court explicitly
recognized in INS v. Chadha,616 Presidents during this period opposed
the legislative veto with enough consistency to foreclose any sugges-
tion that they acquiesced to this particular derogation of the unitary
executive.617  The institution of the special prosecutor made an occa-
sional appearance.  In each instance, however, the special prosecutors
were subject to presidential direction and removal.
Throughout this period, Presidents also asserted their authority
in other myriad ways to ensure that federal officials executed the law
in accordance with their wishes.  They freely exercised the removal
power and opposed efforts to lodge executive functions in officials
answerable only to Congress.  They widely supported executive reor-
ganization and created the Bureau of the Budget and the Executive
Office of the President to centralize control of federal spending.
There can be little doubt that all of the Presidents from Benjamin
Harrison to Franklin Roosevelt were committed defenders of the the-
ory of the unitary executive.  Thus, contrary to what some have as-
serted, the historical record does not serve as a trump that obviates
consideration of the broader range of constitutional arguments re-
garding the President’s authority to execute the law.
Perhaps most importantly, the period between 1889 and 1945 saw
a tremendous growth in presidential power, as strong Presidents like
the two Roosevelts and Wilson (and to a lesser extent Cleveland and
McKinley) helped remake the institution of the presidency into the
primary institution for mobilizing and implementing political will.
Their administrations set the stage for the imperial presidency that
would dominate modern times.
616 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
617 Id. at 942 n.13.
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